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The aim of this thesis was to establish whether South African companies 
implementing Quick Response in an apparel textile pipeline moved towards flexible 
specialisation and post-Fordism or a neo-Fordist method of production. I also 
determined whether these companies implemented Quick Response according to 
the theory or to suit their environment. 
Manufacturing 
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Fordism or mass production became the most important manufacturing system in the 
early 20th century. When it was in crisis a new era, post-Fordism, was born. The 
change in manufacturing in post-Fordism was labelled flexible specialisation. It 
utilises new technology and flexible ways of organising work to help companies 
become more competitive. However, some people believed the new era was not 
new, but rather a modification of Fordism. They called this modified system neo-
Fordism, consisting of both Fordist and post-Fordist features. 
The clothing and textile industries 
South Africa's textile and clothing industries are faced with increased competition 
due to the country's re-entry into the world economy and the subsequent drop in 
tariffs. One way for textile and clothing companies to compete is by developing a 
Quick Response approach - a type of flexible specialisation. It could help these 
companies fight cheaper imports as it cuts lead times and allows companies to use 
their local proximity to deliver the right products at the right time. 
Methodology 
Using qualitative research methods I attempted to describe Quick Response in this 
pipeline by finding out what it is, what its features are, how it is implemented and 
what its effects are. I combined descriptive and explanatory elements in my study. I 
used semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to interview workers, 
middle and upper management of the companies in the pipeline. I also used non-
participant observation by attending meetings these companies held. 
7 
Quick Response or not? 
The system that this pipeline implemented has some of the main trademarks of 
Quick Response. The companies improved their relationships, shared some 
information, cut the lead times, and relied on sales figures to determine production. 
All of this resulted in an increase in sales, Quick Response's ultimate goal. However, 
this system lacked many features of Quick Response such as worker involvement, 
full information sharing, Pareto improving measures to ensure no company is worse 
off than before, and cutting lead times constantly. 
Despite this I still believe this system could be classified as Quick Response as it 
was mainly about cutting lead times and this pipeline did that in a small way. 
Post- or neo-Fordism? 
Although these companies introduced elements of Quick Response, Fordist 
production features were still evident. These include manufacturing with long runs, 
just-in-case or safety stock, power differentials, mistrust, managerial prerogative, and 
large wage gaps. 
It is clear that Quick Response as described in the theory is a type of flexible 
specialisation, which is the change in manufacturing in the post-Fordist era. 
However, the version used in this pipeline contained many elements of Fordist 
production combined with post-Fordist methods. So the conclusion is that the 
companies who implemented Quick Response moved towards a neo-Fordist method 
of production. Only when they import Quick Response as an integrated package 
might their methods be described as post-Fordist. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
'Twenty years ago everything seemed so clear-cut ... The international division of 
labour divided the industrialised nations from the rest of the world. [They] exported 
manufactured goods; the under-developed countries exported mineral or agricultural 
raw materials, or migrant labour. .. Jt was all a matter of stages of economic growth; 
the underdeveloped countries were simply "behind" the industrialised countries. It 
would not be Jong before they reached the industrial age ... with integration into the 
world market speeding up the process' (Alain Lipietz, 1987: 1-2). 
Lipietz's quote sows the seeds for many questions: Has manufacturing changed in 
the last twenty years? Is South Africa catching up with the industrialised countries? 
Is it being threatened by increased competition? What about its clothing and textile 
industries? Are these industries adopting measures enabling it to compete? 
1.1 Changing manufacturing production systems 
What is manufacturing production systems' recent history? Bessant (1991 :35) says 
that Fordism became the most important and pervasive manufacturing production 
system in the early twentieth century because of its impact on productivity. 1 When 
there was a demand for huge numbers of new products the efficient mass production 
system established by Henry Ford had the capability to supply what was needed. 
However, the Fordist system was in crisis in the mid-1970s. The reasons for this 
were the saturation of mass markets, the emergence of rigidities in the labour 
process (e.g. the wage explosion) and the growth of certain developing countries. 
The latter resulted in more competitive players in the world arena. With the age of 
mass production in a crisis a new regime of accumulation emerged in the mid-1970s. 
For Amin ( 1994: 1) this change occurred in the heart of modern industrialised 
economies and societies. Technological, social, institutional and market forces 
1 Not everyone accepts Fordism as the dominant method of production at the time. Wood (1989:29) 
criticises theorists for their continual use of Fordism as a 'benchmark of the pasf. 
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caused a break in capitalism's development, which resulted in a drastically different 
structure compared to the period after World War II. Many theorists agree with this 
observation, describing this phase of capitalist development since the mid-1970s 
with new labels. Piere and Sabel (1984) call it the 'second industrial divide', while 
Bessant (1991 :8) refers to it as the 'fifth wave'. For many it is the post-Fordist age, 
where a clean break has been made with Fordism. 
However, not everyone agrees with the assessment of a break with Fordism. This 
so-called break is sometimes viewed·rather as ·a-modification or refinement.·Aglietta- · 
(1976) and Hyman and Streeck (1988) dispute the existence of a post-Fordist age. 
The term neo-Fordist, which does not imply a total break with the mass production 
system, is more acceptable to these critics. It incorporates features of both Fordism 
and post-Fordism. 
Allen (1992:184), describing the debate over the end of Fordism, regards the 
questions to be what kind of manufacturing an~ product demand has replaced mass 
production and mass demand. 
1.2 Flexibility 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 :22-23) identify three main theories, which address the 
changes in manufacturing, technology and business: regulation theory, flexible 
specialisation and other variants of post-Fordism. The most prominent of these is 
flexible specialisation. Piere and Sabel's 'The Second Industrial Divide' (1984) 
introduced the term 'flexible specialisation'. Its main argument was that methods of 
production are changing, substituting Taylorist and Fordist trends with new forms of 
organising work. These 'new forms' are coupled with technology and a changed 
international capitalism. Yet, Bezuidenhout (1997) argues that often in South Africa 
these changes are not new methods of production, only new methods of control in 
the capitalist labour process. 
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Allen (1992:170) continues in Piore and Sabel's footsteps by stating that the 'new' 
economy is organised around flexible forms of production, concerning the 
technologies used and the kind of work expected. The aim of flexible production is to 
be able to supply the greater diversity that consumers now want. It is a way to be 
able to address fragmented market tastes. Contrary to the era of mass production, 
the role of the Jones' has changed. The idea is not to just keep up anymore, but to 
be totally different. 
Why does manufacturing need to be flexible? A flexible manufacturing system will 
provide organisations with closer links between their production capabilities and the 
changing markets. Previously organisations were production-dominated, where the 
need for long production runs dictated what was most profitable to sell. Flexible 
manufacturing has changed this by fitting products exactly to the changing market 
needs (Clutterbuck, 1985:xii). Flexibility also entails changing the relationships 
between organisations. 
Bessant (1991 :267) says that power-based relationships where a hierarchical 
dependence exists are becoming obsolete. In its place partnerships are established. 
These contain a sense of mutual development. Yet, with increased competition 
retailers are becoming more powerful. They can now demand better service, better 
quality products, better support and quicker delivery. Because retailers can now play 
a larger role in what and when manufacturers produce, the latter are using supply 
and distribution chain management more often. So instead of inventory being held 
'just in case' of problems, the move is to a 'quick response' by the manufacturer and 
the arrival of products 'just in time' to be sold (Bessant, 1991 :21 ). 
Flexibility in work organisation could possibly increase the levels of productivity, 
which could assist South Africa in becoming more competitive in international 
markets. If this can be achieved, economic growth could increase. One of the ways 
of achieving growth is through an export-oriented manufacturing sector (Maree, 
1991 :76-77). But in South Africa there is not any confidence in this sector. Millward 
(1995:39) points out that the South African stock market does not believe in the 
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future of local manufacturing: the price/earnings ratio of textile and motor 
manufacturers are around six or seven, while average price earnings in the retail and 
leisure sectors are twenty. Banks and the financial services sector have price 
earnings of thirty-five. Clearly the stock market expects South African manufacturing 
to disappear soon. Yet the labour intensity evident in the textile and clothing and 
motor industries makes the social implications of these industries going to ground 
unbearable to imagine (Millward, 1995:39). 
The 'Presidential Commission to Investigate Labour Market Policy' or Labour Market 
Commission (LMC) (1996) suggests that South African manufacturers become more 
flexible, especially in their work organisation. It is essential that this flexibility be 
combined with security. If business and government show a commitment to labour 
market security (protection against arbitrary loss of employment) workers are more 
likely to accept flexibility in work organisation. Unless flexibility, coupled with security, 
is bargained, it could result in short-term gains for one side, which could damage 
long-term relationships (LMC, 1996: 12). 
1.3 A new response for textile and clothing 
Whether Fordism was dominant or not, Bessant ( 1991 :36) argues that new 
responses are needed in current day manufacturing where competition is increasing 
and markets are changing. The responses should be in the form of changes in 
technology and organisation, while sustaining productivity growth. Some companies 
could respond by doing nothing, not believing that markets have changed. This could 
lead to disaster. Another response is that manufacturing has become obsolete and 
that only service industries will deliver economic growth in the future. The problem 
with this view is that the supposed shift to a post-industrial society where 
manufacturing becomes uncompetitive is disputed. Using the available technology, 
decisions can be made to implement a strategy that brings about a rebirth in 
manufacturing (Bessant, 1991 :36-37). 
The shift to post-industrialism is probably more relevant to the countries of the 
'north'. What remains true is that South Africa's manufacturing industry, more 
specifically the textile and clothing industries are faced with enormous hurdles. 
13 
Maree (1994:7) identifies the following stumbling blocks in the way of the textile and 
clothing industries: South Africa's re-entry into the world economy; the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) which stipulates that local tariff protection 
should be halved over a twelve year period; the history of conflict between these two 
industries over the levels of protection; and the clashes with the state over the levels 
and forms of protection granted them. The latter was resolved in June 1995 with the 
announcement of a Trade and Industry tariff proposal (Finance Week, 1995a). More 
\ 
challenges and possible solutions will be discussed in chapter two. 
According to the Bilateralism Review (1994:81) the following are problems evident in 
the South African textile and clothing industries: they are unable to source all inputs 
at world prices; since 1989/90 profitability has gone down; they cannot achieve a 
competitive cosUproductivity balance; technology and machinery have become 
outdated; wage rates are not competitive; and training is not a priority. Coupled with 
this is the fact that the apparel textile pipeline is one of the longest in the world. A 
United States study found that 85 percent of the time is spent in storage (Kurt 
Salmon Associates, date unknown). This adds to the cost of the product. If 
organisational efficiency can be increased, stock levels reduced and work-in-
progress time reduced those companies and sectors in the pipeline can survive and 
might even prosper. One way of achieving this is to develop a Quick Response 
approach (Industrial Strategy Project (ISP), 1994:71 ). 
Quick Response results in 'having the products the customer wants, in the right 
place, at the right time and at the right price' (Hunter, 1990: 1 ). It is an operational 
philosophy that employs procedures to maximise the profitability of the apparel 
textile pipeline. It has many elements and requirements. These will be discussed in 
chapter two. The most important feature of Quick Response is that it uses sales to 
final customers (at the retailer) to determine production activities and decisions. This 
is possible because of the linking of production and distribution companies in the 
pipeline (Schonberger, 1996:23). 
1.4 Aim and outline 
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Flexible specialisation or neo-Fordism? The aim of this thesis is to establish whether 
the South African companies implementing Quick Response in an apparel textile 
pipeline are moving towards flexible specialisation. Or are they actually in a neo-
Fordist method of production? 
To answer the research question, it is necessary to establish whether this pipeline is 
in actual fact implementing Quick Response as described in the theory, which" mostly 
originates from northern industrialised countries. Maybe local companies have 
adapted Quick Response to suit their environment. If they have, can Quick 
Response then still help them compete with cheaper imports and so ensure the 
sustainability of the local industries? 
In chapter two I will attempt to make sense of the theory and debates around 
flexibility. Concepts such as post-Fordism, neo-Fordism, flexibility and flexible 
specialisation are often used without a sound understanding of what each means. 
Some are employed interchangeably, while others are used as opposites. I will also 
discuss the applicability of these concepts for manufacturing. One of the reasons for 
these debates is the continued increase in competition. I will examine this and the 
impact of globalisation on manufacturing. This will be followed by a look at 
manufacturing in South Africa: the threats and opportunities it faces. 
Chapter three concerns the textile and clothing industries: the global picture and the 
local situation. Thereafter I will discuss solutions for these industries' many problems. 
One such solution is Quick Response. Can it assist the South African apparel textile 
pipeline as it did in the United States? I will analyse the different elements and 
possible benefits of Quick Response. 
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Chapter four presents the methodology that was used to evaluate the apparel textile 
pipeline and its implementation of Quick Response. The reasons for its use, as well 
as the strengths and weaknesses of the methods, will follow. When I set out studying 
Quick Response my first aim was to establish exactly what it is and how it works. 
Secondly, I tried to determine what the economic gains and benefits would be for 
each company. Thirdly, I attempted to establish what change there would be in work 
organisation, especially for the textile mill and the garment manufacturer. Fourthly, I 
tried to assess the changes and implications that the adoption of Quick Response 
would bring for workers and their relationships with the management. Fifthly, I used 
this project to make some recommendations on how to effectively run Quick 
Response in a company. Finally, I did an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats that resulted from this project. I will conclude the chapter 
with a discussion of the validity of my data and the ethics involved in the study. 
Chapter five contains a description of the data gathered and an analysis of it. In this 
chapter I will refer to the differences and similarities between the data and the 
theory. Chapter six, my conclusion, will try to establish whether the changes in 
production in this pipeline constitutes Quick Response as described in the theory or 
whether it is a South African version suited to local circumstances. I will also give my 
verdict on whether this project was a type of flexible specialisation (as Quick 
Response is described in the literature) or a different type of work organisation. 
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Chapter 2 Theory 
Quick Response is often referred to as a typ~ of flexible specialisation. Thus, before I 
enter into a discussion on Quick Response, it is essential to establish what flexible 
specialisation is. But before this egg there is another chicken: post-Fordism. Some 
authors use post-Fordism and flexible specialisation, as synonyms while others 
perceive there to be a different relationship between the two. In this chapter I will 
attempt to make sense of these two concepts, as well as related concepts such as 
Fordism, neo-Fordism and flexibility. 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 :22-23), discussing the relationship between post-Fordism and 
flexible specialisation, emphasise that there are very real differences between the 
two and yet there are wide-spread assumptions in political and academic debate that 
they are similar. They ( 1991: 1-2) say that confusion can be eliminated when 
manufacturing is analysed. Fordist organisation was prevalent from the 1940s until 
the 1970s when post-Fordist work organisation replaced it. Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 :2) 
identify three approaches to post-Fordist industrial change: flexible specialisation, 
regulation theory and other variants of post-Fordism. Although there is a superficial 
similarity between the theories, there are many fundamental differences. Hirst and 
Zeitlin (1991 :22) say that the three theories all address the question of changes in 
methods of manufacturing organisation, but each makes distinct claims about what 
and how much have changed. 
Ewert (1992:3) on the other hand describes the concept of post-Fordism, when 
employed in a productionist sense, as virtually identical to Hirst and Zeitlin's (1991) 
flexible specialisation. He (1992:2) explains this by pointing out that many writers' 
use Fordism as the benchmark for explaining post-Fordism. Fordism is a system of 
mass production and mass consumption where labour, business and the state are 
involved at macro level. This regime of accumulation experienced some problems in 
the early 1970s and post-Fordism was born. It refers to the move away from 
standardised mass production where economies of scale, a strong division of labour 
and dedicated machinery are used. In its place, flexible machinery and a flexible 
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multi-skilled work force produce smaller batch runs of specialised products for niche 
markets (Greig in Ewert, 1992:3). It is this definition of post-Fordism that is very 
close to Hirst and Zeitlin's (1991) flexible specialisation. 
For the sake of this thesis, post-Fordism is a change in the regime of accumulation 
from Fordism, whereas flexible specialisation is a change within a company or 
organisation within the post-Fordist era. Regime of accumulation refers to a set of 
regularities at macro level that enable (or not) the flow of the process of capital 
accumulation. These regularities include norms pertaining to the labour process; 
relationships between branches of the economy; rules of management; 'principles of 
income sharing between wages, profits and taxes'; norms of consumption and 
patterns of demand in the markets; and other aspects of the macro-economy (Amin, 
1994:9). 
Post-Fordism is a wide concept and includes other aspects of society, whereas 
flexible specialisation concerns changes in production on the floor and in other 
departments of a company or organisation. Flexible specialisation is one way of 
looking at the change in the regime of accumulation (what many writers describe as 
post-Fordism). 
2.1 Neo-Fordism or post-Fordism? 
In the preceding section some of the concepts that I will use in this thesis were 
defined. In this section and sections 2.2 and 2.3 I will analyse the concepts in much 
more detail. 
Wood (1989:25) says some writers use post-Fordism because they have detected a 
reskilling and fusing of vertical relations. This is in contrast to the deskilling and 
hierarchical relations where power was in the hands of the technocratic elite in 
Fordism or its variations. Rather it consists of teamwork, the merging of direct and 
indirect work, the development of supervisory powers to non-supervisory jobs and 
the disappearance of the distinction between production and white-collar work. This 
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is a clear departure from Fordism and Taylorism, with its separation of roles. 
Moreover, Wood (1989:26) observes that post-Fordism is used to describe more 
than changes in the labour process, but rather changes in the forms of regulation 
and accumulation. It is important to note that not all the new forms of production lead 
to post-Fordism and flexible specialisation. One such form is neo-Fordism, which is 
not just a transitional state after Fordism. Some firms might see it as a viable 
strategy (Wood, 1989:27). Smith (in Thompson, 1989:219) describes neo-Fordism 
as 'a new equilibrium between production and consumption in which there is 
continuity with mass production with respect to aspects of skill and control, but more 
flexible and decentralised methods for both workforce and technology to match 
differentiated and turbulent markets'. It thus constitutes an effort to move towards 
post-Fordism but elements of Fordist production are maintained. 
Neo-Fordism and post-Fordism differ in the way that new technology is utilised. In 
the former it is used to save labour and improve quality. The horizontal and vertical 
division of labour, found in Taylorism, might still bH prevalent. However, it is a fallacy 
to suppose that there is a clear distinction between the two concepts. The fact that 
neo-Fordism exists somewhere between Fordism and flexibility does not mean that 
by analysing the labour process and technology used one can necessarily identify a 
certain trend (Wood, 1989:27-28). 
As was mentioned, post- and neo-Fordism use Fordism as a benchmark. In order to 
grasp the former two concepts, it is necessary to discuss Fordism. The first two 
decades after World War II saw growth, economic prosperity and social stability in 
the western industrialised countries. Inflation was moderate and unemployment low. 
However, in the late 1960s the bubble burst. A general crisis had developed in the 
industrial system. Ewert (1992:3) identifies declining productivity growth, the 
divergence between wage growth and productivity decline, and the relocation of 
labour-intensive organisations to low-wage countries as contributing factors to the 
crisis. At micro level the problems were poor quality control and an inability to co-
ordinate assembly and delivery in a global market. Other factors that contributed to 
the crisis were social unrest, raw material shortages, rapid inflation, an increase in 
unemployment, the challenge from Japan and the Asian tigers (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and finally economic stagnation. This raised 
questions about the institutions that initially brought prosperity. Piore and Sabel 
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( 1984: 166) identify two reasons for this crisis: firstly there were external shocks to 
the macro economy and its institutions and secondly, the institutions of the time did 
not have the capacity to deal with the changes in production technology. The system 
that delivered this initial prosperity was Fordism. It reached its pinnacle in advanced 
capitalist societies after World War II. 
According to Rainnie (1991 :45) it is characterised by the semi-automatic assembly 
line which is based on four principles: standardised products, which meant that parts 
and tasks could also be standardised; mechanisation of similar tasks resulting in 
special machinery for each model; remaining tasks were subject to Taylorism or 
scientific management which fragmented all tasks and subjected them to time and 
motion principles; and the movement of products from worker to worker instead of 
vice versa. Bessant ( 1991 : 19) adds more features to this system which started in 
Henry Ford's car plants, but spread to other industries in the 1930s: standardisation 
of control over the labour process; uniform output rates, where the speed of the line 
determined all activity; payment and Incentive schemes based on productivity; the 
elimination of worker discretion and passing of control to specialists; a strict 
hierarchy with a heavy reliance on rules and procedures; and the training of 
operators to do specialised tasks, thus increasing the division of labour. 
Amin (1994:9) describes Fordism as the 'age of intensive accumulation with 
monopolistic regulation of the economy'. It has a distinctive type of labour process 
where semi-skilled workers operate assembly lines. It involves mass production, 
although not all workers are directly concerned with it. As a regime of accumulation, 
it moves in a circle where growth is based on mass production, increased 
productivity is based on economies of scale, increased wages linked to productivity, 
increased mass demand due to higher wages, increased profits based on full 
utilisation of capacity; and increased investment in improved mass production 
equipment and techniques (Jessop in Amin, 1994:9). Tomoney (1994:158) 
elaborates on Taylorism, which was often used with Fordism: it was based on the 
separation of conception and execution and extreme task fragmentation. This 
increased managerial control and brought management closer to the ultimate work 
simplification. This coupled with the specialised training of Fordism, made workers 
even more dispensable. 
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Mathews (1989:22) relates that mass production was poised to dominate as new 
mode of production, but it was still threatened by the skills and knowledge that craft 
workers had. Along came scientific management or T aylorism, the ideology that 
Fordism lacked. By taking away the skills of the craft worker Taylorism would gain 
control for management. This was done by dictating to each worker exactly how 
work was to be done. There are three principles to this system: dissociation of the 
labour process from the skills of the workers, hence management had a monopoly 
on all knowledge and skills; separation of conception from execution, i.e. taking all 
brainwork off the shop floor into the planning department; and then using the two 
principles to control each detail of the labour process through complete written 
instructions (Mathews 1989:23). 
But, as was discussed earlier, economic disorder resulted and questions were being 
asked of this industrial system. Piore and Sabel (1984:183) ascribe the disorder to a 
crisis of supply that later turned into a crisis of demand. The former was caused by 
labour shortages in the capitalist societies; food shortages brought about by poor 
Soviet harvests and the oil shortages in the 1970s. The consequence of those 
shortages was an inflationary spiral. As a result, a crisis of demand followed with 
slow growth, minimal rise in productivity and increased unemployment the 
consequences. Most importantly, mass markets for standardised products broke up. 
This lead to a decline in the rate of productivity increases and slower growth. The 
saturation of mass markets made it more difficult to increase economies of mass 
production in domestic markets. The alternative for industrialised countries was to 
export to other industrialised countries and the developing world (Piore and Sabel, 
1984: 183-184). But questions continued about this mode of production. It was 
realised that saturated markets needed another method of production. However, to 
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equate any change in work organisation to a move to post-Fordism or non-Taylorism 
would be foolish. Also, to talk about a universal change would be incorrect: it 
depended on country, industry and even company. The focus will now fall on post-
Fordism, after which neo-Fordism will be analysed. 
According to Allen (1992:190) post-Fordism means a movement beyond Fordism. It 
is a qualitative shift in the manner that production and consumption are organised. 
Flexible manufacturing systems are useful because they have the ability to switch 
from mass production to batch production - or economies of scale to economies of 
scope. Innovative work organisation aimed at improving product quality is introduced 
and so are new technologies, which may deskill, but will also enskill and reskill. 
Overall, post-Fordists are optimistic that there will be a multi-skilled labour force 
working in a less hierarchical organisation. In a post-Fordist environment changes 
will be made to product life and product innovation due to shorter, flexible runs and 
more products on offer; changes in stock-keeping, as just-in-time and Quick 
Response is implemented; and changes in design and marketing in response to 
greater specialisation. Consumption is also changing as companies now focus on 
niche markets, segmented markets and changes in consumer behaviour (Murray, 
1992; Esser and Hirsch, 1994:77-78). 
Jessop (1994:257) goes even further when trying to establish what post-Fordism is: 
'a minimum condition for referring to post-Fordism is to establish the nature of the 
continuity in discontinuity which justifies the claim that it is not just a variant form of 
Fordism but does actually succeed Fordism.' This means that if there is not a clear 
break it is not POST-Fordism, and if there is not enough continuity it is not post-
FORDISM. Jessop (1994:257) adds to the features above: the labour process is a 
flexible one, using flexible systems and a flexible workforce. This flexibility is used to 
overcome the alienation and the resistance of the worker in the Fordist factory; the 
stagnation of Taylorism and mass production; threats from lower cost competitors; 
saturation of mass markets for standardised goods; to increase productivity; and 
meet the demand for specialised products. Post-Fordism further addresses the limits 
of Fordism by being demand-driven rather than supply-driven ahd so is less 
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constrained by national demand conditions. It uses supply-side innovation such as 
Quick Response. In a post-Fordist environment competition does not only depend on 
price anymore, but on improved quality and performance, responsiveness to 
customers and, the biggest departure from Fordism, rapid response to changing 
markets (Jessop, 1994:259, Bessant, 1991 :267). 
Amin (1994:2) describes post-Fordism wider than the previous two authors do: in the 
industrialised countries many features ofthe previous phase of capitalist 
development are now fading in this phase. These include the centrality of large 
industrial complexes, blue-collar work, full employment, centralised bureaucracies of 
management, mass markets for cheap standardised goods, the welfare state and 
mass political parties. Amin (1994: 17) adds that in a post-Fordist era innovation will 
be used to change managerial practices, inter-sectoral and inter-firm relationships. 
This will be by means of information technology where computer networks will 
enable inter- and intra-organisational communication and collaboration to take place. 
New patterns of work will also be established such as· teleworking, home-working 
and flexible hours. 
A post-Fordist era can bring a radical shift in the nature of relationships between 
organisations, according to Bessant (1991 :267). The Fordist norm was power-based 
relationships, where there was hierarchical dependence, but in these 'new times' 
relationships are built in a network model where mutual development within the 
partnership is the key. One of the reasons for this is increased competition. With 
markets opening up, barriers going down and the use of information technology, new 
competitors have the ability to compete against local firms. One way to cope with 
increased competition are inter-firm linkages. Another reason is that firms have to be 
much more responsive to changing markets and produce products of high quality. 
This can be done when companies include suppliers in the quest for total quality and 
a quicker response. Thus, there is a bigger reliance on the market to indicate what to 
produce. This can be achieved through changed relationships between companies 
(Bessant, 1991 :269). 
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Esser and Hirsch ( 1994:77) warn against talk of international post-Fordist capitalism 
or re-established post-Fordism. Post-Fordism has been, as yet, unable to impose 
itself. What one rather finds is a mixture of alternative strategies that have been used 
to overcome the crisis. This depends very much on the region or country. Esser and 
Hirsch (1994:77) believe that the features and changes mentioned above are 
tendencies towards and starting points for post-F ordism. Bessant ( 1991: 11) also 
talks about a transition to post-Fordism - one that has not necessarily taken place 
yet or will do so overnight. If manufacturing enterprises intend to effect this transition, 
they need to use new technologies of information and communication and change 
their organisational structures towards new supporting structures. Slyton and Morris 
(1991 :4) label this information technology used in the· industries as flexible 
automation. This includes computer-aided design (CAD), flexible manufacturing 
systems and other advanced manufacturing technology, such as robots and 
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines .. 
Mathews (1989:2), referring to industrial relations in a post-Fordist era, argues that 
the drive for competitive survival where management and workers co-operate, is 
replacing the drive for managerial control found under a Taylorist labour process. 
The hope is that the antagonism evident in the industrial relations of the past will be 
replaced by a less authoritarian, more participative, democratic shop floor. Mathews 
(1989:2) says that trade unions and their members must move from antagonism to 
protagonism. This can be done if they develop strategies concerning new 
technology, changes in work organisation, skills formation and industrial relations. 
Thus, unions can promote certain types of technology or work organisation that will 
suit their members. However, changes in job design and work organisation are 
affording some employers the opportunity to undermine unions. This is often done 
when firms only appoint a small core of workers and sub-contract their work to a 
periphery. 2 Mathews ( 1989:4) states that this can be countered if unions and their 
members create their own agenda for the transformation of work. Unions must 
assess technology from their own point of view. This will allow them to promote the 
2 See Bezuidenhout (1997) for a discussion of this in South Africa. 
post-Fordist developments and block computer-aided Taylorisation (Mathews, 
1989:5). 
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In summary, Mathews (1989:108-113) identifies these principles as the most notable 
in post-Fordist work organisation: minimised division of labour, where tasks are 
integrated; multi-skilling and the acceptance of greater responsibility by workers; 
group and teamwork; flattening of the enterprise organisation, resulting in wider 
involvement during decision-making; shared supervision; and work to meet basic 
criteria of satisfaction. 
This discussion of post-Fordism must not create the idea that it is a clear-cut issue. 
Within the post-Fordist debate there are many writers who differ greatly and yet, they 
all call themselves post-Fordists. The above only represents some of the areas that 
consensus has been reached on. Jessop (1994:276) warns that, in this 'phase of 
transition, experimentation and strategic intervention', one must be cautious when 
describing the form and functions of a post-Fordist organisation or institution. Its final 
form will only become apparent later .and will definitely differ from society to society 
and firm to firm. Mathews (1989), Amin (1994) and Elam (1994) identify different 
routes or models that can bring about a post-Fordist institution. The main ones are 
the neo-Schumpeterian approach and the flexible specialisation approach or neo-
Smithian perspective (exemplified by Piere and Sabel in 'The Second Industrial 
Divide') (Amin, 1994 and Elam. 1994). 
However, the fact that Fordism or the mass production system is in crisis does not 
automatically mean that the regime of accumulation will change to post-Fordism. 
Many writers feel that it might in actual fact be neo-Fordism. Wood (1989:20) says 
that neo-Fordism is also an attempt to move beyond Fordism, but contrary to post-
Fordism, it does so without negating its fundamental principles. By restructuring 
tasks, drastically changing automation and an increased internationalisation of 
production, neo-Fordism tries to shake off the problems presented by Fordism. 
Some writers see neo-Fordism only as a transitional form that cannot solve the 
difficulties experienced by Fordism, some, notably the French regulation school, use 
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it as a critique of post-Fordism, and others perceived it to be more of an end-state, in 
capitalism, which might be able to arrest the downward slide in the regime of 
accumulation. At the job level, neo-Fordism means eradicating the current division of 
labour, using job enrichment and other ways of increasing productivity. It involves a 
high level of automation that enhances co-ordination and control (Wood, 1989:20-
21 ). 
According to Mathews (1989:31 ), in a neo-Fordist system there is either an 
intensification of previous Fordist strategies or a modification of Fordism towards 
innovation and specialisation. The former is evident when firms intensify their use of 
mass production principles - expanding outwards to international markets; 
contracting inwards, behind tariffs and other protectionist measures; or changing 
production by using information technology, but not deviating from the Taylorist 
approach. They stick to Taylorism with the hope that it, together with computers, will 
still increase productivity and reduce wage costs. In this way, Fordism's premise that 
a mass production system needs to pay high wages to support mass consumption is 
done away with. The second neo-Fordist approach is to pursue innovation and 
specialisation within a Taylorist environment. This means that although mass 
production has been replaced by economies of scope or batch production, Fordist 
work organisation, industrial relations and skills restriction are still in place (Mathews, 
1989:33). 
Allen ( 1992: 193) discusses the differences between post- and neo-Fordism: post-
Fordists such as Murray (1992) perceives the current changes in manufacturing to 
be potentially progressive, while neo-Fordists such as Aglietta (1976) is of the 
opinion that, especially for workers, the move from Fordism is generally regressive. 
The two camps differ in the way that Fordism is interpreted. Neo-Fordists argue that 
the changes in production is only an attempt to adjust to the problems of Fordism, 
hoping that the period of Fordism can be extended, whereas post-Fordists see the 
changes as a step beyond Fordism with the start of a new era. Methods of 
production might involve a mix of regimes next to one another, within and between 
countries and industries. This is contrary to the view that one method will replace 
another completely (Allen, 1992:194). 
Wood (1989:21) says that the definitions given to neo-Fordism by Aglietta (1976), 
Lipietz (1987) and others form part of the French regulation school. Regulation 
school members use neo-Fordism to critique post-Fordism. The regulation school 
does not see neo-Fordism as an ideal type and are not exponents of it. It does not 
believe that the current neo-Fordism is a temporary state on the way to post-
Fordism. 
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To understand the regulation school's use of neo-Fordism, it is necessary to return to 
their concept of Fordism: it involves more than the labour process, can be applied to 
a specific regime of accumulation and refers to a paradigm of production and a 
pattern of consumption. Neo-Fordist changes in production were aimed at 
monopolising conception for management. Coupled with automation, it reduced the 
need for skilled workers. Aglietta (1976:122) defines neo-Fordism as 'an evolution of 
capitalist relations of production, still in its embryonic stage, that is designed to meet 
the crisis in such a way as to safeguard the reproduction of the wage relation - in 
other words, to perpetuate capitalism'. In neo-Fordism, as in Fordism, the needs of 
management dictate how production is organised. It is different in this new 
environment, as automation or automatic production control is the new complex of 
productive forces. The neo-Fordist principal of work organisation operates because 
there is a systematic application of the principle of feedback to the functioning 
machinery. The fact that the machinery controls its own operations is of great 
importance. The advances in information technology have made possible the 
developments in this production system. It allows companies to switch from mass 
production to production in short or medium runs (batch production) (Aglietta, 
1976:125). 
In a neo-Fordist organisation, departments with skilled jobs will grow because of the 
transfer of production decisions to it. However, Aglietta (1976: 126) cautions that this 
centralisation as a result of automation is eliminating many less skilled jobs. The new 
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jobs created do not compensate for the lost jobs, as they are totally different and 
thus incommensurable. This is especially relevant to South Africa where many 
workers are illiterate and so the creation of new skilled jobs would not compensate 
for the loss. Taking into account the bad training record of South African companies, 
exacerbates the situation. 
Aglietta ( 1976: 127) is of the opinion that this regime of intensive accumulation can 
survive the crisis of Fordism. This will happen if there is separation of execution and 
conception and if management can wield effective power over the forces of 
production, which will result in a long-run pressure on both constant and variable 
capital. 
Aglietta (1976:128) says that the power that management holds causes job rotation 
and job enrichment to be the ultimate extensions of Taylorism and Fordism. Contrary 
to assembly lines where work is too fragmented and time is lost, these changes in 
the labour process secure a more effective fit between jobs. Management's power is 
also increased when the strict hierarchical structures of command are eradicated. In 
this system, management isolates conflicts on the shop floor and undermines the 
functioning of trade unions by instituting their own structures as an alternative to 
trade unions (Aglietta, 1976: 130). In this way, allowance is made for one of the 
problems of Fordism, worker resistance (Wood, 1989:22). 
As can be gathered from the discussion thus far, Hirst and Zeitlin's (1991 :17-18) 
labelling of neo-Fordism as the middle ground between two poles is very apt - not 
the middle point on a journey between two points. Neo-Fordism attempts to 
incorporate the openness and contingency of the flexible specialisation approach, as 
well as the insistence on the systematic nature of capitalism as a mode of production 
and the centrality of class struggle. 
In neo-Fordist debates, there are two key concepts that identify the core 
mechanisms at work. Amin (1994:8) and Bessant (1991 :9) identify them as regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation. Boyer (1990:35) describes the former as 'the 
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set of regularities that ensure the general and relatively coherent progress of capital 
accumulation, that is, that allow for the resolution or postponement of the distortions 
and disequilibria to which the process continually gives rise'. 
The mode of regulation is the institutional mechanisms (laws, agreements) and the 
cultural habits and norms, which secures capitalist reproduction as such. It refers to 
the 'institutions and conventions which regulate and reproduce a given accumulation 
regime through application across a wide range of areas ... ' (Amin, 1994:8). Boyer 
(1990:43) uses mode of regulation to 'designate any set of procedures and individual 
and collective behaviours that serve to: 
• reproduce fundamental social relations through the combination of historically 
determined institutional forms; 
• support and steer the prevailing regime of accumulation; 
• and ensure the compatibility over time of a set of decentralised decisions, without 
the economic actors themselves having to internalise the adjustment principles 
governing the overall system.' 
Boyer (1990:43) believes a mode of regulation describes how all the institutional 
forms 'fashions, guides, and in certain cases constrains individual behaviour'. 
Bessant (1991 :9) suggests that 'there is in any period of capital accumulation a 
balance between the regime of accumulation (which balances consumption, savings 
and investment) and the mode of regulation (the social and institutional structures 
within which this takes place)'. The neo-Fordists ascribe the crisis in Fordism to 
changes in both these, which resulted in a mismatch. Changes in the basic 
conditions of accumulation (saturation of mass markets, new specialised markets 
and changes in demand) caused a mismatch with the rigid organisational structures 
and practices found in mass production (Bessant 1991 :9). Bezuidenhout (1997:4) 
says that the capitalist system can only survive if it changes the regime of 
accumulation (to fit in with the mode of regulation). The regulationist school of 
thought perceives neo-Fordism as an accumulation regime that tries to address 
some problems inherent in capitalism and Fordism. However, a neo-Fordism system 
has internal contradictions and hence, does not solve the problems of Fordism. So 
Bezuidenhout (1997:4) argues a new accumulation regime will have to be found in 
the future. 
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Arguably the most important contribution by the regulation approach and other neo-
Fordist writers has been that the dichotomy between Fordism and flexible 
specialisation has been shown to be false under certain circumstances. Ewert 
(1992:3) also points this out when relating how neo-Fordism and the continued use 
of mass production have undermined the flexibility thesis of the 1980s. Suddenly it 
became obvious that any change to methods of production is not necessarily a move 
to post-Fordism. 
Returning to the contradictions of neo-Fordism or, as Mathews (1989:33) calls them, 
the limits of intensification and innovation/specialisation. These are the same limits 
that Fordism faces. In order to succeed, ,specialisation and innovation strategies 
demand a highly skilled and motivated workforce. However, this is contrary to 
Taylorist principles of work organisation and control. Mathews (1989:34), noting that 
the response to this was work humanisation programs, argues that the responses 
will not succeed as the industrial relations system will still operate in a Taylorist 
environment. Changes in this system will then actually translate into mere superficial 
relaxation of the rigid Fordist structures. By only consulting workers superficially, 
management cannot expect loyalty, skilled innovation and motivation. Multinational 
corporations have kept intact their assembly lines and at the same time sought 
greater flexibility or introduced work humanisation programs without including the 
unions or addressing industrial relations issues. The shortsightedness of these 
'innovation' strategies have been realised and subsequently discarded (Mathews, 
1989:35). 
Allen (1992:196-197) criticises the post-Fordist debate: firstly because the extent to 
which post-Fordist work organisation has infiltrated manufacturing is not always an 
issue. Some industries (or even companies) might not have the capacity or might 
choose not to adopt post-Fordist methods. Even if it was empirically found that post-
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Fordism is being implemented extensively, the real issue is not how many firms use 
it, but rather whether these changes can sustain a new kind of economy, as it is 
suggested post-Fordism is. Secondly, it does not take into account the geographical 
scope of developments. What might be happening in the 'north' (or industrialised 
countries) might not be the case in the 'south'. An international division of labour 
causes post-Fordism to blossom in the 'north', while mass production is shifting to 
the countries in the periphery. Thus, what is happening in the north is surely 
impacting upon the lives of people in the 'south' (Allen, 1992: 197). 
Amin (1994:3) questions the 'theorisation of historical evolution and change' and 
says that literature on post-Fordism should be viewed as 'a debate rather than an 
achievement or universally accepted theory of transition'. Marxists criticise the 
practice of periodising capitalist history. They would rather see an approach that 
acknowledges that change is evolutionary and has an open nature in class societies. 
The trend of identifying absolute turning points or sharp distinctions between phases 
falls prey to 'a logic of binary contrasts' between rigid old times and flexible new 
times (Amin, 1994:3). 
2.1.1 Racial Fordism 
While the changes in manufacturing discussed so far had been taking place in the 
core, industrialised countries, the situation in South Africa was slightly warped. Gelb 
(1991) and Bethlehem (1991) describe it as racial Fordism. It was a caricature of 
Fordism where mass production was evident, but only whites occupied skilled and 
supervisory jobs. Mass consumption was only present among whites as their wages 
made it possible. Black South Africans were excluded from this consumption pattern 
due to their low wages. Racism stopped the growth of 'an average' Fordist system in 
South Africa. Webster ( 1995: 5) labelled the system of labour control 'racial 
despotism' as one race group dominated at the expense of others and physical and 
economic coercion was preferred over consent. Bethlehem (1991 :2) suggests that 
South Africa differed from other forms of Fordism as it was both racially constructed 
and regulated. Mass production in South Africa included raw materials and 
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manufactured products such as metal, paper, clothing and chemicals. This regime of 
accumulation depended on low wages and levels of consumption by blacks. In racial 
Fordism the state intervened to secure the conditions for accumulation, but in a 
repressive way. It used influx control (pass laws) to shape the labour markets and 
eliminated black trade unions. Bethlehem (1991 :4) argues that, concerning control, 
racial Fordism can be regarded as the epitome of Fordism: not just were there 
fragmented jobs, strict discipline and managerial hierarchy to ensure control, but also 
racial despotism. The vision by Taylor to transform the worker into an executor of 
one specific task was also epitomised in racial Fordism, as black unskilled workers 
did not even have access to primary education (Bethlehem, 1991 :4). 
Coupled with this was the use of cultural Taylorism that, according to Webster 
(1995:2), was used to explain problems affecting the productivity of black workers. 
Absenteeism, sabotage and industrial conflict were all attributed to the alleged 
psychological and cultural differences between whites and blacks. Kraak (1996:40) 
says that racial Fordism was a combination of apartheid and import substitution 
industrialisation. The latter used tariffs and quotes to protect local industries. This 
meant that there was no real competition for these industries which had negative 
long-term consequences, especially in the clothing and textile industries, as will be 
discussed later. 
Concerning the current situation in South African manufacturing, Kraak (1996:41) 
hopes that the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) envisage structural reform that will result in a post-Fordist 
system. The South African circumstances demand special attention such as 
industrial restructuring; a new trade and investment policy to ensure exports; an 
improvement in education and training that will allow workers to participate in the 
new style work organisation; and increased co-determination. Neo-Fordism is also 
prevalent in local firms. Kraak (1996:42) suggests that it has basically the same 
qualities as elsewhere, but included is a partial dilution of the racial division of labour, 
which does not disturb the status quo regarding power relations on the shop floor. 
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Kraak (1996:43) regards the optimism for a move from racial Fordism to post-
Fordism as premature. It is based ontwo premises, which may have resulted from a 
misreading of the true situation: that Fordist work organisation became widely 
embedded in South African industries and the extent to which post-Fordism have 
been incorporated into organisations. There is no evidence that shows the extent of 
Fordist (and for that matter, racial Fordist) or post-Fordist work organisations in local 
industries. When the spread of one or both of these are assumed, then one does not 
take into account the uneven development of the South African capitalist labour 
process (Kraak, 1996:42). Webster (1995:8) uses research to suggest that there is a 
gradual and uncoordinated drift in industry towards the use of new technology and 
new methods of production, rather than a rapid and co-ordinated departure from the 
past. Kraak ( 1996:44-45) agrees with this assessment, adding that in the 1980s the 
local labour process was a hybrid of racial Fordism, jobbing and familiar production. 
The transformation in production means that there is currently a hybrid of neo-
Fordism, post-Fordism and untransformed past processes. 
Ewert ( 1992: 18), in his study of Western Cape firms, concludes that new information 
technology, automation, changing work organisation, improved quality and reduced 
lead times and work-in-progress are evident in some firms, but these are usually 
inserted labour processes with strong Fordist features. Based on this, the current 
restructuring can best be described as a shift in neo-Fordism, rather than a total 
departure to post-Fordism. Ewert (1992: 18) found that managers saw local 
conditions as too different to even try and emulate successful companies in 
industrialised countries. A feature such as just-in-time, although not impossible, 
would be hard to realise in South Africa, because of the dependence on overseas 
suppliers, the lack of local infrastructure, inadequate machinery and the nature of 
local industry.3 When work organisation is changing or automation incorporated 
locally, the aim is not to achieve flexibility, but rather to increase productivity or 'for 
their skill-saving character' (Ewert 1992:6). 
3 See Duncan and Payne (1993) for an example of just-in-time production in South Africa. 
33 
Other factors that might hinder the development of local post-Fordism is the largely 
illiterate workforce with relatively little skills, the high cost of imported technology, the 
non-existence of research and development into local technology and the power of 
corporate capital over technology and industry (Ewert 1992:4). Kraak (1996:53) adds 
to this the racially segmented labour markets, inappropriate macro-economic 
frameworks (such as import substitution), the triumph of market ideology, obstinate 
managerialism, capital's poor training record and its short-term perspective and a 
lack of co-operation between state, capital and labour. 
Von Holdt ( 1991) and Kraak ( 1996) warn against differentiated industrial 
restructuring. The result could be that post-Fordist methods (and, more importantly 
for workers, principles) are established only in certain strategic industries in South 
Africa. Hence, the other industries will be characterised by a hybrid of systems. The 
result will be the establishment of a few Cinderella industries that are supported by 
state industrial policies and consist of competitive, productive firms and a few 
workers who reap the benefits. Von Holdt ( 1991 :24) sees this as one of the great 
dangers of post-Fordism: certain skilled workers might benefit from changes in work 
organisation and restructuring, while the semi- and unskilled workers who cannot 
use technology or assist in improving productivity will be left behind. The result could 
be the birth of 'an organised labour aristocracy', which, by co-operating with 
business, revitalises capitalism in its current state rather than reform it. Other 
dangers for workers include job loss as new technology is employed, deskilling when 
jobs are fragmented and increased divisions within working class (von Holdt, 
1991:23-24). 
2.2 Flexibility 
It has been mentioned that firms strive to become flexible. But what does this mean? 
Atkinson (1985:16-17) identifies three types of flexibility: functional, numerical and 
financial. The first two are operational necessities, while the latter is a means of 
implementing the first two. Functional flexibility occurs when workers can be moved, 
quickly and efficiently, between activities and tasks. This implies that workers are 
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multi-skilled in order to move between mechanical, electrical and pneumatic jobs. It 
might also mean that workers are able to move between departments where there is 
a complete change in the job description. Hence, changes in work organisation and 
production methods will imply that the same workers change with them. 
Numerical flexibility has to do with the numbers of a workforce. If there is a change in 
the demand of labour, this flexibility allows for a quick increase or decrease in the 
number of workers to suit the change in demand. This implies a move away from the 
regular 'basic hours' type of work. It can either result in hire-and-fire policies being 
easily implemented, a looser contractual agreement between worker and employer, 
or a reorganisation of work hours to be more responsive. Financial flexibility has two 
benefits for the employer: labour costs will reflect the supply and demand of the 
external labour market and a remuneration system that facilitates either of the other 
two types of flexibility. These include assessment-based pay systems instead of 
rate-for-the-job systems (Atkinson, 1985:16-17). This thesis will only focus on 
functional flexibility. 4 
NEDO (in Wood, 1989:1) defines functional flexibility: it is about what workers do and 
how firms can change and use the skills of the workers to match changes in work 
organisation, technology or workload. It either consists of a vertical integration of 
tasks (doing tasks of workers at higher levels) or a horizontal integration (tasks of 
workers at similar level). This and other types of flexibility mean a total change from 
the traditional homogeneous employment patterns, standardised contracts, single 
payment system and deployment of labour practices. The reasons for this leap 
towards total flexibility are technical change, market uncertainty and a search for 
lower labour costs (Slyton and Morris, 1991 :7). 
Bessant (1991 :77) says that the markets have moved beyond accepting products in 
'any colour you like as long as it is black'. Innovation, customisation and variety are 
now demanded. The way to cope with this fluctuation in demand is through flexibility. 
4 For a discussion on numerical flexibility in South Africa see Bezuidenhout (1996). 
It allows firms to produce smaller batch sizes of products linked to what the market 
demands. 
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Bessant ( 1991: 81) goes on to identify four dimensions of flexibility: product, mix, 
volume and delivery flexibility. The former refers to the ability to introduce new or 
modify existing products. Mix flexibility is the ability to change the mix of products, 
while volume flexibility is the ability to change the level of aggregate output and 
delivery flexibility is the ability to change agreed delivery dates. Each of these has 
two components: range and response flexibility. Range flexibility is the scope within 
which the company can move on either of the above-mentioned types of flexibility. 
Response flexibility refers to the time that a company needs to change in a certain 
type of flexibility ( Bessant, 1991: 82). 
The problem with Atkinson's model of flexibility (especially functional flexibility) is that 
it focuses only on workers' position as a response to changes in production methods. 
Bessant's model, on the other hand, examines the changes in work organisation as a 
company attempts to be flexible - what needs to change and how much. A 
combination of the two should suffice when studying an organisation or firm 
changing from a mass production system. This would allow one to analyse the 
changes in the production methods and in the workforce. It fills the gap that 
Atkinson's model leaves by not providing a way to assess the changes in production 
methods. 
Lloyd (1994:35) agrees that some forms of flexibility might be attractive to workers. 
These include the altering of days or hours of work, shift arrangements or days off. 
Especially women workers may benefit from this type of flexibility, as they have 
traditionally been responsible for childcare. Yet, Lloyd (1994:37), referring to the 
South African situation, warns against flexibility. The core workers with career paths, 
multiple skills, good pay and secure employment conditions provide functional 
flexibility. The workers on the periphery earn low wages and have little employment 
security (through casualisation and sub-contracting). They provide numerical 
flexibility. However, these two forms of flexibility are contradictory, as the availability 
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of workers due to numerical flexibility will undermine training and the use of skilled 
workers under functional flexibility (Lloyd, 1994:37). The other danger is that the 
functionally flexible workforce and the numerically flexible workforce will be split 
largely along racial lines in South Africa. In the past skills, education, and secure, 
well-paid employment were the domain of white workers. Flexibility might exacerbate 
the situation, unless education systems and training are improved to help illiterate 
workers. 
Slyton and Morris (1991 :8) criticise certain conceptional issues of the flexibility 
thesis: firstly, some of the central ideas are not new, such as the division between 
core and periphery, the use of non-traditional working practices (such as shift and 
overtime) to achieve flexibility, productivity agreements and the use of temporary 
workers. (Hakim (in Slyton and Morris, 1991 :8) agrees that the search for flexibility 
might not be new, but the pace of it has increased dramatically.) A second issue is 
the defining of core and periphery workers. There is a dispute concerning the extent 
to which sub-contracted and part-time workers are peripheral.
5 
2.3 Flexible specialisation 
The regulation approach and the flexible specialisation approach are two theoretical 
positions prevalent in the post-Fordist debate. These theories provide a framework 
within which writers can substantiate and explain the claim that there is a crisis in 
mass production or Fordism and that it is being replaced by new methods of 
production (Amin, 1994:6). This section will discuss flexible specialisation and how it 
views the move away from post-Fordism. The concept flexible specialisation gained 
prominence after the publication of Piore and Sabel's 'The Second Industrial Divide' 
(1984) and is also associated with the work of Hirst and Zeitlin (1991). 
In order to understand what flexible specialisation is about, Hirst and Zeitlin's 
influential article 'Flexible specialisation versus post-Fordism' will be used. They 
5 See Slyton and Morris (1991) for contributions that provide evidence for these issues. 
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( 1991) argue that when analysing productive systems flexible specialisation identifies 
the connections between technology, institutions and politics. Concerning industrial 
change, flexible specialisation shows awareness for contingency and a scope for 
strategic choice within this change. The mainstay of flexible specialisation theory is 
the distinction between two ideal type models: mass production and flexible 
specialisation or craft production. Contrary to the former, craft production (or flexible 
specialisation) is the 'manufacture of a wide and changing array of customised 
products using, flexible general-purpose machinery and skilled, adaptable workers' 
(Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991 :2). This is in contradiction to mass production. Yet, the 
flexible specialisation approach does not view one as the superior model over the 
other. Both can create economic growth and productivity improvement. This takes 
place under flexible specialisation when multi-skilled labour and adaptable 
equipment performing economics of scope reduce the cost of customisation of 
products for fragmented markets. This results in the growth of these markets and 
allowing for increased investment in flexible equipment, which once again reduces 
the cost of customised products - so the circle continues. The flexible specialisation 
approach claims that this can only become a reality if at micro level (firm and region) 
and macro level (national and international) there are regulations and institutions to 
facilitate it. Hence, these models and developments can only be appraised within 
their environmental framework (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991 :3). 
Piore and Sabel (1984:5) introduces their thesis on flexible specialisation by first 
explaining the concept industrial divide: it is the 'movement when the path of 
technological development is at issue. At such moments, social conflicts of the most 
apparently unrelated kinds determine the direction of technological development for 
the following decades.' In the 19th century the first industrial divide occurred when 
mass production technologies started (eplacing less. rigid craft syst~ms. The latter 
saw skilled workers using flexible machines to produce a variety of products for 
changing markets. In industrialised countries, the second industrial divide is currently 
taking place. There are two options for growth in this divide:·a return to craft'"style 
methods of production or extending the principles of mass production. Whichever 
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option is chosen will result in different consequences for business and labour in that 
country (Piore and Sabel, 1984:6). 
Pi ore and Sabel ( 1984: 17) refer to the first option as flexible specialisation. It is a 
strategy of permanent innovation, where constant change is regarded as a given and 
companies aim to accommodate it. Flexible specialisation is a return to craft work 
principles where skilled workers use flexible machines. What is often not mentioned 
is that it allows for the creation, through politics, of an industrial community that 
'restricts the forms of competition to those favouring innovation' (Piore and Sabel, 
1984: 17). The way that flexible firms can be successful is to attract customers to 
specialised products and use marketing to create the demand for it. Success allows 
firms to invest in more updated flexible technologies to increase their productivity 
and efficiency. Thus, the difference in productivity between mass producers and 
flexible firms decreased, resulting in cheaper specialised products. This helps attract 
customers away from mass-produced goods (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 191 ). Craft 
production is challenging mass production, as the paradigm because customised 
production has become cheaper. This can be attributed to technology and the 
constant improvement of existing technology as companies strive towards greater 
flexibility (Piore and Sabel, 1984:207). 
Companies calling for import restrictions, attributing their losses to the practices of 
foreign competitors (such as dumping), to the economic policies of the government, 
and to the wage demands of their workers - sounds like a typical South African 
scenario. However, it is one of the responses, as described by Piore and Sabel 
( 1984:240), to the crisis in mass production in the United States. When the trend 
towards flexible specialisation started, uncertainty existed about how to reconstruct 
industrial relations systems. Some organisations felt that work reform and unions 
could not be combined, hence, their moves to keep unions away from their shop 
floors. 6 
6 For a discussion on a solution by the United Automobile Workers, see Piore and Sabel, 1984:243. 
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Piore and Sabel ( 1984:252) argue that the crisis in mass production can have two 
outcomes: firstly, a geographic extension of mass production or, alternatively, the 
creation of regulatory institutions and the use of technology can ensure that flexible 
specialisation becomes the dominant method of production. Piore and Sabel 
(1984:258) agree that the second outcome begs certain questions, such as 'whether 
a system of flexible specialisation could prove technologically dynamic enough to 
continually improve manufacturing efficiency?' They believe it can because of the 
use of computers and other technologies to increase efficiency at all levels. The 
latter takes place when there are appropriate conditions of competition. The use of 
computers is especially effective in batch production with short runs, where costs are 
lowered. This is because of the adaptability of the equipment to the task that it has to 
perform (Piore and Sabel, 194:260). 
Flexible specialisation can take on various forms: regional conglomerations, 
federated enterprises, 'solar' firms and workshop factories. For the purpose of this 
thesis, only the first will be examined. Piore and Sabel (1984:265) describe it as a 
specialised industrial district consisting of a few small firms who compete and co-
operate. There are no formal links between them, except for short-term contracts. 
Together the actors in this arrangement create institutions, which secure them 
benefits such as customers, financial assistance and raw materials. There is usually 
a sense of community that keeps the industrial district together (Piore and Sabel, 
1984:266; Sabel, 1994: 131 ). This way firms make use of their local proximity. It 
assists them against competitors from outside their region. There is, however, 
another regime of flexible specialisation that might arise: therestricted regime, where 
isolated firms seek their fortune without any regard for their rivals - be it citizens of 
the same district or country (Piore and Sabel, 1984:278). 
I have already discussed how the use of technology, computers and automation is 
paving the way for flexible specialisation to become the dominant mode of 
production. Amin ( 1994: 15) identifies another feature: changes in the market. 
Demand for mass produced goods has stagnated and, related to this, demand in 
specialised, better quality, short shelf-life goods is threatening mass consumerism -
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one of the building blocks of Fordism. Flexible specialisation is regarded as the 
industrial model most capable of supplying the demand for differentiated models, 
with the minimum of effort, time and cost. It would do so by relying on flexibility, skills 
and producing goods in changing volumes and combinations without decreasing 
_productivity. 
Amin (1994:4) discusses organisational arrangements which can bring about the 
success of flexible specialisation: the division of tasks between specialist 
departments allowing for products to be varied without losing efficiency; reintegration 
of research, design, management and workers in order to increase responsiveness 
to changing markets; a greater reliance on workers' skills and participation to 
increase product quality; the reduction of worker alienation by devolving decision-
making; the deployment of multi-purpose technologies; and the creation of a culture 
of trust and co-operation within firms, but also betw~en firms trading with each other. 
Regarding industrial relations, flexible specialisation aims to restore dignity and skills 
to the shop floor, and introduce more co-operation, dialogue, increased trust and 
mutual respect (Amin, 1994:21). Sabel (1994:116) argues that many multinationals 
are now also changing strategies using some or all of these arrangements. This will 
enable their production methods to be organised along flexible specialisation 
specifications, giving them a chance to achieve the benefits of flexible specialisation. 
The reasons for the moves by these international players are previous failures, the 
challenges posed to multinationals by the success of industrial districts, and by their 
competitors adopting flexible specialisation. American corporations are moving 
towards flexible specialisation slower than German or Japanese ones as they 
enjoyed the longest success with mass production methods (Sabel, 1994:116). 
Sabel ( 1994: 139), in an article written some time after his book with Piore, defines 
flexible specialisation from a different perspective: it is a 'system in which firms know 
that they do not know precisely what they will have to produce, and further that they 
must count on the collaboration of workers and subcontractors in meeting the 
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market's eventual demand'.7 To clearly understand the implications of flexible 
specialisation it is necessary to grasp the relation between flexibility and 
specialisation. The former depends on the latter. There are risks: flexibility has its 
limits as no machine can make any or all goods; and specialisation entails market 
risk, as security in an industry cannot be guaranteed. But flexible security mitigates 
the risks as specialisation can lead to diversification, which reduces the reliance on a 
single type of market. It also reduces risks, as there are overlaps in the machinery 
and materials used to serve one or another market. Firms can thus shift their area of 
specialisation between two markets (Sabel, 1994: 140). 
Wood (1989:9) observes that the flexible specialisation debate's scenario of. reskilling 
stands opposite to Braverman's deskilling model. Supporters of the latter's thesis 
argue that the control of labour is a fundamental part of capitalist management and 
will always be. Contrary to Piore and Sabel (1984) and Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 ), they 
say that any change or restructuring by management will always involve increased 
control for them and labour intensification. Whereas flexible specialisation theorists 
regard technology as a type of liberator, the writers in the deskilling debate only see 
it as a means to increase managerial control. Management initiatives like quality 
circles, often found in flexible organisations, are deemed to be a mechanism to 
decrease the remaining areas of worker control. Wood ( 1989: 10) warns that labour 
process writers might be over-reacting to managerial initiatives. Their warnings have 
merit, but it would be reductionist to regard flexible specialisation as another control 
mechanism. 
Wood ( 1989: 12) says that flexible specialisation writers are not naive in thinking that 
changes to job design, worker participation and work organisation are based on 
concern for workers. Rather, these changes are because of a need to become a 
flexibly specialised firm and be better prepared to act on market and technological 
changes. However, these changes also bring about some liberation for workers, 
although not quite intended by management. The workers are not seen as 
7 This is almost a definition of Quick Response to which I will return in chapter 3. 
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expendable anymore. It is realised that Fordist vyork organisations were restrictive on 
workers and so limited productivity growth. New technology also demands a higher 
skilled and more integrated workforce (Wood, 1989:12). Talking about a highly 
skilled workforce and a changed management focused on ever-changing market 
forces in South Africa involves talking about a Utopia. Can flexible specialisation be 
achieved in a firm in a country that is not industrialised? Flexible specialisation 
theorists say that political and societal conditions in some countries will make it 
easier for those firms to adopt flexible specialisation. The outcomes may also differ 
widely between societies: in some cases, a polarisation of incomes and skills might 
be the result. 
Wood (1989:14) however argues that this polarisation might not take place as 'there 
is a new basis for a mutuality of interest between management and workers rooted in 
the upgrading assumed to follow from the functional flexibility inherent to the new 
paradigm'. Walker (1989:59), answering labour process theorists argument about the 
degradation of work and the introduction of automation, says that human labour 
dictates the terms of production and thus mechanisation also; that the physical 
characteristics of machinery affect the course of mechanisation; and that workers are 
reskilled as well as deskilled over time. The conclusion is that even if it was the 
capitalists' intentions, workers cannot be totally replaced in production (Walker, 
1989:60). 
Rainnie (1991 :47) emphasises the unevenness of the development of flexible 
specialisation and automation. Many organisations are adopting new measures to 
increase flexibility in control and production, but it might be combined with the 
deskilled assembly line of Fordism. An exam·ple is McDonald's, the fast foods chain 
where just-in-time systems, which epitomise flexible specialisation, and information 
technology are combined with mass production. However, the McDonald's workers 
do not have the Fordist image of the skilled, well-paid male, but rather the new 
flexibility of young, black, female, part-time, non-unionised and low paid (Rainnie 
1991 :47). The unevenness of flexible specialisation can be either by choice or forced 
upon a firm. It would be a mistake to regard work organisation as a pure dichotomy 
between mass production or Fordism and flexible specialisation. Rainnie (1991 :54) 
says that by ignoring combined or uneven development, it is mistakenly assumed 
that there is 'only one best way of managing the contradictions between the forces 
and relations of production on the one hand and those between the extraction and 
realisation of surplus value on the other'. 
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Flexible specialisation provides firms with alternative manufacturing policies. The 
policies are differentiated either by being low or high volume and either standardised 
price-competitive or customised quality-competitive. When products are 
standardised they can be produced in economies of scale, making them cheaper 
and allowing producers to compete on price, while customised products are usually 
more expensive, but of better quality and thus companies compete on quality or on 
differentiated products. Simplifying, one could say that before information technology 
and flexible specialisation, a firm either produced low volume, customised quality-
competitive products or high volume, standardised price-competitive products. The 
former would be produced by batch production, while the latter would be mass 
production. But since this new industrial divide of flexibility and new technology, the 
break-even point of mass production has been lowered. This means that 
standardised, price competitive products can be produced io lower v()h.-!mes if this is 
dictated by the market - causing considerable flexibility, which the producers might 
not have had before. More importantly, technology has also allowed customised, 
quality-competitive products to be produced in high volumes. Hence, we find quality 
and variety in large batch production (Sorge and Streeck, 1988:29-30).8 
Rainnie (1991 :53) identifies a characteristic of flexible specialisation that is 
sometimes overlooked: the reduction of costs and rigidities that results from the 
fragmentation of the technical division of labour between different departments within 
a company and between companies. This is especially relevant to stock 
maintenance and inventory management. Walker ( 1989:65) observes that the 
Fordists never paid much attention to these aspects and for that reason Fordism is 
8 See Sorge and Streeck (1988) for a more detailed discussion with an illustration. 
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associated with poor inventory management. This was very costly as finished goods 
piled up in warehouses. Buffer stocks are expensive to carry - 30 percent of 
production costs in industry go to warehousing, inventory, carrying and monitoring 
stocks. This however has changed with the advent of Japanese methods of 
inventory control such as just-in-time. This is contradictory to producing stocks just-
in-case (or even just-too-late), as was often the case with mass production. Walker 
(1989:65) agrees that it provides some flexibility regarding final demand, but it also 
limits production systems because there are no buffer stocks. (The absence of buffer 
stocks means that there has to be reliability in the production process, hence no 
stoppages because of industrial action.) 
Negrelli (1988:90) describes the process as follows: 'the Fordist discontinuity 
between production and sale is replaced by a direct link that attempts to satisfy 
immediately the demand for personalised or new products.' An organisation can be 
divided into two parts: the flow of products and the flow of information. Information 
technology has automated the latter. This in turn facilitates the maintenance of a 
heterogeneous and flexible flow of products. Just as the steam engine centralised 
the source of power and the assembly line centralised production flow, the 
automated information system controls production via its programs (Negrelli, 
1988:90). 
Bessant (1991 :78) observes that flexible specialisation is also used to improve the 
routing and scheduling within factories. To cope with constantly changing demand or 
frequent introduction of new products, firms can either build new factories or use 
existing ones more effectively. Often in factories products lie dormant, without value 
being added to them. This takes place at bottlenecks, in queues, when waiting for 
inspection, in transit between operations and in warehouses before and after 
production. If companies can optimise the time a product spends in the factory and 
improve the way products flow, efficiency will be increased and a higher variety of 
work could be processed. Shorter product life cycles, smaller production volumes 
and higher variety have forced firms to use the same factory (or even machinery) to 
produce different goods (Bessant, 1991 :80). 
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Flexible manufacturing systems have many benefits: lead time and throughput time 
can be reduced; inventory saving (especially of work-in-progress); increased 
utilisation; reduced set-up times; reduced number of machines or operations; and 
increased quality (Bessant, 1991: 107-108). 9 
These benefits are mostly internal. However, as was mentioned previously, flexible 
specialisation also benefits inter-firm linkages. Buyers and suppliers can become 
more competitive if there is mutual confidence with benefits for all involved, co-
operation, a problem-solving attitude over borderlines and an integral cost approach. 
An effective supply chain management strategy requires market reach to customers 
where the supply chain evolves from being product oriented to customer oriented. It 
also requires integration back to suppliers, more efficient logistics and effective 
organisation policies (Houlihan in Bessant, 1991 :283). Often these benefits are not 
realised or flexible specialisation is not even adopted. This can be because 
management has a blind acceptance of past practices and perceives the unknown to 
be risky or unattainable. It might also be because of abuse in the pipeline where 
there is aggressive cost-cutting and price squeezing which damage relationships or 
parochialism where company issues come before sharing or co-operation (Bessant, 
1991 :285). 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 :7) argue that flexible specialisation strategies are 
incompatible with a neo-liberal regime of cutthroat competition and unregulated 
markets. To be successful, flexible specialisation requires trust and co-operation 
between workers and management and supplier and buyer. This is how the industrial 
district in Italy operates. It also has regulatory requirements: rules that limit certain 
forms of competition and institutions that can supply trained labour and technological 
information. This 'harmonious' system of production does contain a healthy dose of 
conflict and for that reason independent institutions, which can resolve these 
disputes, should also be created (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991 :7). Phillimore (1989:82) 
9 See Bessant (1991) for a more detailed discussion on each. 
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observes that flexible specialisation might fall short of its promise if there is not 
growing market demand. Growing demand will ease the transition in work 
organisation to flexible specialisation and eliminate 'competition between flexible 
specialisation firms being based on cutting costs (and therefore wages), rather than 
on innovation' (Phillimore, 1991 :82). 
Wood (1988: 107), discussing the merits of worker participation in flexible specialised 
plants, remarks that it can make supervision more relaxed and involve workers in 
cutting firms' costs and improving quality. This can lead to the development of new 
working arrangements where rules are changed and concepts such as teamwork 
and job rotation are introduced. Even if there is some continuation of the assembly 
line principle, worker participation can soften some of the features that are not 
worker-friendly. Worker participation also has a symbolic and attitudinal dimension to 
it. Workers become aware of plant performance, especially if they have input in 
decisions concerning it (Wood, 1988:108). Mathews (1989:36) observes that 
computerised equipment will benefit workers, as a return will be made to specialised 
craft production where there is flexibility in choice when a worker gets a new job. The 
worker can then respond with their own choice of tools and techniques. But for 
flexible specialisation to work for workers, unions have to be pro-active and well 
informed. Ewert ( 1991 :22) uses the example of the metal workers' union in Germany 
and their agreement with Volkswagen: it concerns a new standard of protection 
against rationalisation - a possible effect of flexible specialisation. The agreement 
states that no worker may be dismissed due to changes in work organisation or 
technology and that works committees must have access to early and detailed 
information on changes. It is necessary for unions to create awareness among 
members about rationalisation and other issues affecting them. 10 
Hotz-Hart (1988:72) is less optimistic about workers' fate: Industrial relations in the 
United States and United Kingdom are more likely to go the neo-Fordist route than 
that of flexible specialisation. One management strategy is to bypass the constraints 
10 See Ewert (1991) for a discussion on unions and rationalisation in Germany. 
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of traditional industrial relations and pursue its own strategies, with or without unions. 
This might involve using new types of worker representation. The challenge is for 
unions to develop their own strategies to either counter or complement 
management's. As the employment relationship is being changed quite drastically, 
traditional unions might not exist for long (Hotz-Hart, 1988:72). 
As this thesis focuses on the textile and clothing industries of South Africa, the 
conclusions of Caroline Lloyd, who studied the influences of flexible specialisation in 
United Kingdom clothing companies, will be discussed. Lloyd (1989:102) regards 
clothing as a good example where price-competition has taken a back seat to other 
types of competition - be it quality or variety. Garments based on shorter runs with 
higher fashion content are now more sought after. The clothing industry has 
increased variety and decreased lead time and cost using new information 
technology in inventory management and at points-of-sale. This innovation could 
increase the variety of shorter runs and eliminate the need for extensive sub-
contracting. The changes brought about by technology have hardly touched 
machining, which accounts for 80 percent of labour costs. One would expect this 
labour-intensive part to be changed through automation - thus increasing accuracy 
and the quality of the process. 
Lloyd ( 1989: 104) attributes this lack of technological advancement in that area to the 
pool of cheap female labour that minimises the cost of sewing. The areas that have 
been affected are lead times (that have been reduced) and the utilisation of fabrics 
(which have been increased). But for clothing workers this has not necessarily been 
good news. The technology has replaced skilled cutters and the jobs of those 
marking-out. A computer operator now takes care of these jobs. Flexible 
specialisation provides for shorter runs but the corresponding fluctuations in orders 
can result in sub-contracting increasing. This is because the company does not need 
to employ a large amount of direct labour. Sub-contracting is a major means of 
cutting costs for companies. It will also cause increased supervision in finishing and 
pre-production. Flexible specialisation can result in factories fragmenting, but control 
will still be concentrated. Lloyd (1989:104) believes this makes worker organisation 
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more difficult. Firms that move up-market tend to increase the differentials between 
wages and between conditions. Although firms become more flexible, workers' jobs 
do not necessarily become more secure or decent. This is because of the trend 
towards casualisation (Lloyd, 1989: 104-105). 
More generally, Thompson (1989:224) criticises the dichotomy between mass 
production and flexible specialisation for being based on 'shaky foundations'. 
Flexible specialisation theorists repeat the myth of the dominance of the assembly 
line. Mass production is further labelled as inflexible, when in truth it can cater for 
considerable diversification and multi-model lines. Small firms are often viewed as 
being the leaders in customised production, yet information technology and new 
machinery are often too expensive for them to procure. In any case, there is not 
necessarily a link between advanced manufacturing technology and flexibility. Many 
firms, especially in Japan, have achieved flexibility without leading-edge technology. 
Thompson ( 1989:225) also questions the statement that mass markets are 
saturated. Most consumer goods, including television and videos, continue to sell to 
mass markets. Another disputed part is that of a return to craft labour. Many workers 
are being multi-skilled, but it still is not a renewal of craft production. A lot of their 
work is still based on Taylorist criteria. Thompson (1989:227) furthermore agrees 
with the perception that there will now be a group of multi-skilled core workers. But 
the cost of it (often ignored by Piore and Sabel) is effort intensification brought about 
by extra work and responsibilities. New management techniques such as just-in-time 
operate on continual pressure. Slaughter (in Thompson, 1989:227) calls it 
'management by stress' while Lloyd (1994:7) calls it 'management by fear or blame'. 
Another criticism against flexible specialisation is that it perpetuates the situation that 
women workers find themselves in. The core with secure, well-paid jobs is mostly 
male, while the periphery with low wages is mostly female. 
Even though there have been countless critiques of flexible specialisation, there is 
still a huge amount of enthusiasm for it. So much so that Curry (1993:99) argues that 
the concept has devolved into fetishism. (This is the process in production whereby 
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the workings of the market appear as natural and inevitable rather than something 
that can be transformed (Thompson, 1989:xiv.) Proponents of flexible specialisation 
argue that organisations and firms everywhere are moving - or should be - from 
mass production to flexible specialisation. When criticising flexible specialisation, 
Curry (1993:100) states that there has to be a distinction between 'is' and 'must'. 
There would be no problem with flexible specialisation theory if it observed that some 
industries and some firms are moving towards flexibility. But, supporters claim it is 
necessary to move from mass production to flexible specialisation because of 
economic and market reasons - 'must'. This is fetishism: where no other system is 
regarded as effective or 'natural' and for that reason flexible specialisation should be 
adopted. 
Phillimore (1989:82) continues the critique of flexible specialisation by saying that 
small, innovative firms such as those of the 'Third Italy' (extensively used by Piere 
and Sabel as examples) will not necessarily be the dominant characteristic of flexible 
specialisation. Of more importance will be the dependent sub-contractors or 
sweatshop labour with little job security and low wages. The 'Third Italy' gave hope 
of the rise of industrial districts. But Amin (in Rainnie, 1991 :56) regards the rise of 
industrial districts in other areas as a utopian myth. Piere and Sabel and other 
proponents of the industrial districts did not take into account the multinationals re-
establishing their dominance. Hence, small, innovative firms will find it difficult to 
impregnate markets. Flexible specialisation writers also ignored the differences in 
characteristics and origin of the various industrial districts. The supposed 
harmonious relationships that will exist in industrial districts do not take into account 
the power differentials between suppliers and retailers (October, 1996) or between 
the employers and the unskilled, unemployed workers. The retailers usually 
dominate their suppliers; hence the workers in the suppliers are especially 
vulnerable. These industrial districts usually do not differ too much from other 
institutions, as inequalities are still evident. A lot of the firms in these districts are on 
the periphery. Thus, they are more likely to exploit the vulnerable workers through 
poor pay, no job security and no formal protection of basic rights (Rainnie, 1991 :56). 
This criticism and the other that Fordism still persists, causes Glimell (1991 :84) to 
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observe that instead of flexible specialisation 'sweeping the floor' with Taylorism, 
maybe some quality production will be combined with current modes of production, 
resulting in a modified neo-Fordism. The other possible outcome is that flexible 
specialisation will mainly be evident in core areas, whereas intensified Fordism (or 
neo-Fordism as described earlier) will be consigned to the periphery (Glimell, 
1991:84). Amin (1994:16) says that Piore and Sabel was naive in thinking that there 
would be a major return to craft-scale production. Fordism is too embedded and it 
will probably adapt to new circumstances rather than disappear. The multinationals, 
which are the main protagonists of Fordism, have a strong grip over finance, market 
outlets, distribution networks and advertising and will thus continue to dominate. 
Chris Lloyd (1994:21) is sceptical about new methods of production working in South 
Africa. Certain issues will halt the implementation and success of flexible 
specialisation measures, yet South African business is trying to adopt such 
measures. There is a perception among managers that if something works in Japan 
or the United States it should work here. But South Africa's apartheid history has 
created unique structures, institutions and attitudes that are not the same as that of 
other countries. The issues are education, wage inequality, local trade unions, 
management culture, the technology tap and local markets. I will discuss education, 
wage inequality and management culture. 
Lloyd (1994:22) perceives education to be a problem, as the implementation and use 
of flexible specialisation systems require a high level of education among the 
workforce. Different systems require different skills, but workers should at least be 
literate. Yet, in South Africa a great deal of production workers are functionally 
illiterate. This is a direct result of the apartheid education. Wage inequality is the 
second constraining issue. Flexible specialisation systems thrive on harmonious 
relationships between workers and management. Substantial and superficial tactics 
contribute to a perception that wage and condition differentials are fair and 
reasonable. Yet, in South Africa a huge gap exists between management and 
workers' earnings. This inequality is a stumbling block on the road to shared values 
and commitments. 
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Lloyd (1994:24) also labels management culture as an issue. Local management 
has been protected from competition through tariffs and quotas, has been 
unexposed to leading-edge strategies and has had access to cheap production 
labour. Hence, there were no challenges as confronted by managers in the world. In 
Europe and Asia work had to be reorganised and investment in skills and technology 
had to take place to cope with rising labour costs. The growth of independent unions 
and the re-entry into world trade have forced companies to act. These actions 
include importing techniques used elsewhere to make companies more competitive 
or keep them alive. The conglomerate nature of private capital in South Africa is 
contributing to the problems facing management. Investment and production 
decisions are made in a corporate office with little regard for the long-term health of a 
specific plant (Lloyd, 1994:24). 
I would like to conclude this discussion by emphasising Hirst and Zeitlin's (1991 :6) 
statement that flexible specialisation is 'at once a general theoretical approach to the 
analysis of industrial change, and a specific model of productive organisation whose 
micro and macro-regulatory requirements may be satisfied through a variety of 
institutional forms'. Flexible specialisation is an ideal-typical model instead of a 
generalisation or description about a specific firm or economy. Neither flexible 
specialisation nor mass production is wholly predominant. 
2.4 Globalisation and competitiveness 
In the preceding sections it was mentioned how markets are opening up to new 
international players and how South Africa faces competition from around the world. 
It has also been argued that in order to cope with these open markets, countries and 
firms need to become competitive. In the following section I will discuss what is 
understood with globalisation and competitiveness. 
Moody (1997:6) describes globalisation as a long-term process in which 
transnational corporations and financial markets operate worldwide. Globalisation 
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allows for a relative increase in capital's mobility while international and domestic 
investment decisions are made taking into account global markets. Moody (1997:42) 
depicts the process of globalisation: 'As trade and investment barriers fell, 
government ownership and planning shrank, and private corporations became the 
major organisers of the world's economic activity. Competition and its effects (such 
as workforce reduction) became more volatile.' 
Unlike many who believe massive, influential corporations are behind the move to 
globalisation, Moody (1997:7) argues that much of the new market-driven world 
order is politically negotiated. He uses the examples of the World Trade 
Organisation, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Maastricht treaty in 
Europe, which were all negotiated by governments. 
Moody (1997:6) emphasises the negative results of globalisation which 'increases 
some aspects of fragmentation and inequality between nations. Globalisation's 
effects are very different in different parts of the world. ' He ( 1997: 7) refutes some of 
the prominent ideas of globalisation such as the idea that businesses relocate 
offshore in 'the blink of an eye'. 
'Despite the promises and predictions of neoclassical economists and neo-liberal 
politicians that deeper world economic integration and regulation by market forces 
would bring prosperity as the world's resources were more efficiently allocated, the 
employment crisis grew as the process of globalisation proceeded. Beginning in the 
1980s and persisting into the 1990s, the world experienced a crisis in employment,' 
says Moody (1997:41). 
Trying to make the term globalisation more accessible, Wackernagel (1997:35) 
describes it to mean that the world is 'one great big, happy market,' that everyone is 
part of - apart from a few isolationists. Globalisation is a new concept for the free 
flow of capital, labour and produce between countries. There was a period of laissez-
faire until World War I when protectionism replaced it. During the Great Depression 
the situation intensified: tariffs, quotas and capital controls were used to build even 
greater walls around markets. After World War II things changed as GATT was set 
up. The larger countries wanted to remove trade barriers to boost growth. 
Wackernagel (1997:35) attributes this situation to technology. Cheaper 
communication and more efficient technology have made it easier to be a player in 
world markets. 
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How was GATT going to lower barriers? Maree (1995:13) identifies three principles 
that underline the charter that member nations have to sign: most favoured nation 
treatment: if a country lowers its tariffs on imports for one GA TT member, it has to 
apply to all other GATT members; reciprocity of concessions: GATT members must 
show a willingness to cut tariffs in return for receiving equivalent concessions, 
especially at a round of tariff negotiations; protection in the form of tariffs: GA TT 
outlaws quotas, but do allow tariffs, as long as there is a quest to lower their levels. It 
also has rules when using tariffs to protect domestic industries that might be in a 
crisis. This shows that GA TT is not a charter for free trade, but rather freer trade 
(Maree, 1995: 14). At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993, members agreed 
to move towards an ideal situation of full trade liberalisation using lowering tariffs and 
the removal of quotas. Since the inception of GATT world trade has grown quickly, 
with manufacturing being the most dynamic sector (Grimwade, in Maree, 1995:14). 
Elliot (1997:37) says that globalisation has prospered because it has delivered the 
goods. People in the West have higher living standards than a couple of generations 
ago and have many luxuries that have been bought by their increased wealth. Based 
on technological advance and a relentless dynamism, it has to be said that Western 
capitalism has something going for it. However, Handy (1998:16) says that 'in the 
Western World ... all is not what we say it is. We have become prisoners ... ofthe 
money myth'. Globalisation offers a false prospectus. The perception that 
globalisation continues and prospers because it can deliver the goods, is flawed. 
Research has shown that even though per capital consumption has increased by 45 
percent in the United States in the past twenty years, the quality of life is down by 
51 percent. Many more American workers are exhausted at the end of a working day 
and would like a more relaxed life (Handy, 1998:28-29). Globalisation is seen as a 
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machine with skilful hands on board, but with nobody steering it. Meanwhile its 
speed is increasing all the time. While this is taking place, a feeling of resignation 
exists - that nothing can be done to stop it. Elliot (1997), however, argues that 
globalisation takes place within countries and those who want to, can take control of 
it. The recent crisis in the southeast Asian financial markets could have been 
avoided had there been curbs on international capital. If this does not happen soon, 
currency fluctuations will decrease growth and push up unemployment. The global 
elite would be enriched, but workers at the other end would be without jobs -
increasing the already huge inequality (Elliot, 1997:37). 
Sutherland (1998:62) agrees with this assessment of globalisation: 'It can be a 
whirlwind of trade and investment that builds economies and spurs development in 
even the world's poorest nations. But it can also bring economies low overnight. ' 
Some of the effects of globalisation have been good: increased world trade, 
productivity and efficiency and creating jobs. The most telling effect has been 
increased international investment in developing economies. But globalisation 
threatens to leave many behind such as the sub-Saharan African countries that are 
not integrated into the world economy. Sutherland (1998:62) identifies challenges 
that globalisation needs to overcome to continue to deliver: ensure that all countries 
benefit from it; dispel the fear that it is not destabilising; and inform industrialised 
countries that international competition will not lower living standards. Globalisation 
of trade and investment has weakened the independence of some countries and 
made life less predictable for individuals, but it has lowered costs, increased variety 
and opened more markets (Sutherland, 1998:62). 
Wackernagel (1997:35) says that South Africa cannot ignore globalisation. As was 
mentioned before, South Africa is out of touch with global standards and so is not 
keeping up with its competitors. The government supports globalisation and sees it 
as being an integral cog in creating growth. Employers feel that local companies and 
the labour market lag behind competitors. This will hamper South Africa's continued 
participation in the global market. 
Nel (1997:35), discussing the labour market, says that globalisation demands high 
levels of flexibility in the labour market. However, South Africa's strong democratic 
commitment requires that flexibility be compatible with labour market security. 
Increased inequality could be the outcome if South Africa relies too heavily on 
market forces, as it could affect job security. Regarding trade liberalisation, Nel 
(1997:35) suggests a review of the proposed schedule and if job losses may occur, 
South Africa should not lower tariffs faster then required by GATT. 
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The trade unions also realise the inevitability of globalisation. At a National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) workshop in 1991, von Holdt (1991:20-21) 
reported that the union accepted that the South African economy would be affected 
by globalisation. Those countries that have tried to protect themselves against the 
effects of globalisation, such as international competition, have not been successful. 
The result was often a deeper economic crisis. South Africa should adopt an 
offensive strategy when dealing with globalisation (von Holdt, 1991 :21 ). 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation under GATT have opened markets that were 
previously heavily protected. This has lead to an increase in competition: domestic 
and overseas markets are now flooded with new providers of goods. Previously 
these new providers or firms were from the industrialised countries, but that has 
changed, as more firms from developing countries are now able to compete, even in 
industrialised markets. There is a growing realisation that in order to be successful a 
firm needs to be internationally competitive. That also includes firms only involved in 
local markets, as international players are now present in these local markets. An 
international player might be a small, highly efficient firm from a newly industrialised 
country or a multinational corporation with tentacles all over the world. 
Handy (1998:25) describes competition as an essential part of any system as it sets 
standards and provides the basis for comparisons. Firms and countries use it to 
compare themselves with others on price and quality. Competition is the fuel for the 
economy. But Handy (1998:26) warns that even though the United States has 
increased its competitiveness since 1992, only half of the new jobs created could be 
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described as good. The United States is getting richer, but some Americans are 
getting poorer. Compared to Europe, which has not pursued competition as 
aggressively 'the poorest 10 percent in America now earn only half the amount their 
counterparts do in the leading European economies' (Handy, 1998:27). 
Porter (1990:xii) perceives one of the problems of competitiveness to be the fact that 
there is no recognised definition: 'to firms, [it] meant the ability to compete in world 
markets with a global strategy ... to economists, it meant a low unit cost of Jabour 
adjusted for exchange rates.' What is sure is that the national environment plays a 
crucial role in competitiveness. It is thus important for governments to also 
understand competitiveness and the role of the nation in it. This way an environment 
can be created where competitive advantage is established and sustained. However, 
firms still have to do the competing in their specific industries. The home nation 
influences the ability of its firms to succeed in particular industries (Porter, 1990:Xiii). 
There are many explanations as to why nations are competitive or not. Porter 
( 1990:5) does not agree with any of the following: it is a macro-economic 
phenomenon driven by exchange rates and budget deficits; it is a function of cheap 
and abundant labour; it depends on owning many natural resources; it is influenced 
by government policy; or it depends on management practices and labour 
relations. 11 Porter (1990:6) states that the 'only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is national productivity'. Productivity is the value 
of the output produced by a unit of labour or capital. If a nation has high labour and 
capital productivity it would be able to provide a good standard of living for its 
citizens. This is because it is the main cause of national per capita income. Labour 
productivity determines a worker's wages, while capital productivity determines the 
return for its owners. Firms can contribute to improved productivity by increasing 
quality, adding variety, improving product technology, and improving production 
efficiency. As Handy (1998) stated earlier, international competition and exposure to 
it, creates a standard. It creates for each industry an absolute productivity standard 
11 See Porter (1990:3-5) for evidence as to why these explanations are not adequate. 
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concerning international competitors, not just a relative productivity standard within a 
domestic market (Porter, 1990:8). 
Porter (1990:35) identifies five competitive forces in which the nature of competition 
in industry is embodied: the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitute products, 
the bargaining power of suppliers, and of buyers and the rivalry among existing 
competitors. These determine industry profitability because they determine the 
prices of products, the costs and the investment required to be successful in a 
specific industry. If the true forces are favourable, many firms in that industry can be 
successful. However, if pressure from one or more of the forces is intense, few firms 
will be able to be very successful for long periods. Porter (1990:735) states that 
companies and economies are successful because of pressures and challenges that 
force them to improve. If there were no competition there would be no incentive to 
thrive and be even more successful. The same applies when there is outside help -
be it in the form of tariffs or quotas or otherwise. Instead of taking away national 
character, international competition will make national character more decisive. 
'Globalisation makes nations more, not less, important' (Porter, 1990:736). It is 
necessary to qualify these views: it might be very relevant to a strong industry in an 
industrialised country, but it could be suicidal if a struggling industry, such as the 
South African textile or clothing industries, were to liberalise trade recklessly. In an 
ideal world, the removal of all tariffs and quotas would create wonderful trade and 
growth opportunities, but in. South Africa with its protectionist past this cannot 
happen yet. Fragile, local industries need to first show some growth or stabilisation, 
before there can be free trade. 
Porter (1990) and others' notion of competitiveness is not uncontroversial. Lloyd 
(1994:38-39) observes that discussions on competitiveness between nations do not 
take into account that economies do not compete in the way that companies do. It is 
then debatable whether one can extrapolate world-class strategies from a successful 
company to a nation. Gindin (1995:37) criticises competitiveness as an ideology of 
the new era of capitalism. Initially, after World War II, capitalism in the developed 
countries delivered the goods and created good living standards. However, in the 
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past two decades what was understood to be success has been labelled a barrier to 
progress. These include rising wages, job security and equality. This ideology now 
determines that productive forces are there to strengthen the capitalist class and 
individual companies. In the three decades after Word War II capitalism granted 
concessions to workers. Since then, in the name of competitiveness, capitalism has 
asserted that those concessions were too much and must now be recovered. 
Capitalism now thrives on the negative instrument of fear: give in or else. 
Competitiveness forces a full international integration on South Africa and this will 
shift the local balance of power to business. Gindin (1995:38) asserts that the 
ideology of competitiveness will weaken the Reconstruction and Development Plan 
(RDP). 'A mobilisation in support of competitiveness which means a mobilisation in 
favour of realism, of limiting any diversion of resources to non-productive uses, 
maintaining investor confidence, strengthening the role and judgement of market 
forces, etc- will very concretely tend to weaken commitment to the RDP' (Gindin, 
1995:38). These words are proving to be correct. The government closed its RDP 
office and adopted Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) as its macro 
economic strategy. In contrast to the RDP's 'growth through redistribution', GEAR 
states 'growth then redistribution'. This is an effort to be more competitive and 
investor friendly. 
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Chapter 3 The environment 
3.1 Manufacturing in South Africa 
This thesis has examined work organisation in manufacturing and competitiveness in 
this sector thus far. In this section there will be a short overview of the current state 
of affairs in manufacturing in South Africa: what are the challenges facing it, what is 
its weaknesses and strengths and what do further prospects look like. 
The Central Statistical Service (CSS) (1996:2.26) says that in 1994 there were 1 399 
513 workers in manufacturing in South Africa. This is compared to 1 317 200 in 
1977. After 1977 the figure grew and reached a high of 1 542 618 in 1982. It then 
decreased, but grew again to 1 531 072 in 1989. Since then it has decreased to the 
current level, which is lower than that of 1980. In 1950 manufacturing accounted for 
15, 9 percent of total employment. This grew to 24,2 percent by 1993. After South 
Africa became a republic in 1961, there was an all-time economic boom with growth 
rates of 5,3 percent per year until 1972. The period until 1978 saw erratic and 
unimpressive growth rates of 2, 9 percent average per year. From 1979 to 1984 it 
improved to an average of 3, 1 percent per year. But foreign debt, political crisis, 
disinvestment and sanctions resulted in an average growth rate of 0,9 percent per 
year from 1985 to 1991 and -1 percent in 1992 and 1993 (Barker, 1995:63). Labour 
productivity in manufacturing from 1970 to 1992 increased at 0,9 percent per year, 
while capital productivity decreased by 2,5 percent per year. This is in the context of 
a 1 percent increase in labour productivity in the private sector and a fall of 1, 9 
percent per year in capital productivity (Barker, 1995:93). 
In 1991 the ISP was commissioned by COSATU to help develop an industrial 
strategy for the South African manufacturing industry. The ISP (1994:49) regards this 
industry as important as nearly a quarter of formally employed South Africans work 
in manufacturing. The industry can generate high-paying jobs, produce affordable 
basic commodities, ease the balance of payments constraint and raise the 
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productivity of the economy. There are many problems in local manufacturing: output 
was lower in 1992 than in 1981; employment has stagnated since 1980 and began 
falling in 1990; investment has fallen since the early 1980s; where there is 
investment, it is in the capital-intensive sectors; local trade performance is poor, 
because most of exports, primary products, are not in high demand; manufactured 
exports, although growing, have not kept up with competitors' rates; poor export 
performance halts general economic growth; for the past two decades productivity 
growth has been low compared to our competitors; and South African manufacturers 
cannot compete in non-price criteria, such as quality, specialisation and delivery, 
which is becoming more important (ISP, 1994:51 ). Another problem is human 
resources. Developing human resources is essential for efficiency in manufacturing. 
In order to achieve long-term productivity increases, changes to work organisation 
and structures are important. But, well-trained and skilled workers are necessary for 
this - something that South Africa does not have an abundance of (ISP, 1994:66). 
The LMC (1996:76) also identifies South African firms' relationships with their 
external environment as an impediment to productivity growth and performance. 
There are no strong relationships with suppliers and buyers, with other firms in the 
same industry and with tertiary education institutions and science councils. This 
retards the introduction of new methods of production, new technology and 
increases in productivity. Another constraint to the success of firms in South Africa is 
the relationship between management and workers. This includes authoritarian and 
racist supervision; adversarial relationships between management and unions; 
absence of industrial democracy and structures for worker participation; workers' 
poor identification with issues of productivity; and volatile industrial relations (LMC, 
1996:76). 
Another problem identified by the LMC (1996:93) is that South African managers are 
importing new production methods without heeding to the warnings that go with 
these methods: there should not be piecemeal introduction of parts of an integrated 
package of measures and simple importation, without adaptation of the measures 
developed in unique circumstances, should be avoided. These new production 
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methods were conceived in the context of flat management structures and smaller 
earnings differentials than in South Africa. This, coupled with the fact that they will be 
introduced into organisations with problems as described above, will hamper their 
success (LMC, 1996:93). Von Holdt (1991: 19) also identifies certain barriers to the 
adoption and development of new ways of work organisation. The low level and 
piecemeal use of computers and new production methods; the increasing skills 
differential within the black working class; division between members of unions along 
racial and skills lines; and the low levels of skills and inefficient education system of 
South Africa. 
' Contrary to the ISP ( 1994 ), Bell ( 1995) argues that the South African productivity 
growth slowdown is more of a consequence than a cause of the slower growth of 
manufacturing. It is also important that the crisis currently experienced in local 
manufacturing should be seen in terms of the unstable macro-economic environment 
of the 1970s and 1980s that affected developing countries all over the world. The 
debt crisis, which Bell ( 1995:9) describes as the most obvious source of crisis, is not 
even mentioned in the ISP report.
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3.2 The global textile and clothing industries 
Because of the importance of clothing in people's lives, most countries have some 
kind of textile and clothing industry. These industries do not only provide people with 
clothes, they also provide goods for consumption and create many jobs, which 
provide wages for people (Toyne et al, 1984:50). The apparel textile pipeline 
consists of fibre suppliers, textile mills, garment manufacturers and retailers. Fibre 
suppliers can either produce chemical or natural fibres. Textile mills then use these 
fibres to produce fabric. This can be done by spinning and then weaving or knitting. 
Fabrics that will be transformed into apparel or garments go to garment 
manufacturers who make finished goods. From here it moves on to retailers or 
whoever sells the finished goods. There are two other major end markets in the 
12 See Bell (1995) for an alternative view on South Africa's productivity growth performance. 
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textile pipeline: home furnishings and industrial goods. 13 The employment nucleus of 
this pipeline is in the textile mill and the garment manufacturer. These two sections 
are directly dependent upon the sales at end markets for their well being as all the 
goods that they produce end up there. Most countries manufacture textile products, 
but not all of them have the capacity to support the entire pipeline. Hence, pipelines 
might differ drastically from each other. Some pipelines might have to import 
chemical fibres, others the textile machinery, while for others importing fabric or even 
finished goods might be more viable (Toyne et al, 1984:8). 
Toyne et al (1984: 10) divide the pipeline into three major segments: fibres, fabric 
formation and finishing and end-use manufactured products. Fibres consist of two 
groups: natural and chemical. Natural fibres include cotton, wool, hemp, silk, linen 
and jute. Chemical fibres include rayon, polyester, nylon and acrylic. There are many 
natural fibre producers around the world, but few producers of chemical fibres. This 
is because the latter is very capital and knowledge intensive and has large 
manufacturing economics of scale. The result is that industrialised countries 
dominate this section of the pipeline. The textile industry consists of yarn spinning, 
fabric forming and fabric finishing. Yarn can be categorised into either staple-fibre 
yarn or continuous filament yarn. Producers of the former are known as spinners, 
while those of the latter are known as throwsters or texturisers. The major use for 
yarn is to weave or knit fabric or tuft carpeting. The three principal mett"lods of 
producing fabric are weaving, knitting and non-woven technologies. When fabric is 
sold from the forming machine, it is known as greige. The fabric segment in most 
countries has broadwoven fabric and narrow and knit fabrics as major outputs. The 
finishing process is the final one in the textile industry. It is knowledge and capital 
intensive and is of huge importance as it affects the product competitiveness in the 
market. Finishing provides comfort, durability and aesthetic qualities. Included in this 
section is yarn and fabric wet-process where either yarns or fabrics are bleached, 
dyed or chemically finished. Usually, apparel fabric is produced by larger firms, 
which require a large minimum order of one colour or design. Firms usually 
13 See Figure 3.1 in Toyne et al (1984:9). 
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specialise by type of fabric because of different equipment and processes required. 
They are thus very rigid and inflexible, unable to provide a variety of products in a 
short time. The final section is the manufacture of end-use products. End-use 
applications are apparel, home furnishings and industrial. These 'cut and sew' 
companies transform two-dimensional roll goods into three-dimensional utility items. 
The different operations in this section are cutting, sewing, pressing, packing, 
marketing, and dimension determination. The apparel manufacturing process starts 
with the design of the product based on forecasts of fashion, style and needs of the 
customers. Then the design is made into patterns, which are used to cut the fabrics. 
It is sewn into garments, tagged and shipped to end markets. Here fabric is still cut 
and sewn as it was forty years ago. This section is labour intensive, fragmented and 
price competitive. Only large firms typically produce apparel in more than one 
category, price and fashion range. Once again, these are not very flexible and 
unable to produce a variety of goods or ranges (Toyne et al, 1984:10-16). 
Toyne et al (1984:20) identify six stages in the development of the textile complex: 
from embryonic to declining. The embryonic stage, found in the least developed 
countries, is geared only toward consumption for the local market. Natural fibres are 
used to produce elementary fabrics and garments. The second stage, consisting 
mainly of southeast Asian countries, sees the export of apparel - be it low end, 
mature varieties or embroided apparel. Eastern European countries and China 
currently occupy the third stage. In it there is a sharp rise in domestic production of 
fabrics and also initial exporting of fabrics, to go with the apparel exporting. 
Countries in this stage also develop their own fibre section. In the 'golden age' or 
fourth stage apparel and fabric production is more sophisticated, so is chemical fibre 
production. There are also huge trade surprises. Taiwan and Korea occupy this 
stage. Full maturity is reached in the fifth stage. Total output may increase, but 
employment declines as capital intensify increases. There are high levels of product 
and process sophistication as is evident in the United States, Italy and Japan. The 
sixth stage witnesses a significant decline in employment and firms. Trade deficits 
appear and segments seem to be dying. Some Northern European countries such as 
the United Kingdom and France are in this stage (Toyne et al, 1984:20-21 ). 
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Hunter ( 1990: 1) says that textiles and apparel are often seen as 'sunset industries 
that are a kind of drag on the overall economy'. However, the productivity increases 
in these industries in the United States have been some of the highest in 
manufacturing. The problem is that, especially for apparel, they are labour intensive. 
This puts them at a disadvantage, as the low wage countries are moving into these 
industries. The textile complex (Toyne et al, 1984) or apparel textile pipeline (Hunter, 
1990), is the longest and most complex of manufacturing supply systems. The 
reason is that it was developed when time was not of great concern and the garment 
had a long life. There are an enormous amount of players in the apparel supply 
system. This is because of its complexity and length. The result is that competition is 
intense and the financial performance of the industry is below average in 
manufacturing. The emphasis on long manufacturing runs and the large minimum 
order quantities result in large raw material and finished goods inventories. The 
result is a pipeline of sixty-six weeks for apparel made from woven fabrics in the 
United States. Only eleven weeks are actual 'work in process' time - when value is 
being added and the product converted. For knitted goods the pipeline is six to 
seven months with the inventory making up two thirds of that time. 14 One of the 
reasons for this is inventory duplication. The supplier holds product as finished 
goods, while at the same time the buyer holds the same product as raw material. 
This serves as cover for the buyer against late deliveries or unacceptable quality and 
is also known as just-in-case stocks. Apparel retailing is a seasonal business so 
demand is variable. To meet this demand, producers build stocks and then draw 
from it as customer activity increases. These stocks can never be done away with, 
but using flexible manufacturing techniques such as Quick Response, seasonal 
inventories could be levelled (Hunter, 1990:19-21 ). The shortcomings of the apparel 
textile pipeline - excessive inventories, stock-outs and forced markdowns - can be 
quantified. It adds up to 25 percent of retail sales of which more than 23 percent 
occurs at the retail and apparel manufacturer level (Hunter, 1990:31 ). 
14 See Diagram 1 in van der Riet, 1989. 
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Another problem in the apparel pipeline is the reliance on the 'push' method. Van der 
Riet (1989:A3-2) explains it as follows: retailers make educated guesses as to what 
the customer would like and then set up the pipeline and produce goods according to 
these guesses. The guesses are made using information from fashion shows, fabric 
shows, market weeks and range showings. Occasionally the guess would be wrong 
and the customer does not buy the product available - hence, the name 'push' 
method as the retailer pushes their product on the market. If the customer did not 
like the product it would be too late to change to another product because of the 
length of the pipeline. The pipeline would thus be clogged up with that product (van 
der Riet, 1989:A3-2). 
Maree (1995:13) names two international trade regulating mechanisms in textiles: 
GATT (which has already been discussed) and the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA). 
Hunter ( 1990: 10) says that the MFA provides the ground rules for international trade 
in textiles and apparel. It provides procedures for importing and exporting nations on 
quotas. This causes it to violate the rules of GATT, which prohibits quotas. The MFA 
imposes a system of quota control for textile trade between 'north' and 'south'. 
However, all the signatories of the MFA do not always adhere to the rules. Some 
low-cost exporting countries exceed the 6 percent per year growth rate suggested by 
the MFA, others erect non-tariff barriers to imports, while Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
South Korea dominate the poorer countries for which the MFA was implemented by 
still being (mistakenly) regarded as developing nations (Hunter, 1990: 10). 
Cassim (1992:2) observes that the character of the international clothing market has 
change drastically since the 1980s. In the developed economies it has become more 
fragmented because of changes in consumer tastes, the volatility in demand and the 
high capital costs of stocks and work in progress. This has meant a move away from 
mass-standardised production to flexible specialisation. The advantage held by long-
run garment manufacturers has been ended because price has become less 
important. Retailers and manufacturers are now targeting specific groups of 
consumers and are responding quicker to short-term trends in the sales of individual 
product lines. In the lower end of the market longer production runs are still used 
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more often (Cassim, 1992:3). Phillimore (1989:83) describes the firms concentrating 
on the lower end of the market as the primary sector, while the small batch 
producers are the secondary sector. The latter is much less unionised, labour laws 
often do not apply and is more flexible in output, wages and employment levels. 
Lloyd (1989: 101) says that clothing is often used as an example of the move from 
Fordism to flexible specialisation. This is because of the fragmented demand, the 
introduction of computer technology, the targeting of niche markets and the closure 
of large factories. 
Whitaker (1991 :211) mentions that companies in developed countries have used this 
move to flexible specialisation to respond to the import penetration from low labour 
cost countries. In low value added sectors, such as T-shirts, price is still the most 
important facto( A country like China, because of low wages, is able to compete 
very successfully in this sector. Standardised mass production, together with low 
wages, gives them the advantage with products such as T-shirts. Industries in more 
developed countries are trying to capture the smaller, more lucrative market 
segments that require high quality, high style clothing. They do this using flexible 
specialisation methods (Whitaker, 1991 :212). 
Apart from flexible specialisation, other strategies have been devised to improve 
firms' competitiveness in the textile and clothing industries. These include an 
improvement in technology, more flexibility (see Whitaker, 1991 }, research and 
development, increase in labour and capital productivity, industrial district strategy 
(see Piore and Sabel, 1984), just-in-time and Total Quality Management (TQM) (see 
Bessant, 1991) and inter-firm linkages (see Bessant, 1991 ). This thesis will focus on 
Quick Response as a possible solution, but before that it is necessary to examine 
the current state of affairs in the South African textile and clothing industries. 
3.3 The local textile and clothing industries 
In 1994, according the CSS (1996:2-28), the formal sector in the textile industry in 
South Africa employed 67 892 workers compared to a high of 113 700 in 1981. After 
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1981 the number dropped off, but it rose to more than 100 000 workers again in the 
late 1980s. However, since then it declined drastically to a low of 65 955 in 1993. In 
the clothing industry, the number of workers in the formal sector stood at 124 538 in 
1994. In 1977 there were 109 600 workers. The number grew to 135 165 in 1982 
and then fluctuated to reach a high of 139 239 in 1988. It declined after that, but rose 
again quite substantially in 1993 (CSS, 1996:2-29).15 
Maree (1995:22) states that the South African textile industry established itself as a 
major sector only after World War II. By making use of tariffs and quotas, it was able 
to grow rapidly until the end of the 1960s. Even with this growth, it was neither 
economically efficient, nor internationally competitive. From 1972 to 1981 the local 
textile industry had a strong growth rate of 5, 7 percent. Production reached a high in 
1981 of R9 721 million. The phase from 1981to1992 saw a decline in the industry. 
Output dropped sharply (especially between 1981-1985) and so did employment 
(IDC in Maree, 1995:25). Capital investment in the textile industry is below the 
manufacturing sector's average. The proportion of capital stock within the 
manufacturing sector was halved to 2,4 percent from 1972 to 1990. The result is that 
the majority of machinery and technology are dated. Concerning value-added, the 
aim is to achieve a higher value-added per unit of output over time. In South Africa 
this has not happened: the proportion of value-added in total output has remained 
virtually constant from 1972 to 1990 around 27 percent. However, the value-added 
per employee has increased in this period, as well as the labour productivity, which 
grew at 7,6 percent per year on average. This is compared to capital productivity 
(output per unit capital), which increased at a minuscule level (IDC in Maree, 
1995:26-32).16 
The textile industry is mainly concentrated in Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape. 
These two regions employ almost 60 percent of workers in the industry. Other 
important regions are Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. Although there are a large 
number of firms in the industry, production is concentrated in the hands of 
15 For a study that includes the informal sector see Joop de Voest (1998). 
16 For a comparison of these statistics with other countries see table 3.3 in Maree (1995:34). 
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comparatively few large enterprises, some that are subsidiaries of conglomerates 
(Maree, 1995:36-7). South Africa is also unique in that the local demand for fabrics 
varies from third world standards to high fashion merchandise. Hence, a wide variety 
of fabrics are required, which are then also produced by local weaving mills. 
Research has found that the textile industry is too production-orientated and 
insufficiently market-orientated. The local industry can supply most of the country's 
demand, but some specially knitted fabrics have to be imported (Loots, 1992:2). 
Compared to the more 'oligopolistic capital-intensive' textile sector, Loots (1992:3) 
reports that the clothing sector is highly competitive with about 1 500 manufacturers. 
It is also a major employer in South Africa. Not only does it have the oligopolistic 
textile sector on the supply side, but also an oligopolistic retail sector on its output 
side. Similarly to the textile sector it is also caught between two worlds: a first world 
cost structure versus a third world demand structure. The clothing industry is also 
concentrated in the ~estern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. Locally produced clothing is 
of high quality and variety and aimed at the middle and upper end of the market. The 
cost of raw materials dissuades manufacturers from providing for the extreme lower 
end of the market. Development of the clothing industry in South Africa is largely 
dependent upon growth in domestic demand. Labour costs make up 29,2 percent 
and raw material costs 52,8 percent of the ex-factory selling prices in this industry. 
(So in this labour-intensive industry, fabric constitutes more than half of the price. 
Hence the price of fabric is more important for costs than wage levels.) Concerning 
productivity, the National Productivity Institute (NPI) found in the late 1980s that cost 
and productivity, locally, allowed for manufacturers to be quite competitive. At the 
same time, technology improvements were also evident, resulting in time saving and 
the improvement of labour costs per unit of output. However, this technology is very 
expensive and has thus excluded smaller companies from this type of improvement. 
The clothing industry, itself, blames the cost of raw materials, late deliveries and 
shortages for its competitive disadvantage (Loots, 1992:3-4). 
Textile and clothing are importan~ sectors in the Western Cape. With 
footwear, it constitutes 18 percent of manufacturing gross output of the 
Western Cape. In manufacturing value added its share was higher than 20 
percent. Twenty-six percent of South African manufacturers of textiles and 28 
percent of clothing are in the Western Cape (Loots, 1992:7). October (1996:6) 
believes the clothing industry in the Western Cape was in a major crisis in the 
1990s. Employment here has dropped by almost 15 percent between 1990 
and 1994 and clothing production has declined by 20 percent. Yet, clothing 
retail sales have increased at 7 percent per year. The decline in production 
can be ascribed to the increase in imports of clothing - new and second-hand. 
Employment reduced even more in 1995 and 1996. October (1996:6) blames 
illegal imports and tariff reductions. On the positive side, exports have 
increased in the 1990s - 50 percent originate from the Western Cape - from 
R118 million in 1989 to R460 million in 1992. These still only account for 0,4 
percent of world trade. Regarding the overall Western Cape manufacturing, 
textile and clothing accounts for more than one third of the region's 
manufacturing employment. The Western Cape textile industry is the second 
largest in South Africa and produces 20 percent of all textiles. There were 180 
textile firms and 538 clothing firms in the formal sector in the Western Cape in 
1994. Most of South Africa's major clothing retailers are also based in the 
Western Cape. They account for more than half of South Africa's clothing 
retail sales. Most of the 538 clothing firms in this province have indicated that 
they are supplying to only a few retailers each. Reasons for this are the cost 
of transactions and the instability of small retailers and boutiques (October, 
1996:8-9). Loots (1992:9), discussing profit figures for clothing and textiles, is 
not optimistic about these industries: they make up only 1,5 percent of total 
manufacturing profits, compared with 20 percent of value added, 25 percent 
of wages and salaries and 30 percent of manufacturing employment. (The 
clothing industry was the only one to experience negative profits.) These 
industries are low wage industries, which Loots (1992:10) attributes to the 
high proportion of female labour. Wages will probably stay low due to the 
ease of entry into the industries (coupled with this is the low level of 
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education), the nature of clothing production and the low capita.I cost of setting 
up a factor.17 
South Africa shares in most of the problems faced by the textile and clothing 
industries in other countries - be it in varying degrees. However, there are 
certain problems here that are unique to this country. The combination of 
these two groups of problems, produce an enormous stumbling block in the 
path of success. One problem that is also found in industrialised countries is 
dumping. This is when overseas products are sold in a country below the 
price they are sold at in their home market. The products are often made in 
east Asian countries where wages are very low and mass production is still 
cost-efficient. They are usually not aimed at the middle and upper market. A 
related problem is the 'leakage' of containers of fabric and clothing that enter 
South African ports. The products are, supposedly, on their way to 
neighbouring countries, but leak into the local distribution pipeline, before 
reaching their destinations. The problem became so acute, Stewart (1995) 
reports that both industries have called for improved customs control at South 
African harbours on goods entering and leaving the country. 
Another problem encountered in the textile and clothing industries is their 
relationship with the retailers. October ( 1996: 17) argues that the oligopolistic 
nature of the retail industry has reduced profit levels in the textile and clothing 
industries. Although the high standards adhered to by local retailers have 
increased the ability of the rest of the pipeline to produce high quality fashion 
products, there are hitches in the relationship. There are three phases in this 
relationship: initially, manufacturers supplied to many independent retailers 
and had short runs. They did their own designs and had their own brands. 
The second phase saw retailers becoming more powerful. They became 
vertically integrated, took over the design function and brands. Manufacturers 
became glorified sub-contractors for huge retailers, so much so that 
manufacturers felt owned by retailers because of their dependence on a 
specific retailer. Production runs increased and larger factories sprung up. In 
17 See figure 11 in Maree (1995:5). 
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the third phase, design returned to manufacturers due to the cost of it and the 
quality of designs by manufacturers. The high cost of clothing in retailers and 
the small price manufacturers were paid for it led to some manufacturers 
opening their own retail stores. This was a direct route to the market (October, 
1996:18). 
Cassim (1992:4) states that retailers' problems with South African clothing 
firms include problems of delivery, quality, and long lead times. As retailers 
are often increasing their orders from two to four times a year, these problems 
have been exacerbated. It is now more important for the rest of the pipeline to 
have shorter lead times. Cassim (1992:5) says that due to the monopolised 
nature of retailing, garment manufacturers have no choice but to supply a 
large percentage of their products to large retailers. This makes the 
manufacturers very vulnerable as products not made exactly to specification 
or that are late could easily be rejected. Garment manufacturers also 
complain about retailers' high profit margins and the fact that they squeeze 
manufacturers. Thus, even with high fabric costs, retailers still enjoy healthy 
profit margins and customers have not benefited from lower fabric prices 
(Cassim, 1992:5).18 
Cassim (1992:3) observes that the local clothing industry will not be able to 
compete with a high volume/low price strategy. It is because this strategy 
relies on low wages to provide an advantage but local real wages are 
constantly increasing. Also because the local clothing industry cannot cope 
with high volumes as required by this strategy. The reason for its small size is 
the small domestic market. However, a move upmarket will impact on job 
opportunities. If firms start producing high quality, high fashion products and 
expand their output, it will not necessarily increase employment. A decrease 
in production runs and an increase in variety are occurring at many clothing 
firms moving upmarket. Upmarket means more prominence to flexibility, 
shorter production runs, shorter lead times and product variety (Cassim, 
1992:4). 
18 See Maree (1994:6) for more on this unhealthy situation. 
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Maree ( 1995: 17) earmarks another potential problem: as was mentioned 
before, the MFA violates the rules of GATT, so it will be abolished. For some 
countries it will be a benefit as they have high technology, low labour costs 
and sophistication in design. Those countries with market proximity (such as 
Central America, which is close to the large United States market) will also 
benefit from the abolition of quotas on textiles. But South Africa might 
struggle. The way to deal with this is to secure export markets while the MFA 
and other tariffs are being phased out. Maree (1995:17) also urges South 
African textile producers to move closer to their customers - not necessarily 
geographically. If textile firms have reliability and quality, they can ensure that 
they can fulfil their customer's needs. The way to achieve this is through 
implementing Quick Response. 
Loots ( 1992: 12) identifies the long-standing tension between the clothing and 
textile industries as another major problem. In the past the latter has pushed 
for the maximum tariffs to protect it against fabric imports. However, the 
clothing industry wanted the opposite. Many clothing firms imported fabrics, 
despite high tariffs and the depreciating currency. This is because of the 
availability, reliability and price of imports and the late deliveries and supply 
shortages locally (Cassim, 1992:4). Manuel (1994:26), then Minister of Trade 
and Industry, observes that the tariffs on clothing and textiles are, on average, 
the highest for any industrial sector. The result is an increase in the leakage of 
clothing and textiles into the economy. This renders any existing policies and 
measures on imports and tariffs obsolete. In 1993 with the signing of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, this situation started improving. Maree 
(1995:58) says that South Africa committed itself to a gradual reduction of its 
tariffs on textiles and clothing over an eight-year period. Initially tariffs will 
remain at their current levels, allowing local firms to adapt and prepare 
themselves. Thereafter it will be reduced by 50 percent or more. Stewart 
(1994:23) explains the situation as follows: in the past local consumers paid 
the price for the inefficiencies of the two industries in the form of duties and 
import controls. But trade liberalisation under GATT abolishes demand-side 
subsidies and local content incentives. Unless the government can achieve a 
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balance between tariffs and imports, these already vulnerable industries can 
go down. The balance is between providing sufficient protection to ensure 
new private fixed investment, while allowing importers to keep domestic firms 
competitive (Stewart, 1994:23). 
In June 1995 Trevor Manuel announced the trade and industry tariff proposal 
for the textile and clothing industries. Finance Week (1995:9) reports that 
contrary to the National Clothing Federation's five-year proposal, the Swart 
Report's ten-year proposal and GATT's twelve-year proposal, the phasing 
down of tariffs will take place in eight years (from 1994 to 2002). Cloete 
(1995:31) is of the opinion that it favours the textile industry and the trade 
unions more than the clothing industry, while others see it as a genuine 
compromise between the two industries. Millward (1995:39) says that the 
Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU), has blamed 
job losses on tariff reductions. This and the possible demise of the textile 
industry are what probably resulted in Manuel announcing the eight-year 
period. Cloete (1995:31) says that eight years are less than GATT's proposal 
or the ten years put forward by the textile industry. Hence, it will still be a 
challenge to the local textile industry to become competitive. This might be a 
compromise, but it does not heed the earlier warning by Nel (1997) on 
lowering tariffs faster than required by GATT, as it could lead to increased job 
losses. Finance Week (1995:9) welcomes the move for its courage. It gives a 
message to local firms that they have to become competitive soon and to the 
outside world that rational economic judgement from government is more 
important than domestic considerations. This view of adhering to 'rational 
economic judgement' could cause problems in local industry as discussed in 
the section on globalisation and competitiveness. If South Africa were a 
strong economic power, by all means adhere to 'rational economic 
judgement'. But, with huge unemployment, weak local industries that existed 
behind protective walls and wage inequality there has to be some measures 
to ensure a strong economic and social system before our tariffs are halved. If 
economic growth and implementing these measures take twelve, instead of 
eight years then use the extra years, rather than destroying an industry and 
eighty thousand jobs. 
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The Swart Report on the clothing and textile industries, as discussed in the 
Bilateralism Review (1994:80-83) identifies other problems in these two 
industries locally: technology is outdated and needs to be upgraded; skills 
development is lagging behind; and management attitudes and the lack of 
participative management are impediments to improved productivity. An 
increase in technology could lead to job losses. Maree ( 1994b: 11) cites 
research by Werner International on labour productivity in South African mills: 
spinning mills achieve only 21 percent to 34 percent of international norms 
while weaving mills do not do far better than that. Another study found that 
fabric and cutting and sewing lead times are also way behind that of 
internationally competitive firms. These studies found that the problem is work 
organisation. If more modules and teams of multi-skilled workers were used it 
would increase labour productivity. 
Maree (1995:110) identifies a major problem in the apparel textile pipeline: 
'volatility in demand due to the amplification of changes in consumer, and 
hence retailers', demand for textile apparel'. A fluctuation in 1 O percent at the 
retailer due to changes in selling affects the other parts of the pipeline, so 
much so that the fibre spinner could have a fluctuation of 40 percent in 
demand. The further away a company is from the retailer the higher the 
volatility of demand for a product. Hopper (in Maree, 1995: 111 ) names two 
reasons for this volatility in demand: firstly the length of the pipeline. 
Secondly, the stocks held by each sector (often before and after production) 
directly cause and determine the extent of upstream amplification in the 
pipeline. The direct cause of amplification is the stock holding decision of 
each sector. The way the pipeline is structured magnifies small changes in 
retail sales and amplifies the effect the further upstream one goes. 19 A 10 
percent drop in sales forces each sector into using some of its stockholding to 
meet the lower closing stock requirements. Amplification results in the drop in 
sales almost doubling to 19,5 percent by the time it reaches the spinners. An 
increase in sales has the opposite effect. The way to rid the pipeline of its 
19 See figure 7.2 in Maree (1995:112). 
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volatility is by cutting stock levels. A cut in stock levels will ultimately decrease 
the drop in sales at the other sectors when retail sales drop. The lower the 
stock level, the smaller the decrease in sales at the other sectors (Hopper in 
Maree, 1995: 113-116). One way to solve this problem is by implementing 
Quick Response. 
3.4 Quick Response: a possible solution? 
Hunter (1990) says that Quick Response was established in the second half 
of the 1980s because of the need of clothing and textile firms in the United 
States to become more competitive. Kurt Salmon Associates (date 
unknown:2) describes Quick Response as 'a partnership strategy for retailers, 
manufacturers and mills to achieve faster movement of the right information 
and products through the merchandising and production pipelines'. Quick 
Response strategies can be used for basic and fashion merchandise. It 
reduces markdowns and increases sales and inventory turns for each sector 
in the pipeline. There are financial benefits: improved customer satisfaction 
and increases in market shares. 
Quick Response is 'an operational philosophy and a set of procedures aimed 
at maximising the profitability of the apparel pipeline' (Hunter, 1990: 1 ). For 
success to be achieved, there is a precondition: an integration of the fibre, 
textile, clothing and retail sectors in the pipeline into one consumer responsive 
whole that relies on the pull instead of push method. Quick Response is 
dependent on an effective communication system where information can be 
quickly transferred from the retail point-of-sale to the other sectors. Quick 
Response aims to reduce the safety stocks that are held in the pipeline by 
improving communication and trust. Quick Response demands honest and 
open communication between the sectors, as well as mutual trust. Finally it 
calls for the use of new information technology to decrease work-in-process, 
increase customer responsiveness (using pull instead of push method) and to 
make up for the increased costs due to product diversity (Hunter, 1990:1 ). 
Quick Response is a consumer-responsive apparel supply system that has 
become essential to combat the problems and challenges as described in 
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previous sections. It attempts to make 'the manufacturing process more 
responsive to consumer demands by shortening the pipeline and moving the 
retailer buying process closer to the season for which the garments are 
intended' (Hunter, 1990:32). The results are increased financial performance 
and competitiveness with imports. 
Van der Riet ( 1989:A3-1) adds to the definition of Quick Response that it is a 
focused strategy built on vertical partnerships (between the sectors in the 
apparel textile pipeline). It was designed when the apparel industry in the 
United States lost sales to high quality, low cost imports. The only advantage 
that these firms had over imports were local proximity- they were 
geographically close to their customers, which could help them get close in 
business as well. Quick Response was developed to make use of this 
proximity. Van der Riet (1989:A3-3) argues that one way to do this is to move 
from the push method (discussed earlier) to the pull method. Instead of 
making guesstimates as to what the customer might want, decision-making is 
moved to the customer - which also reduces the risk associated with the push 
method. This can be achieved with a thin pipeline where there is a constant 
flow of goods and not bottlenecks or queues. The pipeline must be flexible or 
capable to change over quickly while still being efficient in a stockless 
environment, meaning no just-in-case stocks. Van der Riet (1989:A3-3) states 
that the cost of not having the right product at the right time at the right place 
is around 20 percent of sales in South Africa. This is because of returns to 
manufacturers, excess inventory, stock-outs and markdowns. Van der Riet 
(1989:A3-17) warns that due to the cost, infrastructure requirements and effort 
that goes into implementing Quick Response it is essential that firms are sure 
about the methodology and the technological requirements before embarking 
on it. 
Quick Response is not just about vertical integration between sectors in the 
pipeline; it is also about horizontal integration and communication between 
different departments in a firm. Schonberger (1996:20) blames 
communication dysfunction between the supply-production side and the 
marketing-distribution side for misguided product decisions and poor service. 
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There are two ways to solve this problem: supply-chain partnerships such as 
Quick Response or multi-functional collaborations within the firm. In most 
firms the marketing-distribution side are unaware of productive capacities and 
capabilities, while the supply-production side are unaware of customer's 
needs, hence they only plan to suit their own interest. Schonberger (1996:22) 
describes the solution as final-demand-based bridge building. This is when a 
company uses retail sales data to schedule production of garments or other 
goods. Benetton, the Italian clothing company, realising the uncertainty of the 
fashion business, would refrain from dyeing a quarter of its output until as late 
as possible. They would then do it using data from current sales. This system 
manages to build a bridge between the two mentioned sides of a firm as 
factories can run quite stable, whilst reacting to certain trends in sales. This 
system can be improved if the entire pipeline is focused on recent sales at the 
retailer, ready to produce accordingly. This can be done using point-of-sale 
bar-code technology. Basic Quick Response can be run by using only a few 
retailers' point-of-sale data. This sample can provide an idea as to how 
production schedules should look like. This is in contrast to traditional 
scheduling, which is done months in advance, based on guesstimates 
(Schonberger, 1996:23). 
Fisher and Roman (1996:87) regard the lead time required to manufacture 
and distribute goods as increasing in importance. Long lead times with 
fashion products resulted in losses due to stock-outs and inventories being 
outdated. Quick Response cuts manufacturing and distribution lead times by 
using information technology such as point-of-sale scanners and electronic 
data information (EDI), logistics improvements such as automated 
warehousing, and improved manufacturing methods such as the 
reorganisation of the sewing process into modular cells. Quick Response also 
cuts lead times using operational change such as how often orders are placed 
and how late colouring-up takes place. Unpredictable demand and the long, 
complex supply chain are two of the biggest challenges in the apparel 
industry. The result is that demand forecasts and production commitments 
must be made long before the actual season. If these are not right, the 
amount of goods produced can be more or even less than what customers 
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would like to buy. If it is less there are supply shortages which result in lost 
sales opportunities. If there is too much of a certain garment (excess supply) 
the price is reduced, even below the cost of production, until it sells (Fisher 
and Roman, 1996:87, Iyer and Bergen, 1997:559). Quick Response counters 
this trend by reducing lead times so much that part of production is committed 
only after some sales have occurred.20 Iyer and Bergen (1997:559) agree that 
sales data can be used to decrease forecast error quite substantially: two 
research projects are cited as reducing the error by almost 50 percent. 
21 
Iyer and Bergen (1997:560) attempted to establish who wins and who loses 
under Quick Response. Their findings suggest that both manufacturers and 
retailers are not always better off, with the former more likely to lose under 
Quick Response. Certain actions may have to be undertaken to make sure 
that Quick Response is Pareto improving. It will be Pareto improving if at least 
all the sectors in the pipeline are as well off as before Quick Response and 
one sector better off than before. Thus, nobody loses with Quick Response. 
Iyer and Bergen (1997:562) determine whether Quick Response is Pareto 
improving by comparing the expected profits of manufacturers and retailers 
before and after Quick Response. 
Iyer and Bergen ( 1997) constructed models of the inventory decisions and 
profits of manufacturers and retailers both before and after Quick Response. 
They verified these models by having extensive discussions with different 
managers and buyers of an American retailer who runs a Quick Response 
programme. They also had discussion with the Quick Response managers of 
ten other retailers and used secondary data such as industry reports. 
Their models show that under low service levels, Quick Response is Pareto 
improving but, says Iyer and Bergen (1997:562), they do not expect to see 
such low service levels in practice. Service level is the probability that demand 
20 Fisher and Roman (1996) modelled first period demand as a portion of total demand 
allowing production decisions to be made with the help of sales, and also measured the value 
of Quick Response. See their article for their mathematical models and analysis. 
21 See Iyer and Bergen (1997) for mathematical models of the inventory decisions of 
manufacturers and retailers before and after Quick Response. 
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is satisfied from available stock. Low service levels imply that the inventory 
level chosen is lower than 50 percent - meaning that customers find the item 
they want in stock less than five times out of ten visits. Iyer (2000) regards 
service level as relevant because 'the profit maximising service level is related 
to the gross margin (selling price minus purchase price) as well as the 
goodwill cost (how much a stockout affects whether a customer decides to 
shop at the store again)'. Iyer (2000) continues: 'Under low service levels, as 
the ability to forecast retail demand decreases (i.e. increased forecast error), 
the profit maximising inventory level carried by the retailer decreases.' Iyer 
(2000) explains it in another way: 'As demand forecast error increases, under 
low service levels, inventory decreases. As demand forecast error increases, 
under high service levels, inventory increases.' However, Quick Response 
allows the inventory decision to be made with additional information, under 
low service levels. Hence the inventory level would increase after Quick 
Response. This makes it Pareto improving as profits for the retailer and the 
manufacturer increase (Iyer, 2000). 
Two pre-existing channel arrangements, which Iyer and Bergen (1997:563) 
identify as providing conditions to make Quick Response Pareto improving 
are consignment inventory and markdown money. Iyer (2000) describes the 
former as meaning that the manufacturer owns the retail inventory. Inventory 
that is left over at the retailer can be returned to the manufacturer for a full 
refund. Retailers pay holding cost through the season, but have a salvage 
value for each garment. Iyer (2000) defines the salvage value as 'the price at 
which retailers dispose of retail inventory that is not sold at regular price 
during the season. This inventory can be sold on sale or to an outlet store.' 
Salvage value is usually lower than wholesale price so the retailer does not 
make money-selling products at salvage value. Hence, it is in the 
manufacturer's interest to minimise leftover product and increase the 
likelihood of Quick Response being Pareto improving. 
A manufacturer pays markdown money to a retailer per item left over at the 
end of the season. The retailer uses this to subsidise markdowns. The 
amount is usually below the wholesale price. 'If markdown money is high 
enough, then the savings for the manufacturer from reduced retailer end of 
season inventory may be large enough to make Quick Response Pareto 
improving' (Iyer and Bergen, 1997:563). 
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The higher the service level the better the chance that Quick Response will 
not be Pareto improving (especially for the manufacturer}, unless there is 
additional action. Iyer (2000) explains why action is needed: 'Under higher 
service levels, decreased forecast error decreases the retailer's inventory 
purchased. Thus the retailer makes higher profits while buying less inventory 
- so retail profits increase under Quick Response. The manufacturer, 
however, sells less product and thus sees a decrease in profits. ' The 
additional action can be price commitments, commitments regarding service 
levels or volume commitments. According to Iyer and Bergen (1997:563), a 
service level commitment is when the retailer offers a higher service level with 
the exact amounts ordered conditional on the estimated demand. 
Regarding service levels, Iyer and Bergen (1997:564) argue that Quick 
Response does not automatically result in increased service levels. Only 
deliberate actions will result in an increase in service levels. According to Iyer 
(2000), retailers that are profit maximising choose service levels based on 
gross margin and goodwill cost. Thus, as the ability to forecast retail demand 
increases, the choice of service level does not automatically increase. This 
choice is based on cost considerations. 
Iyer and Bergen (1997:564) identify three ways to commit credibly to higher 
service levels. The first way is a contractual commitment between the 
manufacturer and the retailer to provide a higher service level. This contract 
could state a planned service level of 100 percent for Quick Response 
products. This guarantees that every time a customer walks into a store his or 
her choice of product will be there. If it is not, the retailer might send it to his or 
her home. Secondly, the use of co-operative advertising with service level 
guarantees. It could guarantee that a store will have every size and advertised 
colour in stock - if they do not they will get it for the customer at no charge. 
Thirdly, increasing the importance of a stockout to consumers. Iyer and 
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Bergen (1997:564) argue that the third approach increases the goodwill costs 
associated with a stockout and so increases the retailer's incentives to 
provide a higher service level. An example of the third is when a retailer 
provides its supplier with a renewed emphasis on a product by giving its items 
more prominent display space. 
On the question whether price commitments play a role in Quick Response, 
Iyer and Bergen (1997:565) found that wholesale prices paid to manufacturers 
stayed the same in Quick Response. Price adjustments are not often used to 
make Quick Response Pareto improving. The preference is to negotiate 
rather on service levels and volume commitments. Iyer (2000) attributes this 
to the fact that 'retailers do not want manufacturers to think that improving 
efficiency and decreasing lead times will increase wholesale prices'. 
Otherwise the manufacturer might perform poorly and ask for a price increase 
to improve performance. Also, most companies have price negotiations at a 
different time than procurement and logistics decisions. 
Iyer and Bergen's (1997:567) research found that retailers used explicit 
volume commitments to suppliers in Quick Response. This happens when the 
retailer places an order. It commits itself to buy a certain amount of units of 
combined products. These commitments could be made using purchase 
orders in which the volume was specified. At a later date when demand can 
be assessed, the exact attributes of the garments such as colour, style and 
size will be decided. To ensure that manufacturers are at least as well off as 
before Quick Response the retailers' volume commitments under Quick 
Response have to be at least the same as before. Often, the retailer might 
want to order less of the supplier's products. If this is the case the buyer might 
add additional Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) to ensure the same volume 
commitment (Iyer and Bergen, 1997:567). 
Iyer and Bergen (1997:566) see the flexibility of Quick Response as a huge 
advantage: 'under the old system the retailer would have purchased the same 
quantity for each item. Now the retailer can order items to improve expected 
profit under Quick Response, thereby making volume commitments Pareto 
improving.' 
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Contrary to others, Iyer and Bergen (1997:563) argue that high fashion items 
may result in the largest losses for manufacturers under Quick Response. 
With fashion items a retailer is uncertain about a product's popularity and its 
demand. Yet, for Quick Response the retailer needs to know the customer 
demand. Thus, fashion items would not allow one to learn as much as non-
fashion items (Iyer and Bergen, 1997:563) and would not be as secure in a 
Quick Response project. 
Knorr and Newman ( 1992:61) suggest that Quick Response be built on a few 
crucial factors: trust-based relationships in the pipeline; redesigned business 
process in the entire supply chain; just-in-time delivery concepts; and flexible 
manufacturing in small batches. Current technology increases the chances of 
success in Quick Response. Satellites, electronic processing speed, fibre 
optics, point-of-sale computers and data storage contribute to accelerate 
Quick Response implementation and progress. Quick Response will result in 
product inventories in warehouses improving from five or ten turns a year to 
fifty turns. Knorr and Newman (1992:64) also suggest that companies who 
intend implementing Quick Response should share data and problems with 
the other companies in the pipeline. There should be top-to-top meetings 
involving all the companies in the pipeline. When Quick Response is decided 
upon, the implementation team must have real authority and must also be 
empowered by top management. 
Returning to warehouses, Hotchkiss (1995: 1) perceives a new role for them. 
Instead of just storing merchandise they become distribution points that add 
value under Quick Response. Under Quick Response put away, storage and 
retrieval are replaced by receiving and shipping. The demand for accuracy 
increases as retailers often charge back for any discrepancies with orders. 
Hotchkiss' ( 1995: 1) research reveals that Quick Response does not 
necessarily mean less inventory. Inventory may be redistributed in the 
pipeline to meet the retailers' requirements. In South Africa the powerful local 
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retailers might force the weaker producers to hold the stock. Manufacturers or 
distribution companies can maintain inventory near the retailers' distribution 
centres. This can satisfy the demand for small orders. The result is that cost 
and time are not removed from the distribution pipeline, just shifted 
(Hotchkiss, 1995: 1 ). 
In a critical discussion of the relationship between new production systems 
and work organisation and skills, Cappelli and Rogovsky (1994:205) evaluate 
Piore and Sabel's arguments that flexible systems of work organisation will 
require workers with increased skills. Under Quick Response, products and 
production runs change constantly. Mass production systems are too slow 
and too expensive per production run to use. A modified system of production, 
which allows output to be produced to fill orders instead of inventory, is 
needed. Under Quick Response, a small, highly skilled team equipped with 
flexible tools handle production. Because of the adaptability of these teams, 
production can almost mirror sales based on consumer tastes. Cappelli and 
Rogovsky (1994:220) resolve that Quick Response manufacturing is closest 
to the flexible specialisation model of Piore and Sabel. Quick Response 
results in workers performing more tasks; hence more skills are needed. 
Workers are not governed by an assembly line, so they have greater 
autonomy. Some production tasks are even moving back from machines to 
workers. But Cappelli and Rogovsky (1994:220) warn that improvements in 
the flexibility of machinery might just reserve this trend again. Current 
machinery is often less flexible than workers and thus, the latter hold the 
advantage, but increased flexibility in technology could take away this 
advantage. 
In the late 1980s there were efforts in South Africa to implement Quick 
Response in an apparel textile pipeline. These attempts did not bear any fruit. 
The ISP (1994:71) reports that the NPI blames local retailers that Quick 
Response did not take off. South African leaders in the clothing and textile 
industries, and the large clothing retailers have not taken up the challenge 
and not honoured Quick Response agreements with the other sectors in the 
pipeline. Local retailers are in positions of power over their suppliers and they 
have not acted on Quick Response yet. These two factors combined are the 
main cause of Quick Response not being successful in South Africa yet. 
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Another problem, according to the ISP (1994:71) is the high mark-up of 
retailers. This stifles demand for the goods of the textile and clothing sectors. 
Some retailers are so expensive that manufacturers sometimes change retail 
outlets to increase demand for their products. Often retailers do not pass on 
savings made by suppliers to the consumers. Quick Response in South Africa 
will only succeed if there is industrial stability. Hence, the industrial relations 
system, management and unions play a crucial role. Due to its nature and use 
of just-in-time, Quick Response cannot be successful if there are frequent 
work stoppages (ISP, 1994:71). 
This section has so far explored what Quick Response is about and what its 
benefits are but what needs to happen or change in a firm and a pipeline for it 
to be considered in Quick Response mode? Hunter (1990:2) earmarks the 
following as its principal elements: rapid development of samples; CAD; 
flexible, short-run operations right through the pipeline; just-in-time shipping; 
highly engineered manufacturing such as laser cutting and modular work 
groups; EDI; standardised bar-coding; pre-ticketing and drop-shipping of 
garments; frequent shipments of garments; pulling back open-to-buy dates, 
point-of-sale tracking; reducing initial retail orders to less than 50 percent of 
requirements; flexible merchandise planning; continuous re-estimation of 
customer demand; and frequent re-ordering with short lead times. He (1990:3) 
also identifies the benefits: increases sales volumes; reduced markdowns and 
stock-outs; reduced costs and prices; increased price validity at retail; 
improved financial performance; and increased competitiveness because of 
shorter lead times and increased share in the markets. 
Hunter (1990:42) suggests that the first step in implementing Quick Response 
is the shortening of the traditional pipeline. This can happen when 
unnecessary inventories and non-processing times are done away with. 
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Regarding inventories, the first thing to eliminate is duplicate stock.22 To 
achieve this, flexible manufacturing must be adopted so as to get rid of the 
inventories associated with long runs, and just-in-time supplier relationships 
need to be adopted so that buyers can get rid of their just-in-case (or safety) 
stock. Minimum stock levels can be achieved if wasted time, wasted material, 
wasted energy of machinery, and errors are eliminated. Production must take 
place as if there were no warehouses and goods could not be produced to 
inventory. Hunter (1990:45) also suggests that Quality Management be 
adopted and the whole pipeline sets up specifications for products and allows 
certification of the products. Quality Management can only be successful if 
there is a change to a more participative management style with increased 
employee involvement. The adoption of Quality Management procedures will 
help decrease inventory and work-in-process times (Hunter, 1990:46).23 
Hunter (1990:51) says that the implementation of the mentioned measures 
can reduce the pipeline from sixty-six to forty-six weeks. Further reduction to 
twenty-one weeks will involve full use of current technology, rapid and honest 
information exchange in the pipeline, and trusting partnerships. These last two 
might just turn out to be the most difficult, especially in South Africa where the 
relationships between retailers and suppliers are not good. 24 
Cutting the lead times in a pipeline increases the cost of goods because of 
shorter runs and more styles. Hunter (1990:59) suggests that certain steps be 
taken to counter the frequent changeover between styles. Another cost of 
increased diversity is that of carrying additional inventory by the textile mills. 
For the garment manufacturers diversification affects fabric utilisation 
negatively. Diversification results in a smaller number of units of a product and 
thus it can increase the waste factor (Hunter, 1990:62). There are costs to 
Quick Response, especially for the mills and manufacturers and if they 
outweigh the benefits then there is no reason for them to continue just so that 
the retailer can benefit. One has to return to the suggestions made by Iyer 
22 The supplier holds duplicate stock as finished goods and the buyer as raw material. 
23 See Hunter (1990:46-50) for measures for each sector to decrease these times. 
24 See Hunter (1990:55) for the operational elements that are required for each sector. 
and Bergen ( 1997) to make Quick Response Pareto improving so that no 
sector in the pipeline is worse off than before Quick Response. These 
measures can be used to offset the above-mentioned costs. 
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Hunter's (1990:90) research shows that the cost of operating a $100 billion 
traditional pipeline is $25 billion. Applying Quick Response can result in a 
saving of 50 percent with the cost decreasing to about $12 billion. However, 
the problem is that the benefits favour the retailer and apparel manufacturer 
far more than the fibre and textile manufacturers. According to Hunter's 
(1990:90) research the retailer will have a saving of $8,2 billion (or 66 percent 
of the total savings), while the garment manufacturer will have a saving of 
$3,5 billion (or 28 percent of the total savings). As a percentage of sales the 
retailers and garment manufacturers save 6 to 8 percent, while the fibre and 
textile manufacturers save 2 to 3 percent. This situation worsens when one 
takes into account that the latter two assume many of the burdens of 
inventory risk, diversification cost and just-in-time shipping. Hunter (1990:91) 
suggests that fibre and fabric pricing should reflect the risks taken by the two 
primary producers. The down-stream customer should take a larger 
ownership stake earlier in the suppliers products, offsetting the increased 
costs for the textile and fibre manufacturer in Iyer and Bergen's (1997) words: 
this might contribute to making Quick Response Pareto improving. 
One of the many suggestions that Hunter ( 1990: 157) makes to ensure the 
success of Quick Response is that of modular manufacturing. In a traditional 
factory there are long lines with the work progressing in bundles, but in 
garment manufacturers that have implemented modular manufacturing there 
are many product centres. In each a complete garment is made by a smal I 
group of workers. A product centre is laid out in a horseshoe configuration. 
The workers are cross-trained to allow real time balancing of the workloads. 
The change in work organisation should also bring a change in management 
to reliance on worker participation. The benefits of modular manufacturing are 
faster response times, enhanced worker motivation, increased quality, lower 
total costs, freed-up capital, and a system conducive to change and 
improvement (Hunter, 1990: 157-158). 
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Van der Riet (1989:A3-3) identifies three technological requirements for a 
company to function in a Quick Response mode. The first concerns the 
information pipeline. The development of Market Preference Testing and 
information flow systems on sales by SKU (colour, style and size). This 
causes sales or customer preferences to dictate production. This can be done 
using point-of-sale information systems. The second requirement concerns 
material standardisation: the development of measures to bring about the 
predictability of materials flow that is necessary in a stockless environment. 
These measures include tracking methodology. This can be done by bar 
coding. The third is short cycle manufacturing. The development of 
manufacturing that can respond to the information on sales quick enough to 
take advantage of the trends in sales. Measures to do this have been 
discussed already. Van der Riet ( 1989:A2-4) then goes on to identify three 
'people' components that will set the wheels of Quick Response in motion. 
The first is vertical partnerships, where the traditional adversarialism in the 
pipeline makes way for partnerships that can facilitate the implementation and 
success of Quick Response. Coupled with this is trust in these relationships. 
Trust and openness must replace the history of over-bookings, late deliveries 
and cancelled orders. The third component is commitment. Quick Response 
can only work if all the partners are committed. There must also be a 
commitment to take up booked production capacity. If this is not done in a 
short cycle environment, it will be too late for the capacity to be sold to a 
different retailer (Van der Riet, 1989:A3-5). 
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
The Textile Clothing Cluster Project of the Western Cape brings together 
many of the main players in the two industries in the region. It discusses and 
puts forward solutions to the crisis that the industries face. It identified Quick 
Response as a possible solution to the problems facing the industry. It 
decided to implement Quick Response in a clothing textile pipeline, consisting 
of willing companies as a forerunner to possible wider implementation. The 
results of this project would have to be presented to the Textile Clothing 
Cluster Project. On the basis of this evidence it would be decided whether 
Quick Response is viable in South Africa and whether it can be implemented 
successfully. The success or otherwise of the Quick Response project would 
be concluded from the research done by myself, an industrial sociology 
student, and Thandeka Kunene, an industrial mathematics student. Kunene's 
aim was to construct a mathematical model of the pipeline - in other words 
doing a quantitative study. I did a qualitative study. 
In order to produce data from my research that would be helpful to the textile 
and clothing industries, as well as result in an accomplished academic 
contribution, I had to research the Quick Response project from different 
angles, using different research methods. From an industrial sociological point 
of view it was not only important to study the impact of Quick Response on 
the production process, but also the impact on the people and institutions in 
the pipeline and their relationships. In this chapter I will discuss the different 
research methods that I u.sed in constructing this case study, as well as 
explain why those methods were chosen above other possibilities. 
Following on this would be a section on the advantages and disadvantages of 
using the mentioned methods and how I sought to counter the disadvantages. 
The last section will be on the validity and reliability of my research and the 
ethical issues involved. Taking into consideration factors mentioned in the 
previous chapter, such as the power relationship between retailers and the 
rest of the pipeline, the adversarialism between textiles and clothing, and the 
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lack of co-operation between firms on a horizontal level, the section on ethics 
is of particular interest. 
Before continuing with the chapter it would be useful to outline the 
assumptions of the scientific method. Lastrucci (in Bernard, 1994:3) describes 
science as 'an objective, logical and systematic method of analysis of 
phenomena, devised to permit the accumulation of reliable knowledge'. 
Bernard (1994:3) highlights three words in this definition as especially 
important: objective, method and reliable. Although the idea of true objectivity 
is regarded as a delusion, one must still strive for it. Regarding method, there 
is a single, scientific method based on three assumptions: firstly, that reality is 
in the field and can be discovered; secondly, that, using direct observation, it 
can be discovered; and thirdly, that material explanations for that which is 
observed are sufficient. The third word of importance is reliable: something 
that is true in one case will be just as true anywhere else (Bernard, 1994:4). 
These three concepts used here will be discussed, as they relate to my 
research, in this chapter. 
As I have mentioned, this was a qualitative study. The idea was to form a 
picture of Quick Response in a South African apparel textile pipeline - a 
relatively new, unexplored phenomenon. I combined both descriptive and 
explanatory elements in my study. Bailey (1987:38) states that researchers 
use descriptive studies when they want to show what happened. They usually 
do not have a formal hypothesis that needs to be tested - especially in 
exploratory studies. Descriptive studies are used when studying a relatively 
new issue of which a lot is not known. By asking 'what' questions the 
researcher tries to describe the phenomenon in detail. The descriptive 
elements of my study focused on Quick Response in South Africa, as new 
and unexplored. 
I also included explanatory elements, which Bailey (1987:38) describes as 
going beyond mere description and trying to explain a certain situation. A 
researcher can try to explain by using 'why' and 'how' questions. These 
questions I employed while studying changes in work organisation, especially 
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in the textile and clothing industries in South Africa. Using qualitative research 
methods I attempted to describe Quick Response in a South African apparel 
textile pipeline by finding out what it is, what its features are, how it is 
implemented and what its effects are. The methods that I used were 
interviews and observation. 
4.1 The research methods 
4. 1.1 Interviews 
The main method of gathering data in this study was interviews. I employed 
semi-structured interviews using mostly open-ended questions, but also some 
closed-ended ones. This is close to what Bailey (1987:190) describes as a 
focused interview. After the interviewer has studied the phenomenon in 
question, certain important issues concerning it are identified. So question 
wording might not be decided on beforehand, but question content is. This 
structure, which includes certain crucial topics, stops the interview from being 
worthless and not fulfilling its duty. The open-ended questions provide 
flexibility and allow for unanticipated responses. It also allows the interviewer 
to probe further, if need be. 
Bailey (1987:189) says that a probe is needed when the respondent provides 
a vague answer or even if something of interest is said which needs to be 
explored further. The function of a probe is to provide a minimally acceptable 
answer or to guide the respondent to a more accurate question. Probes may 
be written in advance on the interview schedule or used spontaneously during 
the interview. The flexibility of the open-ended questions and semi-structured 
interview allows for a long series of probes that might delve deeper than a 
structured interview with closed questions (Bailey, 1987: 191 ). 
I chose semi-structured interviews over standardised and unstructured 
interviews as the type that would best suite the theme and circumstances. I 
decided against unstructured interviews (with only a topic and no questions) 
because I did not feel that I had the necessary experience in conducting these 
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kinds of interviews. Experience is important when conducting unstructured 
interviews and not having the benefit of questions or themes. An even more 
important factor in the decision was my initial lack of knowledge on the subject 
of my research. This holds especially true for Quick Response, which is still 
· relatively new in South Africa. I did not use a standardised interview because 
of its inflexibility. This is especially the case when the respondent introduces 
new issues in an interview. A semi-structured interview allows one to probe 
such issues. 
The research took place over a period of one year, allowing for many 
interviews. Towards the end of this period, I had acquired enough experience 
and knowledge of the subject to be able to conduct thorough interviews that 
were unstructured. These were usually third or fourth interviews, with the 
same respondents, following upon previous interviews or discussing the 
current state of affairs in the project. 
4.1.2 Observation 
The second method that was used in constructing this case study was 
observation. Bailey (1987:239) argues that observation usually involves visual 
data collection, such as non-verbal behaviour but can also include data 
collection via hearing. The two types of observation are participant and non-
participant. The former includes regular participation in that which is observed, 
without other participants being aware that the person is to be a researcher. A 
non-participant observer does not participate and is known to be a researcher. 
The aim behind observation is to study in detail the behaviour and 
relationships in a setting or institution. Observation can provide answers that 
other research methods might not be able to do, such as information on 
unconscious behaviour or behaviour that is not the norm. Observation is 
usually conducted in a natural setting - that in which those that are observed 
feel most comfortable. Bailey (1987:243) identifies two types of structures by 
which observation can be classified: the structure of the environment and the 
degree of structure employed by the observer. The environment can either be 
a natural setting or an artificial one, such as a laboratory. The observation 
itself can either be structured, where frequencies of behaviours might be 
counted, or unstructured, where whatever occurs is observed and recorded. 
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Bernard ( 1994: 136) defines observation as 'getting close to people and 
making them feel comfortable enough with your presence so that you can 
observe and record information about their lives'. Hence, it is easier to talk to 
people who are being observed about sensitive topics. 
The Quick Response project was implemented at a textile mill, a garment 
manufacturer and a retailer - which together constitute this apparel textile 
pipeline. In order to study Quick Response in this pipeline, these three 
companies, their vertical relationships with each other and the horizontal 
relationships within them needed to be studied. As was discussed previously 
in this section, most of the data was collected interviewing workers, middle 
and upper management. I also used non-participant observation. This entailed 
attending meetings held by the companies involved in the project. Initially the 
meetings concerned the implementation of Quick Response and later about 
·, 
its progress, success and problems that were encountered. I describe it as 
non-participant observation as those involved in the project gave me 
permission to observe the meetings (thus, it was not covert) but I did not 
participate. 
According to Bailey's (1987) classification it was an unstructured field study as 
it took place in a natural setting and I recorded whatever occurred. This'non-
participant observation complemented the interviews. 
Observing the meetings between representatives of the three sectors of the 
pipeline gave me insight into the relationships between both the companies 
and the people working for them. For Quick Response to be successful, 
effective, open, trustworthy dealings between those who are involved are 
essential. An interview can be used to ask questions about relationships, but 
the observation provided first-hand experience. The observation, like the 
interviews, also took place over a period of one year. 
4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the methods 
4.2. 1 Interviews 
Bailey ( 1987: 17 4) regards the following as advantages of interview studies: 
flexibility, non-verbal behaviour, question order, spontaneity and time of 
interview. The first and the third are connected. 
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An interview allows the researcher to probe interesting or relevant answers, to 
repeat questions when they have been misunderstood, to change the order of 
questions in order to increase the effectiveness, and leave out questions that 
might have been addressed already or that are not applicable. Another 
advantage is spontaneity. Contrary to some other methods the researcher can 
record spontaneous answers, which are often more informative and less 
normative than those answers that one has contemplated. Coupled with this, 
is that the interviewer's presence allows him or her to observe non-verbal 
behaviour. This can help assess the validity of answers. This holds especially 
true in a research project such as this one where sensitivity is an issue. 
Because relationships in apparel textile pipelines are traditionally 
characterised by tension and mistrust, respondents might answer what they 
assume the researcher wants to hear. Interviews have allowed for a method 
to assess validity and observe spontaneous answers. 
Another advantage is the time of interview. This has been the case in this 
study as this project depends on decisions and times. A respondent might 
have a certain view based on a decision taken at a certain time or not taken 
until after the interview. This method allows for the exact time and date of the 
study to be identified. Important events that have occurred during the study 
can be recorded and answers before and after it, can be compared. 
According to Bailey (1987:175) the disadvantages of interviews are cost, time, 
interview bias, no opportunity to consult records, inconvenience, less 
anonymity and lack of accessibility to respondents. Interview studies, 
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compared to other research methods can be expensive. Interview schedules 
can be costly to construct and employing and training interviewers can also be 
costly. This disadvantage was not really applicable in this study as I did all the 
interviews myself and had no one else to train or to pay and no extra 
schedules to reproduce. The travel expenses were not all that harsh as the 
apparel textile pipeline's firms were located in and around Cape Town. 
Three disadvantages are connected: time, inconvenience and lack of 
accessibility to respondents. Interviews usually take time, that of the 
interviewer and the respondent. This study was done in companies where the 
respondents were working. It means that interviews can often be inconvenient 
to respondents even if they have been scheduled weeks in advance, as new 
problems take priority over interviews. These problems were overcome 
because of the one-year period of the research. Often respondents could not 
keep to pre-arranged meetings, but the interviewer was able to return 
because of the length of the study. This factor also negated the fact that 
interviews often do not allow respondents to consult their records. As I 
returned for follow-up interviews, records could be consulted in that time. 
Interviews offer less anonymity than other methods. The only way that this 
can really be overcome is when the respondents trust the interviewer. This 
disadvantage played an important role in this study. The information that I 
received was often very sensitive and it was crucial that I not leak it to 
competitors of the firms or even to the other firms in the pipeline. For this 
reason trust was initially not easy to come by. 
Together with my supervisor and the firms involved it was decided that there 
would be three types of information: that which can be published, that which 
must be masked before publication using indices and that, which cannot be 
published. The firms would also get a chance to read this thesis before 
publication, allowing them to identify information that might be too sensitive. 
These measures were the only way I would be allowed access to the 
companies. 
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Regarding the last disadvantage, interview bias, it is probably the most 
entrenched in interview studies. Interviewers can misunderstand answers or 
even understand them using their own bias and respondents' answers can be 
affected by his or her reaction to the interviewer. The only thing that can be 
done here is, as Bernard (1994) noted earlier, to strive for objectivity and 
attempt to win the trust of the respondents, thus minimising their reaction to 
the interviewer. 
4.2.2 Observation 
Bailey (1987:240) identifies non-verbal behaviour and natural environment as 
two advantages of this method. Observation is very effective in studying non-
verbal behaviour. In this study, certain sensitive questions concerning the 
relationships between the firms in the pipeline might not have been answered 
candidly in interviews. However, by observing meetings of the pipeline it is 
possible to get an inside look at relationships - not just non-verbal behaviour, 
but also conversations and dealings between representatives of the firms. 
This links with the second advantage that the behaviour takes place in its 
natural environment where there are usually meetings between the firms. This 
might assist in less reactive behaviour or answers than with interviews. 
Bailey (1987:241) regards the following as disadvantages of observation: 
small sample size, gaining entry and lack of anonymity. Observational studies 
tend to use a smaller sample size and the data is difficult to quantify. 
However, in this study the aim was not to generalise to a larger population 
such as all South African apparel textile pipelines. It was descriptive and 
exploratory study of one case of Quick Response. The other two 
disadvantages, gaining entry and lack of anonymity, were overcome as 
discussed in the previous section. 
It has to be remembered that the firms that were studied are in a very 
competitive environment. Suddenly they were asked to allow a researcher to 
study their workings and relationships with other companies. This was done, 
using the preconditions discussed earlier. It allowed the firms some control of 
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the information that would be disseminated. These observations took place 
over a period of one year. This fact neutralised the reactivity of an observer 
being present in meetings. Initially it might have been difficult having someone 
else present at meetings but as firms started to trust the situation and 
observer, the meetings normalised. Or as Bailey (1987:244) says, a natural 
setting was not changed into an unnatural one. 
4.3 Validity, reliability and ethics 
Validity is about asking whether the research method really measures that 
which the researcher assumes it does. Bailey (1987:68) says that in order to 
determine the validity of a method one needs to know the definition of the 
concept being measured. Face validity is assessed by the evaluator studying 
that which is to be measured and determining whether the method arrives at, 
the concept adequately. Criterion validity 'entails use of a second measure of 
the concept as a criterion by which the validity of the new measure may be 
checked' (Bailey, 1987:68). 
The second measure .in the case of my research was often the interviewees 
themselves. I interviewed most of them a few times and so got the chance to 
speak to them about some of my preliminary conclusions. The interviewees 
got a chance to confirm or not the validity of the methods used. I could also 
determine the validity of my methods as I used two methods to study the 
same project. By observing meetings between the respondents I was able to 
establish whether my other research method, interviewing, was valid and vice 
versa. When a response or attitude on one measuring instrument correlates 
with the response or attitude on another measuring instrument, it is valid. 
Bailey (1987:70) states that' a measure is reliable if the measurement does 
not change when the concept being measured remains constant in value' -
reliability, in other words, measures consistency. It is crucial for research that 
the methods employed are reliable and valid. 
Bernard (1994:38) states that validity is the most important issue in research. 
It refers to the accuracy and trustworthiness of the methods used, the data 
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gathered and the conclusions made. The validity of data depends on the 
validity of the methods. If data were gathered using research methods that are 
not valid then the data would automatically not be valid. Valid data does not 
spawn valid conclusions from that data automatically. It is still necessary to 
make valid conclusions, as certain findings from data that is valid can be 
invalid. Valid data and valid findings can result in explanations that are not 
necessarily valid. It is still important to make valid explanations when using 
valid data and findings. Bernard (1994:39) defines reliability of a research 
method as it being able to give the same result when measuring something 
more than once. 
Discussing the validity and reliability of interview studies, Bailey (1987:207) 
notes that there are a few ways that error can ruin an interview. Respondents 
are usually more accurate on recent events than on events that happened 
long ago. This results in errors when questions deal with issues that fit into the 
latter category. Errors also occur when a respondent does not know the 
answer and is ashamed, and when respondents answer in a socially 
desirable, yet inaccurate, way. However, the relative control evident in an 
interview situation strengthens the quality of the data gathered. 
Another factor that impacts on the validity and reliability of interviews is that 
records cannot be consulted if the respondent cannot remember. But, as I 
have mentioned before, the fact that the study was longitudinal neutralised 
this as respondents had 'another chance' in follow-up interviews. Regarding 
possible errors when answering took place in socially desirable ways, the fact 
that observation was used assisted in creating validity. Socially desirable 
answers are most prevalent when sensitive questions are asked. By using 
observation to complement interviews some errors were eliminated as two 
instruments were used to study one issue. 
Bernard (1994:140) argues that observation increases validity, as it is then 
possible to collect different kinds of data. My observation of meetings allowed 
me to listen to what the representatives of the firms in the pipeline said and to 
observe their non-verbal behaviour at the same time. I could then weigh up 
--- ---------------------------
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the results. When observing, one of the main problems is that of reactivity. 
Bailey (1987:20) says that reactivity can affect the data. It could be that when 
I observed the respondents in their meetings they acted one way and when I 
was not observing the meetings they acted in another. Bernard ( 1994: 141) 
says that 'lower reactivity means higher validity of data'. The fact that this 
study (and the observation) took place over a year reduced the problem of 
reactivity. The firms and their employees got used to the observer in their 
ranks and started acting normally, if they had not previously. Observation also 
allowed me to construct new questions based on what I had recorded in 
meetings. This might not have happened had I not observed and crucial 
issues might have been neglected. 
Bailey (1987:265) adds to these arguments: 'Observation of an occurrence 
has greater face validity than a second hand account gathered ... through 
interviewing ... ' This was true in my research when interviewing people about 
relationships between companies and actually observing the relationships first 
hand. The observation complemented the data gathered by interviews. 
Regarding the ethics in this study, it would be valuable to use the view of 
Preston-Whyte (1990:246) who says that researchers who enter the fields of 
development or action research are usually confronted by more than the 
average amount of problematic ethical issues. As I have mentioned already, it 
was a problem gaining access to this pipeline. It was only granted once 
certain undertakings regarding confidentiality were given. Data gathered could 
either be published as is, published with indices to mask it or not published at 
all in the case of sensitive information. The main concern was that company 
secrets might become public domain, allowing the firms' competitors to use 
the information. I had gained wide access to the companies, their meetings, 
documents and personnel. The companies wanted to ensure that their 
positions in their respective industries would not be negatively influenced. 
This problem was never of great concern to myself as I did not have contact 
with their competitors and I was confident of the non-sensitivity of that which I 
would publish. Of greater concern was the information flow between 
companies. 
100 
Preston-Whyte (1990:242) says that researchers can observe occurrences or 
hear discussions that those concerned would not want to reveal to others. 
Researchers then have to consider what can be disseminated, what must 
remain confidential and whether to use certain information gained while 
conducting a study. It is necessary to decide whether to preserve the 
confidentiality of research material and the anonymity of individuals and their 
organisation, or not (Preston-Whyte, 1990:242). 
In the previous chapter I discussed the not-so-healthy relationships that have 
existed and exist between textile mills and garment manufacturers and 
retailers. This complicated the research process enormously in this study. The 
companies would divulge information to me about the other participants in the 
project, which I would be able to use in my research to strengthen it. 
However, I had to decide whether the information is public domain or not. 
Would I not damage relationships even further if I let a company know what its 
supplier or customer thinks of it? Am I able to use certain data to construct 
new questions if it might sour relationships? Surely, using this sensitive data 
would enable me to build a better case study, but would it not do harm as 
well? On the other hand, if Quick Response is to be successful, companies 
have to be open and honest with each other. During this entire study I had to 
tread a fine line between using data gathered to build a good case study and 
not using data for ethical reasons. 
Bailey (1987:407) sums it up well: 'We have a scientific interest in 
demonstrating the way harmful effects on people are caused, but an ethical 
interest in avoiding such harm.' Somehow both goals need to be served, but 
we must probably be guided by the fact that people should not be harmed by 
research. 
The last issue of note regarding this study concerns objectivity. Bernard 
( 1994: 152) regards objectivity as a ~kill that can be improved if one works at 
it. An objective measurement is one where no error is made based on 
previous experiences, memory and opinions. It is then quite obvious that no 
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one can ever be objective. By being aware of our values and experiences we 
might strive to transcend it and to achieve objectivity or as Bernard ( 1994: 152) 
describes it, accurate knowledge. Bernard (1994: 153) also argues that 
objectivity does not mean value neutrality. It means presenting irrefutable 
research, not neutral research. 
If one had to evaluate the research my partner and I did it would not adhere to 
the traditional understanding of objectivity where one describes a 
phenomenon without interfering with the objects of the research. During this 
research process we interfered so much that it felt as if we were driving the 
project at times. This 'interference' took the form of questions that we asked 
or remarks that we made regarding the Quick Response project. These 
questions and remarks took place during interviews or when checking findings 
with the respondents (those driving the project). The questions were derived 
from our theoretical research and from studying the project. They triggered 
responses, more questions and actions from the respondents. Hence, we 
influenced the project as the respondents behaved differently to what they 
had before we asked the questions. 
The respondents had experience in and knowledge of the clothing and textile 
industries but did not have the theoretical knowledge of Quick Response that 
we had built up. Our knowledge often provided the basis for some change or 
improvement in the project. 
We were able to 'interfere' as we did because of the length of our research. 
The research continued for more than a year and this allowed us to build a 
relationship with the respondents from the companies. Thus, they were able 
to ask us questions on Quick Response based on our theoretical knowledge. 
The answers that they received often influenced the way they operated in the 
companies. Another reason this aspect of our research was unique to this 
project was because Quick Response is a new phenomenon in South Africa. 
If it had been a project that had been run before, the respondents would have 
had experience of it and would not have needed any input from us. However, 
most of the respondents did not have any previous Quick Response 
experience or knowledge and thus they accepted any help we could give 
them. 
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It was quite obvious that we were not being neutral or objective. We were not 
just researching the project; we also got involved in it. I believe that the 
involvement was positive as it meant an improvement in the way Quick 
Response was run and its chances of success. I also believe that it did not 
affect our research and that we were still able to present an irrefutable, 
accurate account of the project. This has to do with the nature of the research. 
If many Quick Response projects were being compared, then surely helping 
one, as we did, at the expense of others, would have affected our research 
results. But this was an exploratory study and if our knowledge and influence 
improved this project, it could benefit t.he companies involved, help save the 
industries and create jobs. 
Chapter 5 Data and Analysis 
'Quick Response is not like a fish and chips store.' - The retailer's planning 
manager. 
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In this chapter I present the data gathered during the Quick Response project 
as well as an analysis of the data. I use the data to clarify and highlight points 
and to support my analysis. Firstly, I discuss what the respondents believe 
Quick Response to be and compare this to the theory. Secondly, I analyse the 
impact of this Quick Response project on each company in this apparel textile 
pipeline in the Western Cape and what the outcome was. Thirdly, I look at the 
shortcomings of the project. 
Finally, I present a profile of each company: the textile mill, the garment 
manufacturer and the retailer. These profiles highlight the differences between 
the companies before the implementation of Quick Response and thereafter. 
Throughout the chapter I compare the data with the Quick Response theory. 
One can measure Quick Response using different indicators. In this thesis, I 
use lead time, overstock and stock-outs. Lead time is the time from when an 
order is placed until it is delivered. Overstock is when the stock bought by a 
retailer exceeds the demand for it. This could lead to a markdown. Stock-outs 
occur when the stock bought by a retailer is less than the demand for it. This 
leads to a loss of sales and possibly the goodwill of customers. 
The data in this chapter was gathered by interviewing people involved in the 
project and by observing meetings. I interviewed the retailer's planning 
manager, planner, technologist, distributor and buyer, the manufacturer's 
managing director, sales, human resource, planning, and production 
managers and industrial engineer, the mill's managing director, industrial 
engineer, liaison officer and planner and the CEO of the mill and the 
manufacturer. At the manufacturer, I also interviewed three SACTWU 
shopstewards. 
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The interviews took place over the period of a year and different interview 
schedules were used. Enclosed as appendices to this thesis are the interview 
schedules used at different times in the project: the planning (appendix a), the 
implementation (appendix b) and the results (appendix c). These three were 
used for the interviews with managers. The fourth schedule (appendix d) was 
used for the interviews with shopstewards at the garment manufacturer. The 
interview schedules were all semi-structured with probes to elicit more 
information. 
5.1 What is Quick Response? 
For the retailer's planner Quick Response means 'ensuring that the right stock 
(colour and size) is at the right place at the right time. It means getting the 
stock down to an acceptable level to get maximum profit. It is really sales-
based replenishment. For the retailer the name Quick Response might be 
misleading. It means the replenishment of a model stock. The model stock 
determines how many of a specific size and colour must be on a shelf. With 
both Quick Response and stock replenishment the question is how quick you 
can get the pipeline to replace sales while only holding sufficient stock. 
Holding too much stock is expensive. This applies to the suppliers as well. 
The objectives of the project are lower stocks, quicker stock-runs and better 
sell-offs. They are all interrelated.' 
The manufacturer's sales manager sees 'Quick Response as a hands-on 
approach to handling an order because everyone is focussed on it. It is 
actually model stock replenishment. If stock can be replenished in store it 
would mean more units for all in the pipeline. It is an advanced step for us. 
Quick Response means we will be satisfying the customer by having the 
goods in the right place at the right time in the right colour and size. We could 
not measure it before but now that we have stock we will see additional sales 
and satisfied customers.' 
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'Quick Response is the ability to respond quickest to customers' orders. We 
see it as a replenishing of stock programme,' adds the mill's managing 
director. 
These three quotes compare well with Hunter's (1990:1) precondition for 
success for Quick Response: ' ... an integration of the fibre, textile, clothing and 
retail sectors in the pipeline into one consumer responsive whole that relies 
on the pull instead of push method.' The manufacturer's sales manager 
speaks about everyone being focused on replacing the stock (an integration 
of the pipeline into a consumer responsive whole). The retailer's planner and 
the mill's managing director emphasises the need to respond the customers' 
orders, replace sales and stick to the model stock instead of blindly placing 
stock on the shelves (pull instead of push). 
From the previous experience of the CEO of the mill and manufacturer Quick 
Response means 'always having what the customer wants but theoretically 
having only one and when it is sold to replace it. This is done without 
theoretically having any stock. What do we, as suppliers, have to do to ensure 
that the product is available at the retailer? If the product is not in the retailer's 
shop when the customer wants it, the retailer does not only lose the sale but 
also the goodwill of the customer. How can one do it as close as possible to a 
stockless environment? It has to be just.,.in-time, not just-run-out. On the other 
hand, we cannot have too much stock in the warehouse because that is not 
Quick Response. We should rather have one each of a hundred different 
products than one hundred of the same product. There is a better chance of a 
sale being made then.' 
Hunter ( 1990: 1) also discusses reducing the safety stocks held in the pipeline 
through better communication and improved trust. At the beginning of the 
project the manufacturer's sales manager predicted that this project would not 
mean an increase in stock levels. This, however, was not the case as I will 
discuss later in the chapter but still the manufacturer saw that as part of Quick 
Response. 
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The pipeline can only replace the model stock and the sold items in time if it 
cuts the lead time. The mill's industrial engineer identifies one of the ways of 
doing this as holding a certain amount of stock. 'It is easier as the 
administration work is cut out. Instead of ten days of administration work we 
now only have one day's worth to do.' 
When cutting lead times, Knorr and Newman (1992:61) argue that just-in-time 
delivery is a crucial factor. However, the mill's engineer does not agree. 'It 
does not matter if there is not any just-in-time as long as the lead times are 
down and the customers satisfied. It needs to be satisfactory to the retailer.' 
The difference in opinion here can be attributed to the engineer's view that 
'Quick Response's definition depends on the product involved and the 
process'. 
It seems from different respondents' and authors' views that an important 
question when setting up Quick Response is to decide how much stock to 
hold in the pipeline. Holding some stock can help cut the lead time but holding 
too much stock defeats the purpose of Quick Response - a decrease in 
amplification and volatility - and increases warehouse costs. I will return to 
this issue later. 
Quick Response does not only entail moving the product through the pipeline 
quicker, but information as well. The suppliers can only know which sales 
have taken place and consequently what products to produce if they receive 
the right information from the retailer. The mill's managing director sees the 
information the retailer provides on the sizes, colours and ratios as the key to 
success: 'Everything is based on quality of information.' Kurt Salmon 
Associates (date unknown:2) concur when describing Quick Response as 'a 
partnership strategy for retailers, manufacturers and mills to achieve faster 
movement of the right information and products through the merchandising 
and production pipelines'. 
'This information is generated using point of sales technology,' says the mill's 
engineer. 'Quick Response is a system whereby we can replenish the 
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retailer's stock as soon as possible based on its point of sales data. It allows 
the retailer to see daily where to replenish and then send an order to the 
suppliers.' Hunter (1990) also stresses this point: 'Quick Response is 
dependent on an effective communication system where information can be 
quickly transferred from the retail point-of-sale to the other sectors.' 
The CEO regards trust as integral to Quick Response or 'the project falls 
apart'. This is in line with two authors: 'Quick Response demands honest and 
open communication between the sectors, as well as mutual trust' (Hunter, 
1990: 1) and 'trust-based relationships in the pipeline is a crucial factor ' (Knorr 
and Newman, 1992:61 ). 
5.2 Outcomes 
The adoption of Quick Response in this pipeline impacted on each company 
or group in the pipeline. The next section looks at the outcomes for the textile 
mill, the garment manufacturer, both the mill and the manufacturer, the retailer 
and all three. 
5.2.1 Outcome for the textile mill 
5.2.1.1 Pilot project 
The mill has used this Quick Response project as a pilot to use more 
technology in its own production process and in communicating with suppliers 
and customers. 
5.2.2 Outcomes for the garment manufacturer 
The managing director, sales and planning managers of the manufacturer 
describe their company as being flexible by accident, not by design. They 
claim 'the X-tuck shirt drove us to be flexible while falling tariffs and 
competition contributed to it.' 
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5.2.2.1 Closer to the retailer 
Contrary to some of the retailer's suppliers, this one is not a 'hundred-
percenter' - supplying only to this retailer. The retailer's commitment to those 
suppliers is very high. This manufacturer could benefit from Quick Response if 
it moves closer to the retailer and gets the same commitment from it. 
The manufacturer's planning manager believes 'we will only move closer if the 
customer get what it wants'. So it is important for the manufacturer to be 
efficient and ensure a successful project. This will mean more contracts in the 
future. It might even become a 'hundred-percenter'. 
'Moving closer' does not only mean an improved relationship, it also entails 
working together more efficiently. This is illustrated in the following quote from 
the manufacturer's planning manager: 'The retailer has to feed through its 
requirements and be close to us. This will allow us to order accurately.' 
Even when the retailer's information is not accurate the manufacturer is still 
prepared to accommodate it. This happens because, as the manufacturer's 
sales manager says, 'we want to be seen as flexible because the client does 
not always know exactly what colours and sizes it wants. It must be able to 
change.' This might result in more work for the manufacturer. The motivation 
behind doing this lies in a quote by the manufacturer's production manager: 
'We accommodate customers because that means an increase in turnover.' 
5.2.2.2 True value of the X-tuck 
According to the manufacturer's sales manager, one of the benefits of Quick 
Response is that 'we can measure the true value of X-tuck in the 
marketplace'. Previously the manufacturer considered dropping it like it did 
the basic T-shirt but, thanks to Quick Response, this shirt has now secured a 
new base at the manufacturer. 
5.2.2.3 Red-flagging 
108 
The manufacturer's planning manager admits to red-flagging the orders for 
this project: 'Quick Response is planned into the capacity of the factory but it 
enjoys top priority and can be red-flagged.' 
Red-flagging entails marking orders and allowing them to jump queues. The 
manufacturer believes this project cannot be successful without red-flagging 
the Quick Response orders. This way it ensures the Quick Response orders 
are not late and the retailer satisfied. Yet this could result in its other orders 
being late. 
5.2.2.4 A low profit margin 
The garment manufacturer's profit margin on the X-tuck shirt is low. It might 
sometimes even lose on the shirt. As a result it is very sensitive about 
anything that might increase its costs. Its sales manager states that the import 
price is RS or R6 more than its price. 'Ideally, this is not the price that we want 
to sell the shirt for but we know that there are long-term benefits.' 
The manufacturer needs to identify ways to cut costs to ensure it does not 
lose with the X-tuck shirt. One avenue identified by its CEO is packaging 
which can cost R88 000 per month. By finding an economic pack the· - ·· · 
manufacturer can cut its packaging costs. This was being investigated during 
the Quick Response project. 
5.2.2.5 Expensive teal and indigo 
One thing that affects the manufacturer's profit margin is colour. Teal and 
indigo are more expensive than other colours. So if more teal and indigo shirts 
are sold than others the manufacturer does not cover its costs. It makes its 
profits when white and the other colours sell well. Its managing director 
suggests the original price be rectified if teal and indigo sell better than the 
others. One suggestion is a rating structure in case one colour sells better 
than the others. 
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5.2.3 Outcomes for both the mill and the manufacturer 
5.2.3.1 Implement Quick Response elsewhere 
This project will benefit the two suppliers by allowing them to utilise the skills 
and mindset acquired in this project to win more customers and use in other 
pipelines. This is evidenced by the fact that the manufacturer is already 
talking to other retailers about possible Quick Response programmes as 
mentioned by the manufacturer's planning manager. The mill's engineer 
believes that when other potential customers get to know about the project it 
will be good marketing for the mill. 
The project also gives these two suppliers a foot in the door when the retailer 
starts model stock replenishment due to its similarities with Quick Response. 
The mill's engineer is adamant that 'if the mill can meet the retailer's demand, 
it means more business because the· retailer will have more confidence in us'. 
5.2.3.2 Using local proximity 
The two suppliers have been affected by decreased tariffs and the 
subsequent increase in international competition. According· to the -· · 
manufacturer's managing director, sales and planning managers it lost the 
basic T-shirt because of this. Its average order size has gone down from what 
it was in the past. 
An important benefit for the mill and the manufacturer is learning how to use 
their local proximity as an advantage over cheaper imports. Imported products 
might be cheaper but the local firms are physically closer to the retailers. By 
using their local proximity the suppliers can ensure that service and shortened 
lead times become more important than price for customers. Shorter lead 
times provide the retailer with certainty that can neutralise the effect of 
cheaper imports at a much longer lead time. 
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This is reflected in the view of the mill's managing director at the beginning of 
the project: 'It is important for us to find out what it is worth for a customer to 
receive information and deliveries on time. This could differentiate us from 
other suppliers. For us, Quick Response is a way of tying a retailer to us by 
delivering on time.' As the mill's engineer say: 'We cannot compete on price, 
only on lead times.' 
There is also a realisation of this advantage at the garment manufacturer. Its 
managing director, sales and planning managers identify quicker service as 
the only thing that it can offer. 'Importing might be cheaper, but we have the 
edge on lead times.' 
According to Hunter (1990), Quick Response was established in the second 
half of the 1980s in the United States because of the need of clothing and 
textile firms to become more competitive. Quick Response was implemented 
when the apparel industry in the United States lost sales to high quality, low 
cost imports. The only advantage that these firms had over imports were local 
proximity - they were geographically closer to their customers, which could 
help them get close in business as well. Quick Response was developed to 
make use of this. 
This corresponds with Piore and Sabel's (1984:261) use of 'regionat . 
conglomeration', which they regard as part of flexible specialisation. It is a 
specialised industrial district consisting of a few small firms who co-operate. 
Together they secure benefits such as customers, financial assistance and 
raw materials. It assists them against competitors from outside their region or 
country. 
The mill and the manufacturer were already in a 'regional conglomeration'. 
Says the manufacturer's planning manager: 'Because we are physically next 
to each other and part of the same company we can offer special things to 
international customers.' 
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Both suppliers believe that service and quality are their strong points. They 
admit that they might be more expensive than others. According to the 
manufacturer's planning manager, 'price, quality and reliability are important. 
We are not the cheapest but we offer good quality and reliability.' Its 
managing director, sales and planning managers believe 'retailers choose us 
because of our service and quality. We never lower our standards on quality, 
our service is professional and we deliver on time.' 
The mill's liaison claims that it is one of the best quality mills in the country. It 
is perceived to be expensive but its quality and deliveries are good. Thus it 
concentrates on the latter two. Its engineer agrees: 'Customers choose us 
because of our good quality. Doing business with large retailers also 
enhances our reputation.' 
However, despite all the talk about the importance of quality and reliability, the 
manufacturer's planning manager, while discussing its suppliers, says 'We 
import fabric when local prices are not competitive. At the end of the day price 
is the most important thing.' If this is the case, what chance does these two 
'expensive' suppliers have of surviving? It seems that the suppliers want one 
thing from the retailer but this does not apply to its own suppliers. If this 
retailer had the same attitude, the textile and clothing industries in South 
Africa would have been even worse off. 
5.2.4 Outcomes for the retailer 
5.2.4.1 The retailer's responsibilities 
Being involved with this Quick Response project for the retailer means giving 
the delivery instruction (DI) on the right date and calculating the model stock 
correctly. As the mill's managing director says 'The key to success is the 
information the retailer gives us on the sizes, colours and ratios. Everything is 
based on quality of information.' Accurate information will allow the 
manufacturer to order accurately and contribute to a successful project. 
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However, this will not be easy. The retailer's planner describes current orders 
as a thumb-suck as the company does not know for sure whether the order 
will sell. 'We need to order more responsibly. We also need to secure the 
kimble tickets with the dates of manufacture and the SKUs on them.' The 
planning manager adds: 'For Quick Response to run smoothly we have to 
ensure that we get the model stock right and that we insert data correctly to 
ensure data integrity.' 
The manufacturer's planning manager is sceptical on whether the retailer will 
be able to do the above. 'For all of our production to be on Quick Response, 
the forecasting needs to be very good. We need the exact figures and colours 
from the customer. In South Africa this will not happen soon because the 
customers are not specific enough. They change their minds_ too often.' 
This is in line with Schonberger's (1996:22) suggestion that the entire pipeline 
must produce according to sales at the retailer and react to trends in sales. It 
is different to production before Quick Response, which was based on 
guesstimates. 
5.2.4.2 The model stock 
This project has provided the retailer with the chance to, if necessary, DI 
every week as opposed to once a month. It must order at least one thousand 
units by the end of the third week. However, with good sales it can fill up its 
model stock - its optimal stock level as determined at the beginning of the 
season - much quicker. 
The retailer's planner describes the project as sales-based replenishment. 'At 
the retailer the name Quick Response might be misleading. For us Quick 
Response means the replenishment of a model stock. The model stock 
determines how many of a specific size and colour must be on a shelf.' The 
presence of a minimum order (one thousand every three weeks) could cause 
overstocking if sales are not good and the retailer does not need as much. 
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The model stock is constructed by projecting what each store should be 
selling at the beginning of the year. Some colours sell year-round while others 
are seasonal. The retailer can change the colours according to the season. 
The model stock at each store will be different because of their different sizes. 
The retailer cannot wait for smaller stores' stocks to deplete while larger ones 
are standing empty and not selling. The retailer's planner says that if it 
discovers during replenishment that sales have increased or decreased it can 
instruct the suppliers to produce accordingly. 
5.2.4.3 A forerunner to model stock replenishment 
For the retailer Quick Response acts as a practice run for model stock 
replenishment, which will replace Quick Response. It will be much bigger, 
involving more basic goods from other departments. 
Model stock replenishment involves core products that can be ordered daily 
but at least eight times a season. Suppliers have to be on the same 
information systems as the customers and have extra stock available. 
Model stock replenishment will use a distribution unit to transport goods. It 
allows for more efficiency, as different items can be stored in it. Suppliers will 
send the products to a central warehouse, instead of different stores; where it · 
will be put in the distribution unit. 
The planner adds 'During Quick Response orders occur once a week so in 
between orders stock levels fall and is only at the maximum on the first day of 
every order. Model stock replenishment stock is theoretically always at the 
maximum because of the daily orders.' 
The retailer's planner continues: 'In the middle of 1999 we will implement 
model stock replenishment. It will take the place of Quick Response. These 
two suppliers would be able to participate in those projects because they now 
have the skills.' 
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5.2.4.4 New technology 
Contrary to the previous Quick Response project in South Africa, this project 
has up-to-date information flow systems and technology available. This gives 
it a better chance of success as suggested by van der Riet (1989:A3-3) and 
Knorr and Newman (1992:61 ). They regard it as a requirement for successful 
Quick Response. 
The retailer has learnt how to use its point-of-sales information systems more 
effectively to provide information to its suppliers, planners and distributors. 
The mill's engineer explains the benefits of technology: 'The retailer's point-of-
sales information allows us to replenish the retailer's stock as soon as 
possible. Using it, the retailer can see daily where to replenish and then send 
an order to the suppliers.' 
5.2.4.5 Pull instead of push 
This pipeline strives to respond to constant change. This confirms Quick 
Response's status as a type of flexible specialisation as Piore and Sabel 
( 1984: 17) describe it. The companies aim to accommodate change in sales 
by relying on the pull instead of the push method. As the retailer's distributor 
says 'The X-tuck should not be governed by intake but by demand' .. The 
pipeline's ability to respond quicker is brought about by cutting lead times and 
eliminating bottlenecks, as noted by van der Riet ( 1989:A3). 
The companies' reliance on the pull method confirms that this pipeline is 
moving away from supply-driven Fordism to demand-driven post-Fordism, as 
Jessop (1994:259) and Bessant (1991 :267) suggest. They use supply-side 
innovation, in this case Quick Response, to respond to the demand for their 
product. They rely on this demand to indicate what and how much to produce. 
In contrast to Fordist production the companies do not produce in case there 
is demand. In a post-Fordist environment competition depends on 
responsiveness to customers, demand and changing markets. 
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For Bessant (1991 :36) the ability of companies to respond to changing 
markets and increased competition will help ensure their own survival and that 
of their industries. This happens because the retailer responds quicker to 
sales trends, increases the variety of stock it has available in the stores and 
ensures there are no stockouts. Thus the shirts that the customers want are 
available in the stores. If it is not, suggests the CEO, 'the retailer does not 
only lose the sale but also the goodwill of the customer'. 
5.2.5 Outcomes for all three companies 
5.2.5.1 Another product 
Due to the increased sales of the X-tuck shirt and the success of the project 
the pipeline considered including the single jersey - a product that it also 
manufactures - in the Quick Response project. The mill's engineer predicted 
that additional products would be basic products as they sell quicker. 
However, he warns that 'the expectation could arise that "we can do Quick 
Response with one product so we can do it with others too" and this might not 
be the case. Quick Response is product dependent.' 
The manufacturer's sales and planning managers feel underwear will be easy 
because its strike rate is good and it is simpler to produce than the X-tuck. -
The retailer's planner believes Quick Response can only be extended to 
products with consistent sales. Iyer and Bergen (1997:563) warn against 
including high fashion items in Quick Response as it may result in large 
losses, especially for the manufacturers. 
Including another product would mean even greater co-operation between the 
companies and a chance to apply lessons learnt in this project. 
5.2.5.2 Increased stockholding 
Ideally Quick Response should be a stockless environment (van der Riet, 
1989). The CEO agrees that it is done 'as close as possible to a stockless 
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environment. We cannot have too much stock in the warehouse - that is not 
Quick Response. We should rather have one each of a hundred different 
products than one hundred of the same product. We'll have a better chance of 
a sale being made then.' 
However, for the mill Quick Response has meant an increase in stock in 
greige and yarn and for the manufacturer in fabric form and collars. This has 
been done to saturate the market and ensure on-time deliveries. The retailer's 
planner explains: 'With Quick Response it is how quick the pipeline can 
replace sales while only holding sufficient stock. Holding too much is 
expensive - for the suppliers also. Our objectives are lower stocks, quicker 
stock-runs and better sell-offs.' 
Initially the stock in the pipeline consisted of 6000 units: 2000 per colour. The 
distribution was 2000 in finished products, 2000 coloured up, waiting to be cut 
and 2000 in greige at the mill. The pipeline intended to reduce this to 1000 per 
section. 
The mill's engineer explains: 'Stock is kept so we can just dye it up and send 
it. It allows us to replenish the stock in the retailers' store much quicker and to 
cut our lead time.' The suppliers keep the product at its lowest form of 
production until the last minute - knitted greige for the mill. The C60 clarifies: 
'It gives us flexibility as we can dye it any colour in an instant. We cannot hold 
it in a lower form because of the inflexibility of the machinery. In a six-week 
cycle we can have greige knitted and in the seventh week we can dye it once 
we know what the SKUs are. We have to make sure that, when the retailer 
indicates the colours, we are ready.' 
During the initial stages of the project the manufacturer's managing director, 
sales and planning managers believed Quick Response was doing what it is 
supposed to. 'The retailer saw the project as a way to reduce its stock levels 
and this is succeeding. For us, part of Quick Response is holding stock. The 
cost of this is not a major thing. Additional sales mean additional business for 
us.' 
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However, later on because the retailer wanted to hold less stock it was 
perceived as benefiting at the expense of its suppliers. The suppliers felt the 
retailer was benefiting due to them carrying most of the stock. But the 
retailer's planning manager claims the suppliers agreed beforehand to hold 
stock at strategic points. 
It seems the suppliers initially agreed to holding stock because they did not 
realise the cost of it and did not want to jeopardise the relationship with the 
retailer. 
The above does not even take into account the units that would be added to 
the pipeline once the retailer increases the number of stores and colours. This 
will increase the suppliers' costs even more. 
Holding stock negates a benefit of Quick Response: the reduction of the 
effects of amplification and volatility, especially for the mill (Hopper in Maree, 
1995:111). 
Another problem with carrying stock in the pipeline, according to the mill's 
engineer, is that the pipeline cannot use just-in-time with Quick Response. 
Not everyone is convinced that Quick Response means less inventory. 
Hotchkiss ( 1995: 1) believes the inventory may be redistributed in the pipeline 
to meet the retailer's requirements to satisfy the demand for small orders. This 
view seems to be in line with the aim of this particular project: to replenish the 
model stock even if it means holding stock in the pipeline and not benefiting 
from the reduction of amplification and volatility. The stock serves as cover 
against late deliveries or poor quality. However, the stock kept contributes to 
the length of the pipeline (Hunter, 1990:19) that caused the problems in the 
first place. 
This discussion confirms that Quick Response - not necessarily this project -
can be described as flexible specialisation, as flexible specialisation uses 
118 
inventory management to reduce costs (Rainnie, 1991 :53). Thirty percent of 
production costs go to warehousing, inventory, carrying and monitoring 
stocks. Quick Response is a move away from Fordism, which does not pay 
attention to these aspects (Walker, 1989:65). 
5.2.5.3 Ownership of the stock 
Holding stock in the pipeline has resulted in questions about ownership: Does 
the retailer or the suppliers - who hold the stock - own the stock left in the 
pipeline at the end of the cycle, taking into account that the shirts might have 
aged and the retailer might not need it? The manufacturer's managing director 
believes the retailer must honour what is left at the end of the season, 
especially if its information is incorrect. The mill's planner and liaison call for a 
contract with the retailer on this issue. 
The retailer's planning manager and planner point out that the suppliers 
agreed to hold stock and believe the retailer is only responsible for the 
finished goods. They commit themselves to co-operate with the suppliers on 
the work-in-progress stock in the pipeline. 
Because the pipeline did not decide on this beforehand confusion exists as to 
who owns the stock left in the pipeline at the end of the season. If ownership 
had been sorted out earlier the pipeline could have included it with Iyer and 
Bergen's (1997) suggestions on making Quick Response Pareto improving. 
5.2.5.4 Increased orders 
Another outcome for the three companies is increased orders. The retailer 
gets a new batch every three weeks after which it replenishes the stock of the 
stores involved in the project. The retailer's planning manager, planner and 
technologist claim they underestimated the potential of this item. 'Last week 
we were forced to send all the units to our six Quick Response stores 
because of the good sales. We might suggest to the suppliers that we 
increase the units from 2000 to 3000 per colour.' 
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Initially the project consisted of 1000 shirts per colour, three colours and six 
stores. It increased to 2000 per colour, four colours and nineteen stores. The 
retailer's planner believes it could increase further if the manufacturer could 
make more units. 
5.2.5.5 Increased sales 
One of the benefits of Quick Response, according to Hunter (1990:3), is 
increased sales volume. The textile mill has benefited from the increased 
sales at the retailer as its turnover has increased. Still, the mill's managing 
director feels 'Quick Response will not be'nefit us but will give us increased 
turnover by delivering the best product at the best time to our customers. The 
turnover must increase by more than 10 percent otherwise it could be 
attributed to seasonal or design factors.' 
The mill's planner and its liaison are also sceptical about the benefits of Quick 
Response: 'For us there might be some cost saving because of the 
turnaround but only if we stick to standard shades and dyes. We do not really 
see huge benefits with the project, as its order is only 1 OOOm per colour 
compared to 3000m for others. We are doing this more as a service to the 
retailer. It might see us in a better light and give. us more business. We might 
enter into other Quick Response projects because of the partnerships, not the 
cost. We doubt whether there are any positives from a manufacturing point of 
view.' 
In the case of this pipeline, increased turnover is offset in part by increased 
stock holding in greige and yarn. This is part of the stock that the mill and 
manufacturer keeps in the pipeline and replaces after every order. 
As with the mill, increased sales have benefited the garment manufacturer. 
(Yet it also holds more stock, which it replenishes after it receives a DI from 
the retailer.) Contrary to the mill's managing director, the manufacturer's 
planning manager believes that increased turnover and garments being 
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replenished quicker will mean spin-offs such as increased orders, increased 
sales and the creation of job opportunities. Part of why the garments are 
being replaced quicker is because the manufacturer and retailers have re-
evaluated what the market wants in the last five or ten years. 'We are moving 
closer to the people in the street, trying to find out what their needs are,' 
continues the planning manager. This has created an environment conducive 
to Quick Response. 
The manufacturer's sales and planning managers attribute the increase in 
sales to the availability of the stock in stores: 'We can now saturate the 
market and increase the profitability.' They are even talking about doing 50 
percent more shirts than at the start of the project. On the production side 
increased sales and a higher turnover means more work and also, according 
to its production manager, gives the manufacturer more influence with the 
retailer. 
From May to July 1997 an increase in the frequency of orders and the 
replenishment of the fastest selling SKUs resulted in a sales increase of 45 
percent on the previous quarter. Overall sales of the X-tuck are up but sales in 
the Quick Response stores have climbed steeply. The retailer's distributor 
attributes this in part to Quick Response. The planner says that the good 
stockholding this winter compared to previous winters with little stock meant 
that there have been good sales. 
This happened when the Quick Response project was only in a small, 
manageable number of stores. According to the planner, these stores are the 
biggest sellers so if things go wrong the large sales will indicate it 
immediately. By the end of summer 1997 the retailer wanted Quick Response 
in all its stores. 
Initially the retailer did not have high expectations of the project and so 
planned down. Quick Response was only running in six stores. Once up and 
running Quick Response allowed it to get stock in the stores quicker. 'Our 
relationship stock-to-sale is exceeding our expectations. We are selling 20 
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percent of our stock per week. Sales have increased because of quality, value 
and availability. The product is better than any other in the market is, the 
value is great - you are getting a Porsche for R45 - and it is available,' 
remarks the planner. 
Although the shirt was selling well the retailer does not have any previous 
Quick Response sales to compare it with. The planner argues 'it is difficult to 
really gauge its success and know the exact reason for the increased sales. It 
might be Quick Response but we are not one hundred percent sure.' 
As sales increased rapidly, the retailer was establishing what it could sell to 
ensure maximum utilisation and identifying a saturation point for its sales. The 
planner argues that a saturation point exists and that the shirt does not have 
constant sales. 'All the stores could participate in Quick Response but the 
saturation point will affect sales negatively. We have established the minimum 
stock.' 
5.3 Shortcomings 
5.3.1 Relationships between the companies 
The Quick Response project has forced the three companies to work closer 
together as they have to communicate more frequently and be more open and 
trustworthy. Although these companies have worked together in the past their 
relationships are filled with mistrust. Quick Response has forced them to face 
and solve problems. As the manufacturer's planning manager points out: 
'Quick Response is reliant on the links between companies.' 
Before the project began the two suppliers sat down with the retailer and 
discussed the requirements. The mill's engineer says they agreed on the type 
and quality of information needed. The suppliers also aired concerns and 
questions, which the retailer tried to address. 
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According to its planner, the retailer sees Quick Response as an opportunity 
to improve its relationship with the two companies and get more cooperation 
and input from them. It also believes 'there is enough money to be made by 
all three companies in Quick Response'. 
Even though joint meetings were held before the project started it seems that 
many issues were not resolved then. These include the ownership of stock 
and the use of Pareto improving measures. Another issue was standardising 
and optimising packages in which goods are moved or stored. By ensuring 
they use economic package sizes the companies will cut costs as packaging 
and space would not be wasted. It seems not enough research was done on 
Quick Response beforehand, resulting in crucial issues not being addressed 
in advance. The retailer's planner admits that it misunderstood what Quick 
Response is really about: 'You cannot just snap your fingers. You have to 
involve the suppliers and together decide how to implement it.' 
However, it is not just relationships that can hinder effective communication. 
The mill does not have an EDI system that indicates the retailer's sales and 
allow it to respond to it. 'We have to respond to orders from the garment 
manufacturer and then dye up what is needed,' say the mill's planner and its 
liaison. EDI would allow the mill to turn around quicker and react quicker to 
sales. 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1991 :7) agree that projects such as these can only succeed 
if it includes trust and co-operation between supplier and buyer. However, 
they do not see the mistrust disappearing in the current nee-liberal regime of 
cutthroat competition and unregulated markets. 
Successful Quick Response requires partnerships and trust between the 
companies involved. However, in this project the nature of the relationships 
between the industries ensures it is difficult to achieve. The retailer can only 
generate profit if it cuts costs. The shirt cannot be too expensive as it is a 
basic product found in other retailers too. It can cut costs by ensuring that its 
supplier provides the product at the cheapest price. The state of the local 
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clothing industry will ensure enough competition and a cheap price. The same 
applies to the manufacturer. It has to find a textile mill that will provide it with 
cheap materials. The selling price to the retailer has already been set. The 
only way the manufacturer can ensure sufficient profit is getting the cheapest 
price from its supplier. The retailer also informs the mill what the price will be. 
'We then fight with the clothing industry because that is where our profit lies,' 
explains the mill. 
Despite these problems, the project resulted in an improvement of 
communication between the manufacturer and the mill. 'Quick Response will 
be successful if the manufacturer provides us with quality information in terms 
of the orders and delivery dates,' says the mill's engineer. 
The retailer admits that not enough trust exists between it and its suppliers. 
Yet there still is hope. The future might be on the 'technological side' as the 
retailer's planning manager, planner and technologist describe it. 'We 
established three-way cooperation on our product development programme. 
Our intention is to supply basic information to suppliers. This has increased 
the trust between us. Internationally, retailers are getting closer to their 
suppliers using technology,' they add. 
Another issue that harms relationships concerns retailers playing suppliers off 
against each other. The suppliers fear that the retailer is not fully committed to 
them and might move to cheaper suppliers using the information from this 
project. The CEO of the mill and manufacturer explains: 'At my previous job 
we bought from many suppliers and played them off against each other. We 
were not important to them and they were not to us. Then we decided to take 
on only two suppliers. We meant a lot to each other. The moment they had a 
problem they informed us. Both sides were committed to making it work.' The 
mill's managing director adds that retailers use four or five mills to spread their 
risk. The retailer's planning manager, planner and technologist admitted to 
being more committed to the bigger suppliers. 
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That would entail the suppliers becoming hundred-percenters - only supplying 
to this retailer. However, the manufacturer's planning manager has a problem 
with this: 'If the retailer cuts back because of falling sales we will suffer. We 
have our eggs in many baskets, not just one.' The price for this is of course 
that this manufacturer will never have the full commitment of the retailer. 
Quick Response can only succeed if all the partners are committed. Van der 
Riet ( 1989:A2-4) calls for the traditional adversarial ism to be replaced by 
partnerships filled with trust, openness and commitment. This would help the 
pipeline enter into a flexible specialisation arrangement (Amin, 1994:21 ). 
5.3.2 Power differentials 
Rainnie ( 1991 :56) believes harmonious relationships, as discussed above, will 
be difficult to achieve because of the power differentials between suppliers 
and retailers. 
It is the case in this pipeline where, as in most others, the retailer has much 
more power than the suppliers. A lack of trust and openness is the result. As 
the manufacturer's managing director says: 'Every time we have a problem 
with the retailer's order no one wants to be the one to notify the retailer. We 
are scared of possible repercussions.' Because of this fear, the manufacturer 
informed the retailer a day before delivery that an order was late and that it 
needed an extra week. 
The garment manufacturer also does not trust the retailer. It is worried that the 
retailer might give information to other suppliers and move to these if they are 
cheaper. It believes that Quick Response for the retailer only means not 
holding stock as the manufacturer and mill now hold it. The manufacturer's 
managing director believes that the retailer defines Quick Response as 
'having no more stock' instead of 'having the right product at the right time in 
the right size and colour'. 
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The retailer's planner believes the manufacturer is committed but complains 
because it is not liasing with the retailer. He says that it is not only the 
lateness of the order but the fact that the retailer was only informed a day 
before. 
The retailer's technologist on the other hand describes the relationship 
between the retailer and its suppliers as 'a two-string bow'. He explains: 'If we 
do not pressurise them they will not perform. There has to be fear and 
intimidation to make them perform. If you are good friends the supplier might 
use this to extend the time on an order, which could mean problems for the 
retailer.' 
According to October (1996:17), retailers' power has lead to manufacturers 
becoming glorified sub-contractors for huge retailers and feeling owned 
because of their dependence on them. Retailers selling clothes at a high cost 
and paying manufacturers little have reduced profit levels in the clothing and 
textile industries. The mill's managing director concurs and argues that local 
textile and clothing companies have allowed retailers to become too powerful. 
'They dictate to us and ride on our backs. There is no trust, sharing of 
information or partnerships. Maybe we should open our own shops,' he adds. 
The ISP (1994:71) found thatretailers' high mark-ups stifle demand so much 
that some manufacturers change retail outlets to increase demand for their 
products. Often retailers do not pass on savings made by suppliers to the 
consumers. The NPI blames local retailers for the failures of the earlier Quick 
Response projects. This is because retailers are in positions of power over 
suppliers. 
Mistrust can negate the gains made by Quick Response. It will not be easy to 
rid the relationship of the retailer's power so the retailer should not abuse its 
power. This could help eradicate mistrust and ensure openness. It does not 
mean that the suppliers will be less efficient. In a partnership there needs to 
be trust and openness. 'Fear and intimidation' are not ingredients of a 
partnership. Once all the companies see themselves as equal they can build a 
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partnership and contribute more to ensure success. If the relationship were 
seen as more equal the suppliers could reward the retailer with more 
openness, especially regarding problems. If the companies in this pipeline can 
achieve this it would be in line with Bessant's (1991 :267) description of 
relationships in post-Fordism. It needs a radical shift in the nature of 
relationships between organisations. Doing this, would allow the companies to 
co-operate better and compete more successfully. 
It is necessary for all the companies to voice their commitment to the 
partnership. Knorr and Newman (1992:64) suggest companies who intend 
implementing Quick Response have regular top-to-top meetings involving all 
sectors. Current meetings exclude the retailer's top management and the 
spinners. The implementation team must have real authority and be 
empowered by top management. 
One way to ensure more openness is if the retailer were to inform the 
suppliers of its forecasted sales and budgets. Thi.s would make forecasting 
and planning at the manufacturer and mill easier. If a certain amount of units 
were guaranteed it could mean shorter lead times. The garment manufacturer 
is worried that if it forecasts and commits to its suppliers and the retailer does 
not honour the stock in the pipeline at the end of the season it could end up 
with stock that is not going to be used. 
5.3.3 Who benefits more? 
The mill and the manufacturer believe that Quick Response benefits the 
retailer the most as its stock levels are down. This perception can destroy the 
project. Iyer and Bergen (1997:560) confirm that manufacturers are more 
likely to lose because of the cost of implementing Quick Response. They 
suggest certain actions to ensure Quick Response is Pareto improving - all 
the sectors in the pipeline are as well off as before and at least one sector is 
better off. Even if one company is not better off financially, participating with 
others in a successful operation might be enough for it. 
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Iyer and Bergen (1997:562) suggest manufacturers are responsible for 
garments left over at the retailer. Retailers then pay holding cost through the 
season, but have a salvage value for each garment equal to its wholesale 
price. This will increase the manufacturers' profits. The retailer could also 
provide the manufacturers with more prominent shelf locations and display 
space. Price adjustments, on the other hand, are not often used to make 
Quick Response Pareto improving. Manufacturers would rather negotiate on 
service level and volume commitments (Iyer and Bergen, 1997:565). 
This is echoed by the manufacturer's sales manager who suggests the 
companies assess the project after its completion. 'The assessment should be 
on quantifiable issues to ensure no differences of opinion. The retailer could 
possibly compensate the garment manufacturer if we did not benefit from the 
project.' 
Two pre-existing channel arrangements, which Iyer and Bergen (1997:563) 
identify as providing conditions to make Quick Response Pareto improving 
are consignment inventory and markdown money. Additional action can be 
price commitments, commitments regarding service levels or volume 
commitments. 
Hunter (1990:90) also found that retailers and garment manufacturers benefit 
more from the savings brought about by Quick Response than the mills and 
fibre manufacturers. He ( 1990: 91) suggests that fibre and fabric pricing should 
reflect the costs of the two primary producers. 
5.3.4 Problems between the textile and clothing industries 
To add to the above problems, the local clothing and textile industries have a 
history of conflict around tariffs. During the apartheid years high tariffs on 
fabrics protected the textile industry and allowed it to set prices free of 
international competition. (This import substitution combined with apartheid to 
constitute what Gelb ( 1991) called racial Fordism.) Local fabric prices were 
high, yet the clothing industry could not import fabrics because of the high 
tariffs so it asked government to lower those tariffs. 
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The mills, on the other hand, wanted those tariffs to stay in place to protect 
them. (At the same time the clothing industry opposed lower tariffs on 
garments.) This is not a good foundation for relationships filled with trust and 
openness. 
The manufacturer's managing director, sales and planning managers believe 
this conflict gave rise to an 'us and them thing'. They deem the local textile 
industry to not deliver as well as its overseas competitors. This is attributed to 
the spread of fabrics, which is too diverse. 
With South Africa's re-introduction into the world economy the government 
decided to lower the tariffs for the textile and clothing industries by about 50 
percent in eight years, not twelve as suggested by GATT (Finance Week, 
1995:9). This, according to Nel (1997), lead to increased job losses in these 
industries. 
5.3.5 Forecasts 
The textile mill often knits just-in-'case stock before it has received an order to 
ensure that it is not late with deliveries. 'We decide if we want to knit all the 
meters ahead of time, saving on machines in that way,' explains the mill's 
liaison. The mill can afford to do this as it agreed a minimum order with the 
retailer at the beginning of the project and as the X-tuck is a core product with 
a stable demand. 
However, if the Quick Response project broke down or the retailer withdrew 
the mill would be left with stock that it cannot move. The mill argues that if the 
retailer shared projected sales with it knitting just-in-case stock would not be 
necessary. Knorr and Newman (1992:64) agree and suggest companies who 
implement Quick Response share data with the other companies in the 
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pipeline. Yet if the mill knew how much to produce it would probably continue 
with this practice to ensure that it is never late. 
The reply of the retailer to its suppliers wanting forward cover and a 
commitment on how big Quick Response will be is that it does not know as it 
is the first time the project is run. If the retailer were to commit and it did not 
need as much it would be a problem. The mill's managing director points out 
that at the beginning of the project the retailer could channel excess to its 
stores that were not on Quick Response. However, when all stores are on 
Quick Response, there will be no such escape route. 
The retailer's distributor believes it must be much more honest with its 
suppliers: 'We do not indicate what our projected or actual sales are. But we 
are in a partnership now and should work together. The contracts share 
certain information but not all. It is a culture thing. Why should they not see it? 
We should share the good and the bad.' 
The manufacturer and the mill buy on the retailer's forecast. But if this is 
wrong and the suppliers have to produce more dark colours or large sizes 
than expected their original unit price increases. Yet the suppliers cannot 
change their price then. 
This is especially problematic for the manufacturer who claims to have low 
profit margins on the X-tuck. The manufacturer's managing director explains: 
'The current arrangement means that increased sales increase returns for the 
retailer. This is not the case for us. We operate on low margins and the 
problem with the collars and the use of specialist machinery is making it tight. 
The retailer needs to predict the amount of units it will use for us to ensure 
availability.' The manufacturer was hoping the retailer might pay more for the 
X-tuck due to the increased sales. However, the retailer itself claims to 
subsidise the X-tuck. 
The possibility of costs increasing during the project should also have been 
addressed beforehand. A solution could be to construct a model using the 
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retailer's forecast. Once the sales start differing from the forecast the retailer 
adjusts the original price to ensure that the manufacturer does not lose. 
5.3.6 Worker involvement 
Cappelli and Rogovsky (1994:220) argue that Quick Response manufacturing 
is very close to the flexible specialisation model of Piore and Sabel. Cappelli 
and Rogovsky (1994:205) believe that flexible systems such as Quick 
Response will require highly skilled workers who have greater autonomy. In 
addition Mathews (1989:108-113) argues that post-Fordist work organisation 
consists of minimised division of labour; multi-skilling and the acceptance of 
greater responsibility by workers; teamwork; wider involvement during 
decision-making and shared supervision. But in South Africa most workers 
are not highly skilled and Mathews' criteria is absent. Thus the success of 
Quick Response here is doubtful. Its implementation seems to be a move to 
neo-Fordism or a relaxation of Fordist structures, not post-Fordism (Mathews, 
1989:34). 
It is difficult to imagine management giving workers greater responsibility and 
decision-making powers when the mill's engineer believes management is 
aware of competition but workers are more self-gain driven. This attitude is 
more evidence that South African workplaces will find it difficult to move 
beyond neo-Fordism. 
Functional or employment flexibility, as used by this manufacturer, is also 
evidence against a move to flexible specialisation. Explains the production 
manager: 'We employ more people depending on the skills required for a 
garment. When we cannot find the skills at the door we use our own. It also 
depends on the customer. For this retailer we use our own people.' The use of 
casuals will not translate into an increase in worker autonomy, involvement in 
decision-making or shared supervision as casuals are not employed for their 
skills and have no relationship with the company. 
-- ----·-··-·----
Notwithstanding all the doubts, the manufacturer's production manager 
believes Quick Response will result In less management input on the 
shopfloor. 
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If the companies involve workers it could also lead to better industrial 
relations. According to the ISP (1994:71 }, a stable industrial relations 
environment is a prerequisite for Quick Response. It cannot be successful if 
there are frequent work stoppages. The LMC (1996:76) warns that relations 
between management and workers could be a constraint to the success of 
firms. 
5.3. 7 Importing integrated packages ·· 
By only introducing the technical side of production methods like Quick 
Response and not aspects like worker participation, South African companies 
are not heeding the warning by the LMC (1996:93) that there should not be 
piecemeal introduction of parts of an integrated package of measures. 
Methods like Quick Response were constructed in the context of flatter 
management structures and smaller earnings differentials than locally (LMC, 
1996:93). 
Hunter ( 1990: 157) urges garment manufacturers to introduce modular 
manufacturing, as it is essential to the success of Quick Response. This 
change in work organisation would mean greater worker participation. The 
benefits of modular manufacturing are faster response times, enhanced 
worker motivation, increased quality, lower total costs, freed up capital and a 
system conducive to change. This manufacturer has introduced some 
modular units on its shopfloor although Quick Response does not use them. 
The workers in these units do planning without a supervisor. According to the 
production manager. there is multi-skilling, less instruction and higher output in 
these units. If Quick Response is successful, she says they might get more 
modular units instead of lines. The use of modular units is a move towards 
flexible specialisation. 
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Although modular units are not used for Quick Response, a mini Quick 
Response is evident on the production lines claims the production manager: 
'There are no bundles lying about. The worker in front pulls the bundles 
through [just like Quick Response].' 
Ewert ( 1992: 18) found that although new information technology, automation, 
changing work organisation, improved quality and reduced lead times are 
evident in some companies, it is usually coupled with strong Fordist features -
similar to the companies in this project. This confirms that many companies 
have piecemeal introduction of new methods, which translates into a shift 
towards neo-Fordism, rather than post-Fordism. 
5.3.8 Cutting lead times 
The shortening of lead times as done by the mill and the manufacturer is in 
line with Hunter's (1990:42) preconditions for the implementation of Quick 
Response. However, Hunter's proposals show that these firms can go much 
further. He suggests duplicate stockholding and just-in-case stock be 
eliminated and work-in-progress times cut. He also suggests the adoption of 
flexible manufacturing, quality management and just-in-time. Cutting lead 
times will ensure a shorter pipeline and, proposes the ISP (1994:71 ), help the 
companies in the pipeline survive and even prosper. 
Fisher and Roman (1996:87) regard the lead times required to manufacture 
and distribute goods as increasing in importance. Quick Response cuts these 
lead times by using operational change such as how often orders are placed 
and how late colouring-up takes place. Quick Response counters the 
problems of unpredictable demand and the long, complex supply chain by 
reducing lead times so much that part of production is committed only after 
some sales have occurred. 
Quick Response has meant a reduction in this pipeline's lead time from 
between two and four months to three weeks, i.e. the mill and manufacturer 
will replenish in a three-week period. This allows the pipeline to respond 
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quicker to sales trends and have the appropriate stock available in the stores. 
The retailer's planner explains that the three-week lead time was chosen 
because of cost. 'It is not worthwhile sending only two or three shirts to a store 
only a couple of days after the last order.' 
The textile mill has cut the lead time as the customer does not have to confirm 
the colours anymore; by preparing the dye and doing the laboratory dyeing 
beforehand; by keeping greige at the mill; by reducing delays in the clerical 
process; and by eliminating the stage where the colours of the dyed yarn are 
matched with the original specifications. The mill has increased its efficiency. 
Explains the mill's liaison: 'When I get a Quick Response order from the 
manufacturer I handle it within three hours. It immediately goes to planning 
and is put on the system. We check the order, organise the planning, check 
for greige and respond to the manufacturer.' 
The garment manufacturer wants delivery from the mill within one week and 
not ten days. The liaison believes if they plan properly and have greige they 
could do it. 'But at this stage we cannot reduce the lead time because of the 
problems. The current three-week lead time is safe. For this project there 
should be greige in the pipeline.' 
After planning the mill treats a Quick Response order like any other. The mill's 
managing director claims the three-week lead time for a Quick Response 
order is no different from others. 'The project will have little influence on us. It 
will only impact on the sales, financial and production departments. On the 
factory floor Quick Response will affect people no differently. For us it is 
purely about production planning and not actual production. We find 
producing the X-tuck shirt to be easy.' 
The mill's engineer confirms only the administrative functions have changed. 
Queuing times, which make up the majority of the lead times in administration, 
have been cut. For him it does not matter if just-in-time is not used to cut the 
lead times. As long as the lead times are down the retailer will be satisfied 
and that is all. 
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The engineer and the liaison confirmed that when a Quick Response order is 
late the mill red-flags it so it enjoys priority. Still, it is not identified as a Quick 
Response order on the floor. 
Quick Response has forced the garment manufacturer to reduce its lead time. 
It has done this successfully with its clerical process, which it has reduced to 
one day. It has also managed to reduce its work-in-progress time. According 
to the planning manager the three-week DI .period was identified as the 
shortest time within which the manufacturer and mill can do their work. This is 
based on the manufacturer's ability to produce 900 garments per day. If the 
garments have been cut already the manufacturer can do everything before it 
goes into the warehouse within a week. The mill needs two days to dye and 
dry the textiles. Thus, it has three days to dye the collars. But, because of the 
problems with the dyeing, an extra week has been added. The manufacturer 
hopes to cut the DI period to two weeks when all the dyeing problems have 
been solved. It tried to persuade the retailer to drop the problematic colours 
such as teal but because the sales are up it would not. 
'The clothing sector as a whole has had to look at throughput times - being 
able to do things in a shorter time,' adds the planning manager. 'This allows 
the customers to delay their final decision regarding colour and size to the last 
possible moment. We have to adapt to stay competitive.' 
The lead times on the shopfloor have been cut using the minute rate - the 
time and cost to produce a shirt - to determine what can be done to improve 
production. The engineer believes the manufacturer needs to concentrate on 
pre-production, where the delays are 'scary', and the floor to respond to the 
retailer even quicker. He does not think the manufacturer would have a 
chance if it implemented Ouick Response on all products. 'We are committed 
in principle, but not regarding resources.' 
Quick Response adds pressure as it shortens lead times. According to the · 
production manager they will have to plan carefully and might have to stop 
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their own brand to allow for the X-tuck shirt to be produced. The engineer 
fears shorter lead times could translate to strained relationships and 
increased tension. 'We are working overtime because we have over-
committed.' He admits that their planning systems are not good and that 
Quick Response could force them to do something about it. 'With the right 
kind of internal systems Quiel:< Response should work. The project concerns 
information flow from the retailer and how we respond with the mill's 
materials. Quick Response is not just a quick process; it is the right response.' 
Cutting lead times also has its benefits. The CEO says that the shorter lead 
times are bringing in new overseas customers. He explains: 'We might be 
more expensive than others but we are able to deliver quicker and on time. 
Customers appreciate that hundred percent probability with zero time is better 
than zero percent probability with hundred time even if it is more expensive. 
Shorter lead times create certainty.' 
The retailer has reduced its clerical process between availability and DI from 
between two and fourteen days to one day. It will give a DI of at least 1000 
shirts every three weeks. The retailer gets its stock updated once a week and 
its sales every day. 'In theory,' says the planner, 'the idea is to sell one and 
replace one.' 
Shorter lead times mean that the retailer can plan stock levels better. 
'Previously the process took eight weeks. Now it is four-and-a-half to five 
weeks (three weeks to manufacture and a week and a half to two to deliver),' 
explains the planner. 
The mill feels that it is not necessary to implement Quick Response on its 
floor as it is already running in Quick Response mode there. This implies that 
it cannot cut its lead times further. Yet Bessant (1991 :78) observes that with 
flexible specialisation the routing and scheduling within factories are always 
being improved. At bottlenecks and inspection points, in transit between 
operations and in warehouses products lie inactive without value being added. 
Improving product flow will increase efficiency. The mill's engineer believes 
the way to cut queuing time is to monitor the work-in-progress and plan the 
maintenance of the machinery to eradicate breakdowns. 
5.3.9 Collar matching 
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Implementing this Quick Response project, the pipeline has had to pay more 
attention to an existing problem: the dyeing of the collars. The X-tuck shirt's 
body is made of cotton and polyester whereas its collar is made of cotton. 
Because of this the two parts are piece dyed separately. After dyeing the 
parts often do not match, as the teal is inconsistent. Hence the suppliers 
regard the X-tuck shirt as a difficult product to use for the Quick Response 
project. A T-shif! would have been easier. The manufacturer's managing 
director at the start of the project already predicted its collapse due to the use 
of teal and the accompanying dyeing problems. 
After the garment manufacturer knits the collar the textile mill dyes the body 
and the collar. For the mill to dye the knitting has to be good enough. The 
mill's engineer says that the whole industry has problems with the dyeing of 
greens. The mill has even tested its water. 'We can minimise the effect of any 
problems by communicating with the clients so that their expectations are not 
as per normal,' he concludes. 
With lead times being cut, matching the dyed collars and bodies became 
more important. The first two orders were late because of dyeing problems 
with teal with the second delivery taking four instead of three weeks. 
Realising that teal will always be a problem, the retailer's planning manager 
suggested standardising the colour-way for there to be only one teal 
throughout the season. This eliminated the problems of dyeing different 
shades of teal in summer and winter and ensured surplus stock can be used 
the next season. 
The dyeing problems forced the pipeline to look at importing dyed yarn. 
However, this was too expensive so the mill did more tests. According to the 
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manufacturer's sales and planning managers the project is costing three times 
more because of the re-dyeing. Because of the problems with piece dye the 
companies started investigating the possibility of moving to yarn dye for the 
collars. Yarn dyed collars would be easier to match with the body. 'If we were 
to go this route,' says the mill's planner and liaison, 'the manufacturer would 
be responsible for ordering the dyed yarn.' 
If a dye house were to be included, the mill would send raw yarn to the dyer 
who would dye according to the retailer's specifications. The mill then 
matches the dyed collar with the body, which is still piece dyed. The mill's 
liaison explains that it would be too expensive if the body were yarn dyed as 
well, as piece dye is less expensive than yarn dye. She does not see dyed 
yarn solving all the problems because of late deliveries from the dye house. 
The mill's managing director also has a problem with the inability of local 
dyers who do not dye quickly or consistently. 
This might mean investing time and energy in the yarn dyer, but it could rid 
the pipeline of the dyeing problems and cut the lead time. So why not use 
dyed yarn from the start and eliminate the dyeing problems? The retailer's 
planning manager, planner and technologist accuses 'the people that initiated 
the project' for not exploring all the options. The manufacturer's sales and 
planning managers have a different view: 'The X-tuck usually uses yarn dye, 
but because the project does not have a set programme it uses piece dye. If 
the retailer could project its sales we could change to yarn dye.' 
The collar-matching problem, although part of the pipeline before the 
implementation of Quick Response, has contributed to problems experienced 
during the project. It has affected the relationship between the companies, 
especially the mill and manufacturer, and caused orders to be late. The 
manufacturer's production manager sees the problems as being on the mill's 
side. She adds that problems mean they have to work overtime, which makes 
the shirt more expensive. 
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Three days before the first order was due, the manufacturer informed the 
retailer that it would be late. According to the retailer's planner and planning 
manager the manufacturer had received the white shirts but was waiting for 
the teal and indigo orders. The mill had the bodies but the collars were 
rejected. 'The mill's managing director feels that the dyeing of yarn is the 
manufacturer's problem. They blamed each other for the delay. Ownership 
needs to be sorted out as the mill argued that the collars were the 
manufacturer's property,' add the planner and planning manager. 
The retailer is still waiting for the mill to come up with the right recipe. The 
planner admits that the problem could be avoided by only using white 'but that 
would not prepare us for the future. Both suppliers are good manufacturers 
with smooth production runs. Their problems are lateness and matching.' 
5.3.10 A dependence on individuals 
Another shortcoming concerns the project's dependence on individuals. The 
success of the project can largely be attributed to the dedication of those 
involved. This is good but it has a negative side: if these people were to leave 
or their relationships were to sour it could mean the end of the project. It is 
essential that proper systems be put in place, which lessens the reliance on 
individuals. 
At the start of the project the retailer's planner left and were replaced. The 
new planner started off not knowing what had been decided on. He explains: 
'Initially I was running around and the objectives were not clear. It should have 
been documented to keep next to your desk.' Proper systems could ensure 
the project's survival. It would also eliminate problems that could be 
experienced with the partners in the pipeline. 
This is also a problem at the manufacturer. Its engineer describes the 
manufacturer as operating very informally without systems. Things are rather 
left to individuals. 
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5.4 Profiles of the companies 
In order to fully understand how Quick Response functions it is necessary to 
know what impact Quick Response had on the companies. This section will 
construct profiles of the three companies in the project. 
The data in this section was gathered using in-depth, unstructured interviews, 
and observing meetings. The companies' employees outlined their jobs and 
that of their departments. Using this, profiles were drawn up. 
5.4.1 The retailer and Quick Response 
The retailer chose the X-tuck shirt for the Quick Response project. It sells the 
shirt in its menswear department countrywide. It is a 'basic good', as it is 
ordered more than eight times a season and sold year round. The retailer 
sells the shirt directly to the public at an unknown demand. The shirt has a 
polyester and cotton body and a cotton collar. 
The X-tuck shirt is sold throughout the year. It comes in four basic sizes and 
in different colours. They are basic colours (white, black, teal and indigo) and 
others such as red, orange, blue and yellow. The basic colours sell throughout 
the year. 
During a normal season the retailer starts by determining a month-by-month 
budget. It makes forecasts for the season based on guesstimates and 
indicates these to the supplier. It also determines the quality, colour and size 
ratios - SKUs. The retailer then orders and processes the kimble tickets with 
expiry dates and prices on. (Thus the garment manufacturer knows the 
retailer's margins.) Once the manufacturer has availed the order, the retailer 
sends a DI to the manufacturer who packages the shirts. The retailer also 
informs the transport company who distributes the shirts to the various stores. 
Once the retailer receives the order, it will be invoiced. 
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The retailer establishes its model stock (desired stock level) by looking at the 
highs and troughs of a season. It is largely a thumb-suck using the stores' 
estimates of sales and stock levels. It is usually an eight-week forward-cover 
- stock to last a store eight weeks without additional purchases. This initial 
stock is the model stock. Once sales have taken place the model stock is 
replenished to return to its original level. 
The retailer's budget for the shirt will take into account head office's sales 
goals. Buyers will then determine the trends in demand and shades for the 
shirt, using overseas examples and historical sales data. Using this the 
planner will construct the budget and determine the desired opening stock for 
winter and summer. The planner will then make an estimate of sales on a 
monthly and weekly basis. 
The retailer's head office orders using stores' sales levels, the history of the 
product and technology. The only concern for the retailer in the production 
process is the final product: was it on time, in the right colours, qualities and 
sizes, and at the right price? The retailer will take an order with 5 percent 
discrepancy (95 percent or 105 percent of the original order). 
The retailer can change an order up to two months before delivery date or 
before the fabric is dyed. After that it is responsible for the fabric. The retailer 
should not change its order after a contract is signed but sometimes it does. 
The retailer contracts a transport company to deliver its goods. Previously, the 
garment manufacturer organised the transport but the service was unreliable. 
This company has given the retailer guarantees about the time periods of 
deliveries. However, the transport company is not delivering on time. The 
garment manufacturer also has problems with the transport company: the 
trucks will not move until they are full. The transport time is sometimes greater 
than the lead time and goods are not seen as delivered until it actually 
reaches the store. Thus, delays by the transport company penalise the 
manufacturer unfairly. 
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Other problems for the retailer include stock-outs and overstock, which result 
in lost sales or cost of sales because of markdowns. Another problem is that 
the kimble tickets have dates, which set the inventory at zero when the 
season is over. Thus, the stock expires but is still kept. 
The retailer's priority in the Quick Response project is to reduce lead times: it 
has already come down from two months to three weeks. It assumes that if 
customers can find the right product (colour and size) in the store they will buy 
it. It believes increased inventory will result in increased sales. Quick 
Response for the retailer means saturating the market; maximum utilisation of 
the quality; not holding excess stock; transporting goods from the supplier to 
stores in three days; what has been sold becomes the next order; and 
reduction of stock-outs because of shortened lead times. The retailer aims to 
replenish each SKU to a model stock in the shortest time. The retailer's 
stockholding has been moved back in the pipeline to the mill and 
manufacturer. Because basic goods, like the X-tuck, have predictable sales it 
is easier to use in Quick Response than fashion goods. 
Quick Response relies on reliable transfer of the product, reliable sales data 
capturing at the points of sale and the feedback of this information to the 
planners. 
The planning department is the project's engine. It generates the DI, checks 
the stores' stocks and calculates the model stock. Much of the project's 
success can be ascribed to the people in this department. The technology 
department is involved with the dyeing problem. The retailer has experienced 
dyeing problems with teal, one of its most popular colours, for a while now. 
The retailer wants to use Quick Response to bring down stock to a minimum 
level to get maximum profit, taking into account the peaks and valleys of 
stocks. For this project the retailer's main challenge is to calculate the model 
stock correctly and give the DI on time. The project can only succeed if the 
retailer commits at the right time and sends a DI immediately after the supplier 
has given it the go-ahead. 
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For Quick Response the retailer performs the DI in one day. Initially, at least 
1000 units per colour (three colours) were ordered every three weeks. This 
increased to 2000. The retailer can DI every week but at least every three 
weeks. 
The retailer regards Quick Response as a forerunner to model stock 
replenishment where more basic goods are ordered more frequently. Each 
store will receive a distribution unit containing different basic goods. The 
retailer has informed the mill and the manufacturer that Quick Response will 
be replaced by model stock replenishment. 
5.4.2 The garment manufacturer and Quick Response 
The garment manufacturer is a job shop - it produces goods to be sold 
somewhere else and does not hold any inventory of the finished goods. Its 
only inventory is the goods awaiting DI from the retailer. It receives orders, 
procures raw materials and produces the orders. Each order is unique and 
specialised. 
When the manufacturer over- or under-produces an order by more than five 
percent the retailer does not accept the goods. This can happen through 
inaccurate planning or good production where there are no faults in the 
process. The manufacturer usually makes too many units to cater for 
mistakes. The goods can then be sold in its factory shop or to other dealers 
after an agreed time to ensure the retailer does not lose any advantage on 
designs. 
The company regards itself as having reliable service and good quality, being 
able to accommodate customers and one of the better garment manufacturers 
in the Western Cape. It acknowledges that it is quite expensive, but believes 
the above negates this. It receives orders from the retailer, processes it and 
orders from its supplier. Its supplier of the X-tuck shirt is under the same roof, 
which cuts down on transport times and cost. 
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When the garment manufacturer receives a DI it does three things: order 
fabric and collars from the mill, instructs the mill to replace the greige and 
gives a cutting order to replace the units that have left the warehouse. The 
manufacturer buys fabric from the mill in two forms: piece-dyed or yarn-dyed. 
The manufacturer converts an order from garments to fabric required and 
procures the necessary from the mill. 
The garment manufacturer must order a minimum amount of fabric from the 
mill to make it worthwhile for the mill. If the order is less it must decide 
whether to order and what to do with the excess if it does. Its biggest risk is 
the commitment it makes to the textile mill based on the information from the 
retailer. 
The planning manager has to ensure that enough space exists on the floor to 
honour an order. This department does everything until pre-production: 
buying, design, approving samples and printing. It receives the DI, procures 
fabric and books embroidery space. Production takes place based on the 
SKUs needed. 
On the floor there are two sections: cutting and finishing. The production 
manager oversees this as well as the sewing and warehouse process. The 
cutting section receives fabric from the mill and cuts it into the appropriate 
sizes and fashions. From there the product moves to the finishing section in 
bundles containing all the components. On the production line the product is 
assembled, examined and finished (ironing and bagging). The workers sit in 
long lines at machines. Each worker performs a certain function, contributing 
to the final finished product. These functions include sewing on buttons or 
collars or stitching the front and backsides together. It then goes to the 
warehouse for despatch. 
The company has introduced another method of work organisation, the 
modular unit, aimed at increasing efficiency and productivity. It uses multi-
skilling and involves fewer workers with more skills in cells. Each worker 
possesses the necessary skills to produce the whole shirt. 
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Concerning the collars for the X-tuck shirt, the manufacturer knits them after 
receiving the yarn from the mill. It then returns the finished collars to the mill 
that dyes it or sends it away to be dyed. However, there were delays and 
problems with the dyeing. The conflict exists because the garment 
manufacturer cannot cut and produce without the collars. The mill and 
manufacturer disputed ownership of the fabric while it is being dyed especially 
when there are problems. 
The garment manufacturer is looking at ways to cut the lead time. The 
production manager and the work-study department found ways to lower the 
minute rate (time and cost to make). 
If need be the warehouse will work overtime to ensure that deliveries are on 
time. There are no constraints on production. It can use overtime, Cut-Make-
and-Trims (CMTs) or increase its capacity by hiring temporary staff. On the 
floor there is a 60-90 percent efficiency rate of targets reached. The 
manufacturer has constraints on space. If the warehouse is full it slows down 
the production process. 
The sales manager generates sales by acting as a sales representative to 
retailers. Her job is selling, promoting, client service and marketing. So she 
has to keep abreast of new fashions. She works closely with the technology 
and design departments and the TQM section on pre-production. The 
manufacturer can develop new products according to fashion trends. The 
manufacturer has summer, winter and fashion ranges. Its strength is its 
design and sales team who are professional and methodical. 
The sales manager and the retailer's buyer decide on colours. The designers 
work with the retailer and have a good relationship with it. They prepare 
redseals (first samples) for the retailer to check. If it is approved the 
manufacturer continues. After agreeing on style and negotiating costs the 
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retailer can order. The X-tuck shirt started with the retailer and was developed 
by the manufacturer. 
The sales manager cannot finalise negotiations until the colours are matched. 
Different colours affect the price of the X-tuck. The mill and the sales manager 
approve the colours and establish the recipes for the collars and bodies. 
Collar matching is done with new colours. For the X-tuck the body is single 
jersey and the collar double jersey. 
The manufacturer's engineer monitors the flow process: how it works, how 
long it takes and how to solve problems. 
If the garment manufacturer misses a delivery date the retailer can cancel the 
order. However, it is usually not this harsh. 
For Quick Response the garment manufacturer produces 2000 shirts per 
colour. At any time the pipeline has 2000 shirts in greige at the mill, 2000 
shirts coloured-up, needing to be cut, and 2000 shirts in finishing. (It aims to 
reduce this to 1000 later on.) On receipt of a DI the manufacturer has three 
weeks to replace the finished goods. For this project the manufacturer holds 
stock for the retailer. It sometimes uses the just-in-case principle and 
produces excess to ensure that there is always stock. On receipt of a DI from 
the retailer the manufacturer must replace the DI and order. When it receives 
a DI, three things need to happen: order fabric and collars from the supplier, 
the supplier must replace the greige in the pipeline and process the order to 
cut to replace the stock in the warehouse. 
The three-week lead time for this project suits the manufacturer. It decided on 
this lead time having calculated the shortest time that it needed to produce the 
shirts. If the cutting has been done the manufacturer can complete the 
process in one week. The mill needs two days to dye and dry and three days 
for the collars. The extra week is in case of problems with the matching. It 
reduces queuing time to ensure a shorter lead time. 
The most crucial question for the garment manufacturer is who owns the 
Quick Response stock left at the end of the season: the retailer or itself? 
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One of the manufacturer's biggest problems is the matching of collars with the 
dyed bodies. At one stage the pipeline considered importing dyed yarn. 
However, this fell through because of the cost involved. 
The manufacturer red-flags the Quick Response orders to jump queues 
except if another order is in progress or is an export priority. It does this to 
ensure that the Quick Response orders are not late and the retailer happy. 
But this can jeopardise other orders or force the company to increase 
production to ensure deliveries are on time. It claims that it can only do the 
project by red-flagging. The manufacturer will plan the Quick Response orders 
taking into account the capacity of its factory but the Quick Response orders 
will enjoy priority. 
The manufacturer sees Quick Response as a hands-on approach to handling 
orders. It believes that a successful Quick Response' project would mean 
more orders; measuring the true value of the X-tuck in the marketplace; and 
ensuring the mill pays more attention to dyeing problems. 
The manufacturer believes that the project would only be true Quick 
Response once all colours and sizes have been included in the project and 
not just a few colours as is the case currently. This would place more 
pressure on the three companies and show whether the pipeline can really 
handle Quick Response. 
5.4.3 The textile mill and Quick Response 
The textile mill is also a job shop. In it there is a set route: from preparation to 
planning. In the planning department a knit-by date and a dye-by date is 
decided on. The necessary yarn is then procured. This can cause delays, so 
the mill often has yarn in stock. After this the dye recipes are prepared. The 
knitting takes between one and three weeks. Breakage of yarn and change 
over of machines cause delays and extend the lead time. The mill has 
designated machines for the X-tuck shirt. There is also a standard piece 
length. 
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According to its managing director the mill's sales people forecast based on 
the customers and historical information. Using this it constructs a budget for 
its operation. It then checks that there is raw materials and production 
capability. The mill has two options: produce beforehand or produce on order. 
Its bottleneck constraint is knitting. 
Dyeing can take one week. During dye preparation the recipes are tested to 
ensure that the polyester/cotton bodies and the cotton collars will match. This 
is difficult with bluish colours, such as teal. Different fabric demands different 
dyeing machines. After dyeing, the fabric is dried and heatset. Few machines 
exist for this so there are long queues and thus bottlenecks. During the dyeing 
there is constant quality control, as stipulated by the retailer. 
The X-tuck's collar is the mill's biggest problem. The mill contracts the 
manufacturer (who is also its client) to knit the cotton collars. (This causes a 
dispute over the ownership of the collars when dyeing problems occur.) The 
collars cause delays because of the difficulty in matching them with the dyed 
bodies. 
The next process is finishing which can take two weeks. Here lapfolding, 
padding, drying, inspection, ironing and folding take place. This is followed by 
a quality check (for fastness, stability and shade), which lasts one day. 
Thereafter the fabric is packaged and posted to customers. 
The mill has good capital production because it has mainly new and good 
older machines. Breakdowns are limited because of good service methods. 
The mill never plans 100 percent capacity to absorb any extra load it might 
have and never prioritises an order unless it is late. (The dye house has a 




Although the mill is expensive, its quality is among the best in the country. 
This, coupled with reputable customers such as leading retailers, bring more 
customers. It has increased its exports due to the implementation of 1809002 
and TQM, its relative quick lead time and on-time deliveries. 
Another problem in the mill is queues. Bottlenecks are found at knitting and 
heatsetting. If this could be eliminated lead times could fall drastically as the 
work-in-progress (from dyeing to finishing) is only three days. 
Most orders that the mill receives are on existing quality. If the mill has to 
customise quality then the lead time lengthens. The mill is researching more 
efficient packaging methods to cut down on its high packaging costs. 
The mill procures on the retailer's forecast. However, if it is wrong and the mill 
has to produce more dark colours and large sizes than expected the unit price 
of the goods increases. However, the mill cannot change its price then. 
For the textile mill Quick Response means always having what the customer 
wants. In a stockless environment this would mean having one of each item 
and replacing it when sold. It is important for the mill to build trust and 
partnerships. It sees this project as a way to tie itself to the retailer and build a 
partnership. 
Quick Response only affects the paperwork in the textile mill. Administration 
has been cut from ten days to one day. Part of the reason is because the 
customer does not have to confirm and match orders. Things are not done 
any differently on the factory floor, as it is part of the mill's normal cycle. Quick 
Response only impacts on the sales, financial and production departments of 
the mill. These departments have decreased the time they take on the 
administration of Quick Response orders. 
The mill believes it cannot compete on price but on lead times. It could cut its 
lead times even more by eliminating queues and if the product was 
151 
guaranteed and consistent. The mill emphasises short lead times as it creates 
certainty in sales. 
The mill holds 1 OOOOkg stock in greige only on commitment. It will not 
replenish the stock until it is less than 3000kg and the manufacturer 
recommits. 
The mill's workers are not informed about Quick Response so as not to 
prejudice other orders. Management feels that the workers should continue 
with their normal work and not give Quick Response priority. 
In the textile mill Quick Response orders do not jump any queues except 
when it is late which is standard practice with late orders. The mill only 
proceeds with orders on commitment from the clients. According to the mill, its 
yarn supplier is reliable and that it will not experience any problems with it. 
The mill keeps goods at the lowest form of production (knitted greige) until the 
last minute to ensure flexibility. (Greige is the most inflexible in the mill's 
pipeline.) It only starts work once there is a commitment for colour and size. 
When it receives the final order, it dyes and sends the order to the 
manufacturer. The X-tuck shirt is one of the slowest products to knit. 
For the mill the benefits of this project are increased confidence from these 
clients and others; more business; and using it as a marketing tool. On the 
negative side it might not be able to extend Quick Response to other 
products, like fleece, as it is process dependent; the mill runs the risk of 
upsetting other customers; and the process and the production is difficult. 
For Quick Response to be successful in the mill, it needs good quality 
information on orders, delivery data and successful collar dyeing. The result 
could be future business with the other two companies. 
\.. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In the introdudion I mentioned that this thesis ai.ms to establish whether the 
South African companies implementing Quick Response in an apparel textile 
pipeline are moving towards flexible specialisation or towards a neo-Fordist 
method of production. This chapter answers the question. 
Before it can be done it is necessary to establish whether what was 
implemented can be described as Quick Response. Or has it been 
transformed to address local needs? If it has been adapted, can it still help 
local companies compete with cheaper imports and ensure the sustainability 
of the local industries? 
6.1 Important observations 
6.1.1 Methodology and technological requirements 
Van der Riet ( 1989:A3-17) warns that companies must be sure about Quick 
Response's methodology and technological requirements before 
implementing it. However, answers to questions on where the respondents 
learnt about Quick.Response showed that thorough research was not done 
before implementation. 
If it had, this pipeline might have considered Iyer and Bergen's (1997) 
suggestions on how to make Quick Response Pareto improving. This would 
have resulted in the garment manufacturer and textile mill being compensated 
for holding stock. Thus, the retailer would not have been seen as benefiting 
more from the project than the other two companies, as is the case presently. 
Making Quick Response Pareto improving, meaning that no company is 
worse off than before, would satisfy the manufacturer and mill. During this 
project, these companies believed that the retailer's high margins did not 
allow them to set decent margins. If the retailer were to compensate them as 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In the introduction I mentioned that this thesis aims to establish whether the 
South African companies implementing Quick Response in an apparel textile 
pipeline are moving towards flexible specialisation or towards a neo-Fordist 
method of production. This chapter answers the question. 
Before it can be done it is necessary to establish whether what was 1 
implemented can be described as Quick Response. Or has it been 
transformed to address local needs? If it has been adapted, can it still help 
local companies compete with cheaper imports and ensure the sustainability 
of the local industries? 
6. 1 Important observations 
6.1. 1 Methodology and technological requirements 
Van der Riet (1989:A3-17) warns·that companies must be sure about Quick 
Response's methodology and technological requirements before 
implementing it. However, answers to questions on where the respondents 
learnt about Quick Response showed that thorough research was not done 
before implementation. 
If it had, this pipeline might have considered Iyer and Bergen's (1997) 
suggestions on how to make Quick Response Pareto improving. This would 
have resulted in the garment manufacturer and textile mill being compensated 
for holding stock. Thus, the retailer would not have been seen as benefiting 
more from the project than the other two companies, as is the case presently . 
. Making Quick Response Pareto improving, meaning that no company is 
worse off than before, would satisfy the manufacturer and mill. During this 
project, these companies believed that the retailer's high margins did not 
allow them to set decent margins. If the retailer were to compensate them as 
s:.iggested by Iyer and Bergen (1997) it could make Quick Response 
worthwhile for them. 
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If Quick Response were researched thoroughly and a thorough contract 
drawn up there would not have been confusion about the closing down 
procedure when sales equal zero (the season or the project ends). It would 
have been clear who owns the stock left in the pipeline when the project ends. 
6. 1.2 The role of workers 
·The manufacturer's management claims that the relationship between itself 
and the workers is good. Yet, when the researcher interviewed th~ shop 
stewards, it had to be done in the human resource manager's office with her 
present. The company claims that it wants to involve workers in projects but .it 
is not doing it with this project. 
The companies in this pipeline are implementing Quick Response without the 
involvement of workers. Yet Hunter (1990) argues that it can only be 
successful if companies increase worker involvement and change to more 
participative management. 
To add to this, the Swart Report found that the lack of participative 
management is impeding improved productivity in the clothing and textile 
industries (Bilateralism Review, 1994). 
Top management constructed this project without properly involving the 
managers who drive it. This continued during the project. It is also applicable 
to the relationship between lower management and workers. As a result those 
in lower positions feel removed from the project. Flexible specialisation can 
' 
only be successful if the lower management and workers are committed. If 
they are excluded, this will not happen. The exclusion of workers and any 
participation by them at the manufacturer confirms that it did not implement 
flexible specialisation or move totally away from Fordism. 
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This does not imply that local companies and industries should not move to 
flexible specialisation. To compete successfully, especially in the clothing and 
textile industries, they need to move. What it does imply is that under flexible 
specialisation workers are less secure in their jobs, unlike under Fordist work 
organisation. So, they need protection and here the government, employers 
and unions have a role to play. Quick Response and similar innovations 
require skilled, educated workers. The government and employers should 
train and educate workers so they can participate in flexible specialisation 
methods. Employers have a responsibility because without skilled workers 
they would not be able to compete and might close down. 
Government and business also need to show a commitment to labour market 
security and protection against arbitrary loss of employment as suggested by 
the LMC ( 1996). This would probably see workers and unions more likely to 
accept flexibility in work organisation. 
Government and trade unions must ensure workers' rights are not abused 
under flexible specialisation. Contrary to others, Ewert ( 1991) believes flexible 
specialisation can benefit workers if unions are pro-active and well informed. 
This can be done if unions sign agreements on protection against 
rationalisation - a possible effect of flexible specialisation. 
If local companies plan to introduce new measures they need to ensure that 
there is not piecemeal introduction of such measures. This does not only 
mean using all the technology and methodology but also ensuring that the 
conditions on the shopfloor, such as wages and relationships, are based on 
where the measures are imported. If this is not done we will never see a truly 
post-Fordist workplace in South Africa. 
6.1.4 Modular manufacturing 
The garment manufacturer has introduced modular manufacturing on its floor. 
Both Fisher and Roman ( 1996:87) and the Swart Report (Bilateralism Review, 
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1994) believe that the reorganis.3tion of the floor into modular cells can benefit 
the clothing industry. The former believes that it will cut lead times even 
further, while the latter argues that it will improve labour productivity. 
Hopefully, the garment mantJfacturer will introduce more modular cells and 
use them in the Quick Response project also. 
6.1.5 Just not Quick Response 
As per the.agreement with the suppliers,. the retailer orders at least 1000 units 
every three weeks. However, what happens if the retailer does not need 1000 
units? During the research it was never necessary to order less than a 1000 
units but if sales were to drop it could happen. During the research the retailer 
was able to channel extra ·units into its stores that were not on Quick 
Response. This would not have been an option had all the stores been on 
Quick Response. It could .affect the supplie·rs if the retailer decides it is not 
going to take 1000 units while the supplier is expecting it. This could result in 
the amplification of the pipeline. 
This agreement that the retailer has to order 1000 ·units after three weeks 
·does not constitute Quick Response. It does not take into account sales in the 
three weeks. Thus the pipeline is not using the pull method. It is reverting 
back to the push method. The logic of this can be understood if the aim is to 
guarantee certain units to the suppliers, but it does not constitute Quick 
Response. 
Another development in this project that is not part of Quick Response is the 
use of just-in-case or safety stocks. As a solution to the dyeing problems, the 
mill considered keeping dyed shirts, as cover should there be problems. This 
defeats the purpose of Quick Response, which reduces stock keeping in the 
pipeline.· 
When the mill knows how much the garment manufacturer is going to order, it 
might knit everything beforehand. Thus it saves time, ensures ~rders are in 
time and has space for other orders. This is also not Quick .Response. It is 
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pushing products forward instead of waiting for the pull. 
6.1.6 Responding in time 
Previously, when sales increased the retailer would supply the market with 
more. units, often too late because of the length of the pipeline. This project 
ensures that the retailer supplies these units in time. Now the retailer can 
respond much quicker to changes in the market and so take advantage of it. 
This is in line with Cassim's (1992:2) observation: retailers and manufacturers 
are now targeting specific groups of consumers and are responding quicker to 
short-term trends in the sales of individual product lines. He (1992:3) adds 
that the advantage held by long-run garment manufacturers have been ended 
because price has become less important. Only in the lower end of the market 
are longer production runs still used often. 
Because of Quick Response this pipeline has smaller lead times. Yet Quick 
Response also involves the use of just-in~time and the elimination of stock 
keeping. This has not happened with this project. The mill's engineer says 
'Quick Response is about cutting lead times. It does not matter that just-in-
time is not involved. As long as the customer is happy and the lead times are 
shorter.' 
6. 1. 7 Relations between the companies 
Initially the mill gave the assurance that there would not be any problems with 
the y_arn supplier who doubles as the dyer. However, after the first order was 
late, the mill admitted that there were problems with the dyeing. As suggested 
in the previous chapter, the chance of Quick Response being successful will 
be enhanced if all components of the pipeline are involved. The yarn supplier 
(dye house) was not involved in this project even though quality and delivery 
problems were experienced with it in the past. The problems experienced with 
dyeing, especially that of teal, resulted in orders being late. Quick Response 
can only be successful if deliveries are on time - it gives the pipeline its 
advantage over competitors - and if all the parts of the pipeline enjoy equal 
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priority. In this case the pipeline did not give adequat'3 attention to the yarn 
supplier resulting in problems. If it had been included from the beginning the 
problems could probably have been lessened. 
The previous chapter dealt extensively with the relationships between the 
companies. Two incidents illustrate what the absence of trust and honesty 
and power differentials do to the pipeline: The first order was late. The 
garment manufacturer only informed the retailer the day before delivery that it 
would be a week late. If an order were a week late, surely the manufa_cturer 
would have known it more than a day before. Why did it inform the retailer 
· only then? On the other hand one can understand that the manufacturer does 
not want to inform. the retailer when listening to what the retailer says. In an 
interview the retailer mentioned how the fear that the supplier has for it keeps 
the supplier on its toes. The retailer knows the supplier is afraid of it and that it 
holds power over the supplier. It believes this fear will ensure that the supplier 
performs. Surely there are other ways to ensure that a supplier delivers on 
time and does not step out of line. Fear and intimidation cannot be good for 
what is supposed to be a partnership based on trust. 
6.1.8 Importing yarn 
During the project the pipeline, especially the mill and garment manufacturer, 
looked at the possibility of importing dyed yarn because of the dyeing 
problems. In the end it did not because it was too expens_ive. The fact that it 
considered it is a problem. What if the retailer does the same when it has 
problems with the textile mill or garment manufacturer? The textile and 
clothing industries would have been in an even bigger crisis. Why not invest 
time and resources in the dye house and make sure that it delivers quality 
products on time? An efficient dye house will solve many problems in this 
pipeline: problems with the dyeing of blues and with late deliveries. It could 
increase the chances of being in permanent Quick Response mode. Whether 
this proposal is feasible or not, I do not know but the benefits thereof are 
obvious. Hopefully the pipeline, especially the retailer with its resources and 
motto of quality, could assist the dye house. 
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6.1. 9 Lead time 
According to the garment manufacturer's planner the clothing sector has had 
to work on cutting lead times. Customers need thatfacility to delay their final 
decision regarding colour and size to the last possible moment to take into 
account sales. Yet the garment manufacturer builds in extra time to allow for 
problems. It claims that the retailer does the same. How much does all this 
add to the lead time? At the mill lead times were only being cut in the 
administrative process, yet its engineer believes that production times can 
also be cut. 
Cutting lead times should not be seen as a process with an end. The mill and 
the manufacturer can go much further. They could start by removing the time 
built in for hiccups or problems. Hunter (1990) then suggests eliminating 
duplicate stockholding and just-in-case stock and cutting work-in-progress 
times. After the firms had done this they could adopt flexible manufacturing, 
quality management and just-in-time. Lead times should be cut continuously 
by increasing quality and by scrutinising the flow of goods for bottlenecks and 
other problem areas. There should be a culture of continuous improvement. 
Cutting lead times will ensure a shorter pipeline and help the companies in the 
pipeline survive. Other companies may be cutting their lead times all the time, 
. so it is crucial for these and other local companies to do the same to become 
a.nd stay competitive. 
6.2 Quick Response or not? 
This project has some of the main trademarks of Quick Response. The 
companies improved their relationships by working closer together and 
formed some type of partnership. They coordinated their activities, held 
regular meetings and shared some information. By moving closer together, 
the pipeline increased its chances of countering cheaper imports. 
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Quick Response also allowed the pipeline to compete with cheaper imports by 
helping the companies cut their lead times. The competition was not 
necessarily on price but by ensuring the right product was at the right place on 
the right time. Thus the companies were using their local proximity to better 
effect. 
By cutting the lead times, the retailer relied on sales figures to determine 
orders instead of guesstimates and the suppliers relied on sales figures to 
produce the necessary garments. This meant using the pull instead of the 
push method. 
All of this meant an increase in sales, which is Quick Response's ultimate 
goal. This benefited the c~mpanies, workers and the industries. 
However; this project lacked many features, which form part of Quick 
Response, as described in the theory. These have been discussed in this or 
the previous chapter. They include: real worker involvement; proper 
partnerships with full information sharing and without power differentials; 
Pareto improving measures to ensure no company loses from this project; 
and cutting lead times constantly. 
This project also contained features that should probably not form part of a 
Quick Response project. These are minimum orders, which mean that the 
companies do not rely totally on the pull method; stockholding in the form of 
just-in-case stock that allows the lead times to be cut; and stockholding by the 
suppliers for the retailer, which meant that the amplification and volatility in the 
pipeline were still present. 
So, can this project be classified as Quick Response seeing as so many of its 
features as described in the theory are absent? I believe that it can. The 
pipeline adopted some features of Quick Response, although they might not 
have done enough concerning the cutting of the lead times or the forging of 
genuine partnerships. As the engineer said, it is not whether you employ just-
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in-time or,keep stock in the pipeline, it is about cutting the lead times and this 
pipeline did that. Yes, it could have done more but it was a start. 
Implementing Quick Response can be the start of a fight back by the local 
textile and clothing companies against the cheaper imports. It is a way for 
them to use their local proximity and build partnerships and deliver the right 
products at the right 'time and place. This is something that cheaper imports 
cannot deliver. Because of these reasons I believe that implementing Quick 
Response is a way forward for the local textile and clothing industries. 
Evidence shows that Quick Response gives the textile and clothing industries 
a weapon against cheaper imports. Will it be enough to ensure the industries 
do not collapse? My research methodology does not allow me to predict 
whether Quick Response can save the local industries but the signs are there 
that it might. It forces companies to examine the way they operate, to look at 
ways to cut their lead times and to forge partnerships. All of these can set 
companies on their way to becoming sustainable and competitive in the face 
of falling tariffs, cheaper imports and other threats from globalisation. 
However, they need to implement the other elements of Quick Response as 
well to ensure they get optimum v.alue from it. Companies can implement 
Quick Response with the help of workers and unions but then it is essential 
that they follow the LMC's (1996) suggestion that it be coupled with security of 
jobs. Workers will accept flexibility and Quick Response easier if their jobs are 
secure. 
If the textile and clothing industries become sustainable and competitive they 
can ensure that, as Hun.tar (1990: 1) says, they can prove wrong those who 
believe that they are sunset industries that are a drag on the overall economy. 
It will also be difficult to determine whether Quick Response can save the 
textile and clothing industries, as I did not see the project's end results. Hence 
I do not have the necessary financial information to say without a doubt that 
Quick Response can save the industries. 
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6.3 Post- or neo-Fordism? 
The main question this thesis deals with is whether the South African 
companies implementing Quick Response in an apparel textile pipeline are 
moving towards post-Fordism using flexible specialisation in the workplace or 
towards a neo-Fordist method of production. 
Glimell (1991 :84) does not believe that Fordism will be totally replaced by 
post-Fordism and more specifically flexible specialisation. He describes it as 
neo-Fordism where some quality production is combined with current modes 
of production. Kraak (1996:44-45) argues that in South Africa there is a hybrid 
of neo-Fordism, post-Fordism and the methods of the apartheid era. 
The findings of this thesis correlate with those of Glimell (1991) and Kraak 
(1996). Although these companies are introducing elements of Quick 
Response they still make extensive use of Fordist production methods. As 
discussed earlier, the absence of modular manufacturing, worker involvement, 
just-in-time production, methods to eliminate stock keeping and partnerships 
shows that this is not pure post-Fordism. 
The presence of manufacturing with long runs and lines, just-in-case or safety 
stocks, power differentials, mistrust, managerial prerogative and large wage 
gaps shows that these companies use elements of Fordism. 
However, the presence of a reliance on the pull method, shorter lead times, 
improved communication and co-operation and the use of local proximity 
show that the companies are using some elements of post-Fordism. 
It is clear that Quick Response as described in the theory is post-Fordist. 
However, the version used in this pipeline contains too many elements of 
Fordist production combined with post-Fordist methods. These companies 
have not made a total break with Fordism. Rather they have modified Fordism 
resulting in neo-Fordist methods. For that reason the conclusion of this thesis 
is that the companies implementing Quick Response in this pipeline is moving 
towards a neo-Fordist method of production. Only when they import Quick 
Response as an integrated package might their methods be described as 
post-Fordist. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire 1 Planning 
1. How did you learn about Quick Response? 
2. How does your company define Quick Response? 
3. How is it going to influence your company? 
4. Is this different to what the theory stipulates? 
5. How do the other companies in the pipeline approach this project? 
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6. What do you think Quick Response will do for your company? Benefits and 
negatives? 
7. What are the links between you and the other companies in the pipeline? 
How will Quick Response affect this? 
8. Can Quick Response help the textile and clothing industries in South 
Africa compete? 
Appendix 8 
Questionnaire 2 Implementation 
1. What is necessary for this to work? How would you define Quick 
Response? And just-in-time? And stock replenishment? 
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2. How do the other companies in the pipeline approach Quick Response? 
3. Do you foresee any problems on their side? 
4. How do you think Quick Response will change your job and your 
company? 
5. Do you think Quick Response will improve the relations between your 
company and the other two in the pipeline? And between your company 
and the workers? 
6. Do you have a capacity limit? Do you employ workers when needed? 
7. Do you only make units when orders are processed? 
8. Which company will benefit most from Quick Response? 
9. How will you gauge the success of Quick Response at the end of the 
project? 
10. What needs to be done in your department and company for Quick 
Response to be implemented? Is it worth it? 
Appendix C 
Questionnaire 3 Results 
1 . Where does the Quick Response project stand at the moment? 
2. I see Quick Response as part of flexible specialisation where the 
environment has changed. How has this influenced your company and 
what strategies have you adopted? 
3. When did things start changing? 
4. How does international competition affect you? And falling tariffs? 
5. Why do you choose a certain clothing manufacturer and textile 
manufacturer? 
6. How do you see your company's position in South Africa? 
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7. Do you see amplification and volatility as problems? Do you think Quick 
Response will address these? 
8. Do you think that your company has a good relationship with its 
employees? Is it going to be influenced by the project? 
9. Do you think that your company is keeping up with competition? 
10. What are your views in general about the relationship between the textile 
and clothing and retail sectors? 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire 4 Shopstewards at the manufacturer 
1 . What is Quick Response? 
2. How will it benefit the company and workers? 
3. What does a normal day on the shopfloor consist of for you? 
4. Do you think that textile and clothing workers' jobs in South Africa are 
safe? What threats do you think there are? Why do other companies 
close? 
